Modern scholarship recognises two traditions of scepticism in the Graeco-Roman world. There is the Academic tradition, beginning with Arcesilaus, (316/5-241/0 BCE), the fifth head of the Academy after Plato himself, and extending to the early first century BCE; and there is the Pyrrhonist tradition, drawing inspiration from the obscure figure Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 BCE), but beginning as a continuous movement with Aenesidemus (1st century BCE), who was initially a member of the Academy in its latest phase, but then broke away to found a Pyrrhonist variety of scepticism in reaction to what he saw as the enfeeblment of Academic scepticism in his own day. The only sceptic of either tradition of whom complete works survive is Sextus Empiricus, who is generally thought to have been active in the second century CE, and who appears to belong near the end of the Pyrrhonist movement. It is clear from fragments and second-hand reports that ethical topics figured from the start among the concerns of both sceptical traditions. But the meagre evidence on the sceptics other than Sextus Empiricus does not allow us to reconstruct any

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1 Jouanna 2009 has argued for placing him in the early third century CE, on the basis that Galen, who lived into the third century, never mentions him. Like most arguments from silence, this is not conclusive. But the article does have the merit of highlighting in detail how unlikely it is that Galen would not have mentioned Sextus had they been contemporaries, given the amount of name-dropping about medical Empiricists (of whom Sextus was one) that occurs in his works. However, the issue is not important for our purposes.

2 For a brief account of this history, see Bett 2013: section 2.
positions on issues that we might identify as relating to a notion of evil. From now on, therefore, this chapter will confine itself entirely to the writings of Sextus.³

The centrepiece of Sextus’ scepticism (as for ancient scepticism generally) is suspension of judgement. The following sentence, from the opening chapters of his best-known work *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (hereafter referred to as *PH*, the transliterated initials of the title in Greek), offers a thumbnail sketch of his outlook: “The sceptical ability is one that produces oppositions among things that appear and things that are thought in any way whatsoever, one from which, because of the equal strength in the opposing objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement, and after that to tranquillity” (*PH* 1.8).⁴ We can distinguish three stages in the process described here. First, one assembles a set of conflicting arguments and impressions on some topic. The sceptic is one who has a particular expertise at designing this set of conflicting arguments and impressions in such a way that they exhibit the characteristic of “equal strength” (*isostheneia*); this is what Sextus refers to as the sceptic’s “ability” (*dunamis*). The notion of “equal strength” should be understood in psychological, rather than in evidential or logical terms; the point is that the person faced with the oppositions among these arguments and impressions will in fact find them all equally attractive or persuasive. This means that the particular mix of arguments and impressions juxtaposed with one another may need

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³ Virtually nothing is known about Sextus as a person, either from his own works or from other sources; on this see House 1980, which (except for the matter of his dates – see again n.1) has not been superseded. Certainly we know nothing about him that might be relevant to the topic of this essay aside from what can be gathered from his writings.

⁴ Translations of passages of Sextus are my own. In the case of *Against the Ethicists* they are taken from Bett 1997. The best complete English translation of *PH* is Annas and Barnes 1994/2000.
to be tailored to the propensities of the audience – who may, of course, include the sceptics themselves – so as to produce the desired psychological effect. In any case, Sextus now says, the result of being faced with this set of opposing ideas of “equal strength” is that one suspends judgement about the matter in question; if one finds all of them equally persuasive, one has no incentive to accept any one of them over the others, and so one will decline to accept any of them. Again, it is not that there is no rational basis for accepting one of them over the others, but simply that one finds oneself unable, in this situation, to opt for one of them in particular. And a further result of this suspension of judgement, according to Sextus, is ataraxia, tranquillity. I will return shortly to the question of why he thinks this.

What is the range of potential topics of such sets of opposing arguments and impressions? The sentence I have quoted from Sextus makes it sound as if their subject-matter is quite unrestricted, and there is a sense in which this is so. But elsewhere, in explaining how the sceptic can act, Sextus says that the sceptic follows the appearances, and that whether something appears to one a certain way is not itself open to question; the question is whether things actually are the way they appear (PH 1.22). There is a longstanding debate about whether Sextus means to restrict the sceptic’s focus to the theoretical accounts of the underlying natures of things offered by non-sceptical philosophers, or whether he is operating with a more everyday distinction between how things appear and how they are; it may be that the texts offer no single and consistent answer to this question. In any case, the sceptic devotes his attention to how things are, rather than how they appear –

5 On this topic, see the classic series of essays collected in Burnyeat and Frede 1997; also Brennan 1994, Perin 2010.
whatever exactly that amounts to.\footnote{It will turn out that an answer to this question that suits our present purposes is available, even if a general answer is elusive; I return to this point in the next paragraph.} But provided that is understood, there is in principle no restriction on the kinds of “things” that may be the subject of the procedure outlined in the previous paragraph.

In particular, it is clear that ethics is among the areas to which Sextus is interested in applying that procedure. The second half of the final book of \textit{PH} is devoted to this area (3.168-279); there is also a complete book, \textit{Against the Ethicists} (\textit{M} 11), belonging to another of his works,\footnote{This work also includes two books \textit{Against the Logicians} (\textit{M} 7-8), and two \textit{Against the Physicists} (\textit{M} 9-10); together with \textit{Against the Ethicists}, these cover roughly the same territory as the second and third books of \textit{PH}. These five books were almost certainly preceded by a general book or books, now lost, which would have paralleled the first book of \textit{PH}.} which covers similar material at considerably greater length. In addition, one of the sets of Modes, or standardised forms of sceptical argumentation, which Sextus discusses in the first book of \textit{PH} includes a Mode dealing with differences in human behaviour and differences in views about how humans \textit{should} behave (1.145-63). A central issue in all these places is the question of what things, if any, are really, or by nature, good or bad. There is some room for debate about exactly what is built into the terms “really, or by nature” in this context; but they seem at least to entail an objectivist picture of the nature of value, and this in fact seems to be enough to make sense of Sextus’ account. Now, any non-sceptical philosopher in antiquity would be committed to some position holding that certain things are, in this sense, really good and others really bad; and at one point (\textit{PH} 1.30) Sextus makes clear that he thinks ordinary
non-philosophical people also hold such views. In this case, then, the interpretive question mentioned in the previous paragraph, concerning whether Sextus’ focus is only on theoretical positions or also on everyday opinions, has a clear answer: he takes both non-sceptical philosophers and ordinary people to hold views to which his sceptical procedure is to be applied. And the effect of this procedure, as in any other case, is that the sceptic distances himself from both groups by refraining from any claims of the form “X really is good/bad”.

Sextus does not use any term that could fairly be translated “evil” as opposed to “bad”. But in so far as evil can be thought of as a particularly acute form of badness, and in so far as genuinely thinking that someone or something is evil presupposes that there are some true claims of the form “X really is bad”, Sextus’ stance regarding good and bad would seem to apply to evil as well. If one were to present him with the notion of evil, understood as badness magnified, he would say that, as a sceptic, he will avoid any assertions of the form “X is evil”; this is a simple consequence of his policy of suspension of judgement.

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8 See also M 11.159, where the belief that pain is really a bad thing is clearly not meant to be limited to philosophers.
9 This is perhaps an overstatement, in that, given the interpretation of “really” in the previous paragraph, it precludes someone who denies the objectivity of values from thinking that anything is evil. I do not wish to deny that an anti-objectivist about value might have a legitimate use for the term “evil”. However, my own observation, at least, is that the term is generally used precisely when the speaker does wish to convey the implication that some value claims have an objective status. “Hitler [or substitute any monster you choose] was an evil man” is regularly viewed as a refutation of any position that takes ethics to be at bottom a matter of individual or societal preferences, with no objective moral order underpinning them. In any case, given the ancient consensus that “good”, “bad” and other ethical terms do pick out real properties of things, it seems harmless in the present context to ignore this complication.
But there is more to be said about this, which involves us in the question why Sextus thinks that suspension of judgement produces ataraxia – a question that I earlier left unresolved. When he first introduces this point, Sextus makes it sound as if ataraxia were a result of suspension of judgement quite generally. The idea is that sceptics start out as normal philosophers, trying to discover the truth, and thinking that they will thereby achieve ataraxia. This original ambition is thwarted, because the search for the truth keeps on yielding a conflict between equally powerful opposing positions on the same subjects, which produces suspension of judgement rather than discovery. Yet this suspension of judgement itself leads to the ataraxia that had been sought all along (PH 1.12, 26). Sextus does not explain why this should be, but it sounds from these passages as if one is tranquil because one no longer has a stake in how things really are, which was the source of worry in the first place; in any case, there is no suggestion here that suspension of judgement about some subjects is more conducive to ataraxia than suspension of judgement about others.

However, both in PH (1.27-8, 30, 3.235-8) and, at much greater length, in Against the Ethicists (M 11.110-67) Sextus addresses directly the relation between suspension of judgement and ataraxia, and now a somewhat different picture emerges. It turns out that beliefs to the effect that certain things are really good or bad are the specific source of the non-sceptic’s turmoil, and therefore that freedom from these beliefs in particular is the source of the sceptic’s ataraxia. Here the idea is that if one thinks some things are really good and others really bad, one will be obsessed by the need to get or keep the good things and to ward off the bad things. The non-sceptic is therefore in a state of constant turmoil and anxiety, because of caring so much about
the things deemed good or bad. And the sceptic, who by definition has no beliefs of
the form “X is really good/bad”, is therefore free from an immense source of trouble
that afflicts others – who include, to recall, both non-sceptical philosophers and
ordinary people.

It is not obvious how we are supposed to reconcile these two pictures – the
one that restricts the beliefs freedom from which gives the sceptic ataraxia to those
concerning things considered really good or bad, and the one that treats suspension
of judgement quite generally as yielding this result. Sextus apparently sees no
difficulty in combining them; indeed, in one passage (PH 1.25-30) he alternates
freely between the two, as if there is no difference between them. One might of
course hold that beliefs about what things are good or bad are necessarily
connected with a wider range of beliefs about the nature of the world, in which case
the two pictures are not as distinct as I have suggested. But Sextus never makes any
explicit moves in that direction, and one might well wish that he had said more to
explain himself. Be that as it may, it is clear that he regards the topic of good and bad
as especially relevant to the issue of the sceptic’s tranquillity and the non-sceptic’s
distress. If, then, as suggested earlier, we think of evil as (real, objective) badness of
an especially intense kind, then it is not merely the case that Sextus’ sceptic lacks all
beliefs of the form “X is evil”; these are precisely among the kind of beliefs that he is
especially glad to be rid of.

Indeed, at times Sextus presents this point so graphically that one may
wonder whether he lapses into inconsistency. The various forms of anxiety allegedly
produced by beliefs that things are really good or bad are themselves sometimes
described as bad things; given the forcefulness of his language, one might even say that he considers them evils. This tendency is particularly marked in the longer account in *Against the Ethicists*; for example, we are told that the person who believes that certain things are really good or bad “is swept around accompanied by never-ending disturbances, avoiding some things and pursuing others, and drawing on himself, because of the good things, many bad things, but being pounded, because of his opinion about the bad things, by many more bad things” (*M* 11.145; cf. 119-24, 130). Now, one may say that the description of these effects as “bad things” is supposed to be understood as coming from the perspective of the troubled believer in real good and bad things. But, while this may well be how Sextus would respond if pressed on the matter, in this and other passages of *Against the Ethicists* he at least gives the impression of endorsing the judgement that these effects are bad. In addition, it is somewhat surprising to find Sextus declaring in such unequivocal terms that these are the results of believing that things are really good and bad. Normally he is keen to emphasize the differences of viewpoint or reaction between different people; that everyone is affected in these dreadful ways by holding such beliefs itself seems more of a doctrinaire claim than one would expect from a sceptic. In some respects, though not in this last one, *PH* is notably more careful. Not only is the exaggerated tone avoided, but the badness of the effects is never independently asserted, appearing only in the antecedent of a conditional (*PH* 3.238). This is one of a number of reasons for thinking that *PH*, although much more concise, is a later and more polished composition than *Against the Ethicists*.¹⁰ At any

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¹⁰ I have argued for this in detail in Bett 1997.
rate, it is clear what Sextus can and should say about this matter; and if his claims concerning the effects of believing in real good and bad seem unexpectedly one-sided, they may still be consistent with scepticism, so long as they are understood as reports of what he has observed rather than as immutable truths.

So the sceptic is not troubled by beliefs to the effect that someone or something is evil, and Sextus would regard this as one of the major advantages of the Pyrrhonist outlook – or, in other words, as a major component of the ataraxia the sceptic is said to enjoy. But what if a sceptic were faced with an actual example of what the rest of us would call evil? Some people clearly considered this the basis of a serious objection to the sceptical position, and at the end of the section of Against the Ethicists on why the sceptic is better off than the non-sceptic, Sextus takes the trouble to respond to it (M 11.162-6). The example given is, what if a tyrant had power over you and compelled you to do some unspeakable deed, on pain of torture and death? And, as Sextus presents the objection, the thought is that no matter what choice the sceptic made, it would involve some definite commitments concerning what things are good and bad. If the sceptic refused to do the unspeakable deed, it could only be because of a conviction that such things must never be done, no matter what the cost. But if he submitted to the tyrant’s demand, this too would betray another evaluative commitment – namely, that the fate the tyrant had in mind would be too terrible to endure. The thought, then, is that either way one would be unable to remain a consistent sceptic in the face of the appalling choice the tyrant presents.
Before seeing how Sextus responds to this objection, it would be as well to step back and consider more closely how he explains the sceptic’s choices and actions in general. As noted earlier, Sextus says that the sceptic acts by following the appearances. Elaborating on this theme in the first book of *PH*, he mentions four broad categories of appearances that together shape a great deal of how the sceptic behaves (*PH* 1.23-4). The first two may be thought of as natural: we are just born with certain perceptual and cognitive capacities, and, as bodily creatures, we are bound to experience hunger, pain and other feelings. In both cases, it is not hard to see how our responses can lead to action without the need for any belief about how things are. Given our perceptual capacities, things look or sound to us a certain way, and this can lead to our doing certain things; and the feeling of hunger, for example, can lead us to eat. The sceptic’s behaviour in these cases can be explained in the same kind of way as can the behaviour of non-human animals. The other two types of appearances, however, are distinctively human, and here the story is a little more complicated. One is the “teaching of skills” (*didaskalia technôn*); one learns and then practises certain kinds of expertise. It may seem that this must involve learning, and hence coming to believe, certain propositions about the world. But it is at least possible to understand some skills, such as riding a bicycle or carving a sculpture, as consisting in nothing more than knowing *how to do* certain things, with no additional doxastic component involved; and this seems the most plausible model for how Sextus is conceiving the skills that a sceptic can take on board.¹¹

¹¹ This may still strike us as a drastically impoverished conception of skills at the more technical end of the spectrum. But the ancient world, being largely innocent of anything that could be called technology, had far fewer of these than we do. And
The other kind of “cultural” appearance is especially relevant for our current purpose, and this Sextus calls “handing down of laws and customs” (*paradosis nomôn te kai ethôn*). In a nutshell, the sceptic is inclined towards some kinds of actions and against others because of having been trained to have these inclinations through living in a particular society that encourages the former kinds of actions and discourages the latter. Again one may wonder whether this could happen without any element of belief; and the example Sextus gives to illustrate this type of appearance may seem to reinforce this worry. He says that in virtue of the handing down of laws and customs “we accept piety as good and impiety as bad, in terms of ordinary life”. How is this different from believing that in fact piety is good and impiety bad? But the qualification “in terms of ordinary life” (*biôtikôs*) must be intended to mark a kind of observance of piety that is embedded in everyday practice, rather than captured in any kind of intellectual commitment. One observes (and feels favourably disposed towards observing) the religious rituals current in one’s society, and one feels repelled by violations of religious norms. More generally, one is disposed to do the kinds of things considered good, and to avoid the kinds of things considered bad. While other people may very well believe that the former kinds of things are indeed good and the latter kinds bad, the sceptic

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12 There is a real question whether Sextus has a consistent story when it comes to the sceptic’s attitude to religion; I have discussed this in Bett 2009. However, the issues involved are not particularly germane to his treatment of the tyrant case.
echoes their practice without involving himself in any beliefs; for him, these actions and avoidances of actions are simply a matter of ingrained habit and preference. It is also quite possible that, before becoming a sceptic, he himself believed that these things really were good and bad respectively. But now that he is a sceptic, the beliefs have been shed, and all that remains are the dispositions to act that originally accompanied them. He does not offer any justifications for what he does, or does not do; he will simply point to a causal explanation in the patterns of behaviour that society has inculcated in him. By the same token, he does not make any decisions, if by that term is understood a process of deliberating and settling on the best course of action in the circumstances. Rather, he runs on autopilot; he simply lets his ingrained dispositions incline him towards or against doing certain things, and follows these inclinations.

Let us return to the case of the tyrant who makes a horrific demand and threatens dreadful consequences if one does not obey. To recall, this is presented as an objection to scepticism; the idea is that, whichever way one acts, one could not act this way without having come to some kind of decision, in the robust sense just mentioned, thereby committing oneself to definite beliefs about value. Sextus’ response is precisely along the lines one would expect from his general account of how the sceptic acts by following appearances. The sceptic faced with the tyrant’s demand, he claims, will not be saddled with any definite beliefs; instead, “he will choose one thing, perhaps, and avoid the other by the preconception which accords with his ancestral laws and customs” (M 11.166). Sextus goes on to say that even in this situation the sceptic will be better off than the non-sceptic, because the latter,
unlike the former, in addition to consenting to do the repugnant act or facing the horrible consequences of refusing, will also be afflicted with beliefs. He does not say what these beliefs are, but we can well imagine that there will be the belief that what is happening (whatever the choice made) is abominable, as well as the belief that the tyrant’s demand was evil. And these are precisely the kinds of beliefs that, as we saw, Sextus thinks are responsible for huge amounts of distress. By not having any such beliefs, the sceptic escapes more easily even in this case, despite having to endure either doing something that disgusts him or suffering the penalty for not doing so.

We might well question whether holding beliefs that things are really good or bad is quite so burdensome as Sextus suggests. For one thing, as already suggested, one might expect this to vary considerably from person to person. In addition, it is likely to vary from case to case. One can certainly think of scenarios in which people care about some outcome – the result of a race, for example, or a political campaign – more than is good for them, and are devastated if things go against them, whereas others who, while paying attention to this outcome, have no great investment in it, retain their equanimity whichever way things go. But Sextus seems to over-generalise from this kind of case; there are surely also cases where having an attachment to some definite moral vision is itself a source of comfort or reassurance. Still, the central question about the tyrant example is whether Sextus is right that, contrary to the objection, the sceptic can stay free from definite beliefs in this extreme situation. His claim is that, in this case as in all others, the sceptic simply
acts as his societally-induced dispositions prompt him to act, with no commitment to anything being genuinely good or bad. Can we accept this?

One possible worry is that laws and customs are hardly likely to include any explicit prescription about how to respond to a tyrant’s demands, so that it is not clear how they could be thought to guide someone’s behaviour in this situation. I think the response to this would have to be that “laws and customs” should be understood in a rather broad sense, to include not just explicit rules, written or unwritten, about what to do, but also a range of behavioural tendencies, or tendencies to approve or disapprove of certain types of behaviour, which could affect what one did in a given situation. For example, in one society there might be strong pressure to show deference towards those in authority, while in another resistance to unchecked power, or to gratuitous bullying, might be highly prized. It is not unreasonable to think that a sceptic raised in the first kind of society would be more likely to submit to the tyrant’s demand than one raised in the second kind. It is possible that something like this is what Sextus has in mind when he speaks not just of laws and customs, but of “the preconception which accords with his ancestral laws and customs”. A “preconception” (prolépsis) in this case would be an attitude, or set of attitudes, concerning the character of the actions open to one in this case, including attitudes of approval or disapproval of those actions. The laws and customs of the sceptic’s society, in the broad sense just outlined, would combine to give the sceptic (and other conventional members of that society) a particular way of looking at those possible actions, which will make one of them look to him more
attractive than the other, and therefore cause him to pursue that one rather than the alternative.

However, it is doubtful whether this response is really adequate. For while we need not doubt that societies do differ in these sorts of ways, it is not clear that such societal tendencies or pressures will suffice to guide one automatically, and without deliberation, to a given action in every single case. Unreflective habits may indeed govern many aspects of our lives, whether we are sceptics or not; so the “autopilot” picture of the sceptic’s action is by no means wholly unrealistic. But exceptional cases, such as the case of the tyrant’s demand, would seem to be precisely the kinds of cases where unreflective habits will not point clearly in any direction. Both because this case is so far outside the quotidian routine of life, and because so much is at stake in how one responds, there is at least a serious question whether the tyrant will not force the sceptic to make a conscious choice about what to do, and thereby to become invested in certain values as against others. The idea that even here the sceptic could simply consult his ingrained dispositions and find himself pushed more towards one action than the other seems not to do justice to the extreme circumstances of the tyrant’s challenge.

Or at least, it seems not to do justice to these extreme circumstances if we take seriously what Sextus’ wording clearly intends to suggest: namely, that it is an open question which way the sceptic will act. The sceptic, according to Sextus, is someone with no moral convictions, but a number of behavioural tendencies, some societally-induced and some natural; his account of the sceptic’s response to the tyrant seems to underestimate the force of the natural ones. For among the natural
tendencies is the tendency to avoid pain, and presumably (though Sextus does not mention this) the instinct to fight for survival. Thus the tyrant’s credible threat of torture and death is likely to produce in the sceptic (as it would in anyone) one of the strongest possible negative reactions. Now, someone with a deep moral commitment, including a very strong conviction that an action of the kind the tyrant is demanding is absolutely off-limits, may be able to surmount this negative reaction and face up to the tyrant. But the sceptic is not like this; he may very well feel revulsion at the prospect of doing what the tyrant demands, but in the absence of any moral commitment to bolster that feeling, it is much less likely that it will outweigh the feelings engendered by the tyrant’s threat of the alternative. In other words, the sceptic seems much more likely to submit to the tyrant’s demand than to resist it, and much more likely to submit to it than would someone whose choices were informed by a strong moral vision.

But suppose I am wrong about all of this; suppose that the sceptic’s ingrained dispositions are indeed sufficient to guide action in all the circumstances of life, even this one, and that the norms of his society have produced in him a revulsion at what the tyrant has demanded that might actually be stronger than his natural tendency to avoid torture and death. In this case Sextus’ account would be consistent. But there is still the further question whether it paints scepticism in an attractive light. There is a peculiar passivity to the sceptic’s life, as so described. He acts as his ingrained dispositions prompt him to act, but he does not endorse any of the values that, in normal people, would go along with those dispositions. He does what his society has programmed him to do, and he does not have the resources to question
what that society prescribes. Even if his society’s norms are internally inconsistent, so that he may be pushed towards conflicting courses of action, he is not in a position to reflect on which of these courses of action is in fact the best; all he can do is observe the relative strength of the forces within him that prompt the different actions. It is not just that he is not going to be one of society’s reformers, although this is surely true. In not identifying with any set of values, and in not making full-fledged choices or decisions (as we noted earlier), he is in a real sense abandoning some central characteristics of normal human agency; or, to put it another way, he is not a fully human self.¹³ So much the worse for normal human agency or selfhood, Sextus might reply; that is precisely where all the trouble comes from. If all one cares about is ataraxia, one may be satisfied with this reply.¹⁴ But most of us think that there is more to life than avoiding mental distress, and if so, the sceptic’s life — supposing, contrary to the objection, that it can be consistently maintained even in the tyrant case — is likely to strike us as a very stunted one. And so although Sextus would not recognise the category of evil, it looks as if his account of how the sceptic

¹³ I have discussed the sceptic’s pared-down self in Bett 2008.
¹⁴ Against this, it might be observed that there are other sources of anxiety and distress than those stemming from an attachment to values and other beliefs. (Dogs can have anxieties, too.) But I think Sextus would agree. He does not claim that scepticism releases us from all distress whatever — only from those forms of distress that have their source in our opinions. As we have seen, Sextus conceives these (especially opinions about what is good and bad) as extremely troublesome, and a conversion to scepticism, therefore, as an immense improvement to one’s life. But he does not deny that, whether we are sceptics or not, we are subject to a variety of unpleasant feelings over which we have no control. See PH 1.25, 29–30; the emphasis here seems to be primarily on physical feelings (thirst and cold are the examples given), but I see no reason why fears, anxieties and other (as we might generally consider them) mental feelings that arise independently of any beliefs should not belong in the same category.
would respond to (what the rest of us would call) evil exposes some significant
limitations in his Pyrrhonist outlook.\textsuperscript{15}

**Further Reading**

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\textsuperscript{15} Thanks to Tom Angier for some helpful comments, in response to which this essay
is, I hope, improved.
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