Abstract and Keywords

This chapter argues in favor of returning both capitalism and labor/class-based movements to a prominent position in the social movement literature. We outline seven elements for constructing such a theory including: (1) the fictitious nature of labor as a commodity and the endemic nature of labor unrest in capitalism; (2) the recurrent transformations in the organization of production and consumption and the recurrent making, unmaking, and remaking of working classes on a world scale; (3) the link between these transformations and the changing forms of workers’ struggles; (4) the growing weight of the unemployed and underemployed in the global labor force and labor unrest; (5) the uneven geographical development of capitalism and the tension between profitability and legitimacy; (6) the related intertwining of class-based and status-based movements; and (7) the ways in which profit-making, war-making and labor unrest have been intimately intertwined throughout the history of capitalism.

Keywords: Labor movements, class-based movements, social movements literature, capitalism, historical capitalism, capitalist world system

Labor, Capitalism, and the Social Movement Literature

The mainstream of the social movement literature since the 1990s has in large measure dismissed the concept of "capitalism" from its toolkit for understanding social movements, while at the same time placing "labor movements" outside its field of inquiry. This state of affairs—particularly the "disappearance" of capitalism—has been the object of lamentations by a subset of social movement scholars who have grown in size and insistence since the 2008 financial crisis (see, e.g., Hetland and Goodwin 2013; Tejerina et al. 2013; Rosenhek and Shalev 2013; Della Porta 2015). Moreover, the recent worldwide upsurge in protest movements from the Arab Spring to the Occupy movements stimulated a significant resurgence of interest among social movement scholars in the dormant subfield of rebellions and revolutions. Yet, while some noted the significant class-based component of these struggles (e.g., Rosenhek and Shalev 2013; Karataşş et al. 2015), overall, the role of workers and workers' movements in these struggles has been underestimated or ignored.

This chapter will argue in favor of returning both capitalism and labor/class-based movements to a prominent position in the social movement literature. The virtual disappearance of "capitalism" from the social movement literature since the 1990s is, as Gabriel Hetland and Jeff Goodwin (2013: 83, 90) write, “a perplexing development... During an era in which global capitalism became ever more powerful... it also became increasingly invisible to scholars of popular movements.” This perplexing disappearance (and recent partial resurgence) of capitalism is not unique to the social movement literature, but is rather a more general phenomenon across the social sciences. Giovanni Arrighi, for one, pointed to (and lamented) a parallel (and perhaps even more perplexing) disappearance of capitalism from the “new economic sociology” literature in the 1990s (Arrighi 2001; see also Arrighi 2010). Meanwhile, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, we can observe a resurgence of interest in “bringing capitalism back in” to economic sociology (see, e.g., Krippner 2011). Indeed, the “disappearance” and
recent “resurgence” of interest in capitalism can be seen across the social sciences and humanities.

The virtual disappearance of labor movements from the purview of the social movement literature has multiple roots dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. The “new left” movements that arose in the 1960s were harsh critics of the organizations that had emerged out of the wave of struggles by the “old left” in the first half of the twentieth century, especially trade unions and labor/socialist parties. These organizations were viewed as having “sold out” (as being corrupt, weak, economistic and/or in collusion with dominant forces at the domestic and international level), as “neglecting the truly dispossessed,” or worse still, as actively excluding women, racial/ethnic minorities, and immigrants in order to protect the interests of a privileged labor aristocracy (for the critiques see Clawson 2003: 51, 59; also Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein 1989: 221–222).

By the 1980s and 1990s, the dismissal of labor movements from the social movement and broader social science literature came not so much from a critique of their political stance as from an assessment of their diminishing structural power. As Aristide Zolberg (1995: 28) put it, the late twentieth-century transformations that have gone under the rubric of globalization have brought about the virtual disappearance of “the distinctive social formation we term ‘working class’” (1995: 28). In a similar vein, Manuel Castells (1997: 354, 360) argued that the dawn of the “Information Age” had transformed the experience of work in ways that not only undermine the labor movement’s ability to act as “a major source of social cohesion and workers’ representation,” but also in ways that undermine any possibility of workers becoming emancipatory “subjects” in the future—the source of a new “project identity” aimed at rebuilding the social institutions of civil society. Looking out from the 1990s, Castells argued that non-class-based identity movements were the only “potential subjects of the Information Age.”

The Persistence and Resurgence of Labor at the Margins

Outside the geographical and thematic mainstream of the (US and western European) social movement literature, there were some important exceptions to this tendency to dismiss workers and workers’ movements as irrelevant. The first was in so-called newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as Brazil (e.g., Keck 1989), South Africa (e.g., Seidman 1994), and South Korea (Koo 2001). For while the decline of Fordist mass production industries in wealthy core countries was leading to a disempowerment of established working classes and their trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid economic expansion of the NICs in the same years was leading to the creation of large industrial working classes and the emergence of powerful independent labor movements (Silver 2003).

These labor movements were not only successful in improving wages and working conditions, they were also key subjects behind the success of the broader struggles for democracy and social and economic justice. But as Ruth Collier (1999: 110) noted, “the comparative and theoretical literature [on democratization] largely missed the importance of the working class and the labor movement in the democratization process of the 1970s and 1980s... In the overwhelming majority of cases, the roles of unions and labor-affiliated parties were important to a degree that is at most hinted at in the literature.” In country after country labor movements were intertwined with struggles of working and poor people more broadly and with cross-class struggles for democracy and national liberation (Chun and Williams 2013).

For example, in South Africa, the independent black trade unions that emerged in the late 1970s in mining and manufacturing were, by the mid-1980s, playing the leading role in the anti-apartheid movement, bringing “a distinctively working class perspective” to the question of national liberation (Obery 1989: 34–35). The movement came to be dubbed “social movement unionism” as it was characterized by a “combination of productive and reproductive struggles” as well as a combination of resistance on the factory floor and resistance in the communities where workers lived (Webster 1988; von Holdt 2002; Seidman 1994; Chun and Williams 2013; Ashman and Pon-Vignon 2014).

Manufacturing capital had been attracted to the NICs in the 1960s and 1970s, partly for their relatively cheap labor and docile, but within less than a generation, this large inflow of capital created new working classes and new militant labor movements. In the late 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century, manufacturing capital was attracted to China, partly in a further search for cheap and docile labor. At the turn of the century, most observers thought that the incorporation of China’s vast labor supplies into global manufacturing production was destined to lead to a “race to the bottom” in global wages and working conditions. But as in the case of the NICs, within less than a generation, an industrial working class emerged in China that became the protagonists of a large and
growing wave of strikes and labor unrest. It could easily be argued that by the second decade of the twenty-first century, China had become the new “epicenter of world labor unrest” (Silver and Zhang 2009). At the same time, China has become an epicenter of social scientific interest in labor and labor movements (see, e.g., Pun 2005; Lee 2007; Friedman 2014; Zhang 2015).

Another exception outside the mainstream of the social movement literature emerged in the late 1990s, and was inspired by the sudden upsurge of militancy among low-wage (often undocumented) immigrant workers in the United States, and in particular the impressive 1990 success of the Justice for Janitors campaign in gaining union recognition for workers cleaning the skyscrapers in the downtown commercial district in Los Angeles—a victory that sparked a wave of union organizing among immigrant workers (many undocumented) across the United States (Waldinger et al. 1998; Milkman 2006). The upsurge in labor militancy led to a wave of scholarly interest in labor movements beginning in the late 1990s and 2000s among social scientists in the United States—the site where the obituary of workers’ movements had been written most insistently in the prior decades. This wave of labor militancy shattered many of the assumptions on which the “irrelevance of workers as social actors” thesis had been based—that is, that labor had been fragmented and fatally weakened by the structural transformations associated with “globalization” and “post-Fordism” such that class-based mobilizations were a thing of the past. This new wave of organizing combined workplace and community struggles, thereby challenging the tendency to see workers’ movements as particularistic, and outside the purview of the social movement field (Fine 2006; Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Chun 2011). The term “social movement unionism” was borrowed from the South African and Brazilian literature as a way of capturing this phenomenon (Clawson 2003).

Methodological Implications

The above examples point us toward some methodological insights for how to think about labor and social movements. First, they point to the importance of moving beyond a common approach in the social science literature (including the social movement literature) of generalizing from the experience of one or a handful of core countries to the world. What looks like a general crisis of labor movements in the 1980s when viewed from the core, looks very different when the geographical frame of our analysis is widened.

Second, they point to the importance of moving beyond the common approach in the social science literature (including the social movement literature) of taking a relatively short (and undynamic) time horizon as the framework for analysis. Based in part on extrapolations from short-term trends, the thesis that class-based movements had become irrelevant as social actors flourished in the United States, just as a new and proactive (largely immigrant) working class had begun to emerge.

A similar misapprehension of the longer-run dynamics for labor movements occurred almost 100 years ago as most early twentieth-century observers were convinced that the transformations associated with the rise of mass production spelled the death of labor movements—making the skills of most unionized (craft) workers obsolete and allowing employers to tap vast new sources of migrant labor. It was only post facto—with the successful wave of sitdown strikes beginning in 1936–37 by mass production workers in the United States—that Fordism came to be seen as inherently labor strengthening rather than inherently labor weakening. Thus, once we lengthen the time horizon of our analysis what looks like a terminal crisis of labor movements—the end of history—may turn out to be another full between recurrent major labor movement upsurges (Silver 2003; Clawson 2003; cf. Riven and Cloward 1977).

To be sure, the protagonists of these recurrent major upsurges of labor unrest are fundamentally different working classes. As Clawson (2003: 13) notes “each period of labor upsurge redefines what we mean by ‘the labor movement,’ changing cultural expectations, the form that unions take, laws, structures, and accepted forms of behavior.”

Labor Movements and Historical Capitalism

In order to understand the timing, location, and changing character of these labor movement upsurges, it is important not only to lengthen and widen the temporal–geographical framework for analysis; it is also important to embed the analysis of labor movements in elements of a theory of “historical capitalism”—this is, an understanding
of the long-run dynamics of global capitalist development. In this section, we will sketch seven elements toward building such a theory. These seven elements are not meant to be comprehensive but rather to provide a set of initial building blocks toward a full theorization.5

The first is the notion that labor unrest is endemic to capitalism. Both Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi contended that one of the historical specificities of capitalism as a social system is the commodification of labor. Moreover, both Marx and Polanyi argued that labor is a “fictitious commodity” and that treating human beings as commodities like any other would necessarily lead to deeply felt grievances and resistance. For Marx (1959 [1867]) “labor power”—unlike other commodities purchased and deployed in the “hidden abode of production”—is embodied in human beings who complain and resist if they are made to work too long, too hard or too fast. Likewise, for Polanyi (1957 [1944]: 71, 130, 176–177), the commodity labor is “no other than the human beings themselves of which every society exists” and moves to incorporate labor as commodities in “free markets” necessarily calls forth a movement toward “the self protection of society,” which takes a variety of forms such as agitation for state welfare provisions and trade union mobilization. Thus, from both Marxian and Polanyian perspectives, labor unrest should be expected anytime and anywhere we find the commodification of labor: sometimes at the point of production, sometimes in political struggles over regulation of the labor market, sometimes in the form of open resistance, but at other times taking “hidden forms” with deployment of the “weapons of the weak” (cf. Scott 1985).

The second theoretical element is the notion that capitalism is characterized by a tendency toward recurrent major transformations in the organization of production and consumption, which in turn, leads to the recurrent making, unmaking, and remaking of working classes on a world scale (Silver 2003). The idea that capitalism is characterized by bouts of massive change is captured by Joseph Schumpeter’s (1954) concept of “creative-destruction” and by Marx’s and Engel’s famous phrase in The Manifesto: “all that is solid melts into air.” Those who in recent decades have insisted on the death of the working class have tended to focus solely on the unmaking side of this process—most notably the unmaking of the industrial mass production working classes in much of the global North. However, the same mechanisms that bring about the “unmaking” of established working classes (e.g., capital mobility, labor migration, the rise/decline of industries), also lead to new working class formation. If we work from the premise that the world’s working classes and workers’ movements are recurrently made, unmade, and remade, then we are primed to be on the lookout for the outbreak of fresh struggles—both by new working classes in formation and by old working classes being unmade; that is, struggles by those experiencing the “creative” and “destructive” sides of the process of capital accumulation, respectively.

Beverly Silver (2003) labeled these two types of workers’ struggles (1) Marx-type labor unrest—that is, struggles by newly emerging working classes; and (2) Polanyi-type labor unrest—that is, struggles by established working classes defending ways of life and livelihood that are in the process of being “unmade.” In a similar vein, Ching Kwan Lee (2007) has labeled these two types “sunbelt” and “rustbelt” struggles with reference to the unmaking of the Chinese working-class that had formed in the Mao era (and were by the mid- and late 1990s being systematically laid-off from state-owned enterprises as part of the dismantling of the “iron rice bowl” social compact), on the one hand, and the simultaneous making of a new migrant working class in the coastal export manufacturing centers in China, on the other hand. Finally, David Harvey (2003) has proposed a conceptual distinction between “struggles against accumulation in production” and “struggles against accumulation by dispossession”—the latter concept having some parallels with the concept of Polanyi-type labor unrest since Harvey understands struggles by established working classes defending their existing ways of life and livelihood as a form of “struggles against accumulation by dispossession.”

Third (and following from the first two theoretical elements), labor unrest takes a broad range of forms as the terrain on which workers struggle—including the sources of their bargaining power, the intensity and nature of their grievances, and the “face” of the working class—is recurrently transformed. Moreover, labor unrest unfolds at a variety of levels—in the workplace, on the labor market, in the community and in national and international politics. The twentieth-century social science literature tended to privilege struggles at the workplace. And while the “hidden abode of [factory] production” was indeed Marx’s focus in the middle section of volume 1 of Capital [Parts 3–5]—where he catalogues an endemic labor–capital conflict over the duration, intensity, and pace of work—it is clear by the end of volume 1 of Capital that the logic of capitalist development, as Marx envisions it, not only leads to endemic struggles in the workplace but also to broader societal-level conflict as the accumulation of capital goes hand-in-hand with the “accumulation of misery,” most notably in the form of an expanding reserve army of unemployed, underemployed and precariously employed workers.6 This in turn brings to the fore
questions of struggles over the conditions for the reproduction of labor power on which there is an important relevant feminist literature (see, e.g., Federici 2006) as well as what Nancy Fraser (2014) has recently called struggles over the wide range of “background conditions” that capitalist production presupposes.

A fourth theoretical consideration follows from the postulate that capitalist development is producing an enlarged reserve army of labor on a world scale. Earlier, we emphasized two divergent types of working-class protest: that is, protest by new working classes being “made” in areas where capital is expanding (the post-2010 wave of factory worker strikes and protests in China is a paradigmatic example) and protest by established working classes being “unmade” in areas where capital is disinvesting (the post-2009 wave of anti-austerity protests in Europe is a paradigmatic example). But, if historical capitalism is characterized, not only by a cyclical process of “creative-destruction,” but also by a long-term tendency for the “destruction” of established livelihoods to proceed more quickly than the establishment of new livelihoods—and hence, an enlarging mass of unemployed, underemployed, and precariously employed workers—then we would expect a third type of working-class protest to grow in importance over time; that is, protest neither by working classes who are being “made” or “unmade” but those segments of the working class who are deprived of the means of livelihood but who have not been absorbed into stable wage employment—those whom capital has essentially “bypassed” (Karataşlı et al. 2015).

All three of these types of labor unrest are playing a key role in the post-2008 upsurge of global social protest, with protests by the vast numbers of unemployed youth around the world as a prominent paradigmatic example of our “third type” (Karataşlı et al. 2015). Yet while instances of this “third-type” of labor unrest are often described in the recent social movement literature—for example, the 2005 riots that erupted in French banlieues; the 2011 London riots; the role of the unemployed in the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions—they are rarely categorized as labor unrest by the authors. The same is the case for much of what could be categorized as “Polanyi-type labor unrest.” The failure to think of these protests as labor unrest is in part due to a tendency to deploy an excessively narrow and rigid definition of “the working class.” For example, Guy Standing (2011: 6) sees what he calls the precariat as a key force behind the recent upsurge of social protest, but he distinguishes the precariat from the proletariat, and restricts the use of the latter term to “workers in long-term, stable fixed-hour jobs with established routes of advancement, subject to unionization and collective agreements, with job titles their fathers and mothers would have understood, facing local employers whose names and features they were familiar with.” Not only is the “reserve army of labor” excluded from this definition but also the vast majority of the world’s wage workers throughout the history of capitalism are excluded by definition from the working class and/or the proletariat.

On the flip side, Slov Žižek (2012: 11) sees the mid-twentieth century unionized wage worker in factories, shops, and offices (that is, Standing’s proletariat), as a major force behind the recent wave of global social unrest; however, Žižek does not classify them as workers, but rather as a “salaried bourgeoisie” who are “resisting being reduced to proletarians.” As we have implicitly argued above, a more useful and theoretically coherent definition of the working class (or proletariat) would include both Standing’s precariat and the lower ranks of Žižek’s salaried bourgeoisie. They represent two moments in the making and unmaking of working classes on a global scale. More specifically, a significant chunk of Žižek’s salaried bourgeoisie are the working classes who made major advances as a result of the mid-twentieth century labor movement upsurges, and are now feeling the brunt of the “destructive” side of the process of creative destruction as their previous gains (and middle-class pretensions) come under attack. Meanwhile, a significant chunk of Standing’s precariat are “new working classes in formation,” the outcome of the “creative” side of capitalist development, some of whom may be on the route to (at least temporarily) making significant gains in wages and working conditions; that is, becoming a “stable working class” if not a “salaried bourgeoisie.” At the same time, another chunk of Standing’s precariat belong to our “third type”—members of a mushrooming global reserve army of labor, they are proletarianized but with little chance of ever finding stable employment as wage workers. All three of these “strata” of the working class are the outcome of different sides of the same processes of capitalist development; moreover, the fate of their struggles is deeply intertwined with one another.

This brings us to our fifth element for a theorization of the relationship between historical capitalism and labor movements. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1995: 25) has pointed out, historical capitalism is characterized by a “system-level problem”: that is, profits can be made—even with the partial decommodification of labor and the establishment of expensive social contracts—as long as those concessions are made to only a small percentage of the world’s workers (as was the case with the mass production social compacts that emerged after the Second World War in the core). Put differently, there is a fundamental tension in capitalism between profitability and
legitimacy. Efforts to overcome the tendency toward a crisis of legitimacy through improving the condition of the working class as a whole (rising wages, improved working conditions, social welfare provisions) can only work for short amounts of time or small segments of the working class without provoking a crisis of profitability. It if crisis of global capitalism of the 1970s was largely precipitated by a squeeze on profitability, the current global crisis of capitalism is increasingly characterized by a deep crisis of legitimacy as inequality mushrooms and growing numbers have lost access to the means to produce their own livelihood without being provided with any opportunity to make a living within the circuits of capital (Silver 2003; Silver 2014; Karatapılı et al. 2015). Moreover, in addition to the limits imposed by the requirements of profitability on the generalization of mass consumption, the ecological and resource constraints on the extension of US-style consumption standards will be critical in determining what kind of social contracts are both generalizable and sustainable in the twenty-first century (cf. Arrighi 2007).

The sixth element for constructing a theory of the dynamics of historical capitalism and labor movements is the intimate relationship between labor movements and status-based movements, which, in turn, is rooted in the above-mentioned “system-level problem.” Fundamental to historical capitalism has been the ways in which status-based distinctions are recurrently mobilized (by capitalists, by states, and/or by workers themselves) to carve out special protections from the worst ravages of an unregulated labor market for a segment of the world’s working class marked for special treatment along lines of gender, race, ethnicity, and/or citizenship. Special protections seek to mitigate the deep tension between profitability and legitimacy—to square the circle, so to speak—by creating legitimating social compacts for some segments of the world working class while maintaining profitability by excluding the majority from those social compacts. However, the successful extension of benefits such as higher wages, job security, and welfare provisions to a privileged group becomes an important incentive for working-class mobilizations along status lines by both privileged and by excluded workers—mobilizations aimed, respectively, at defending or overturning racial, ethnic, national, and gender hierarchies. As a result, the history of workers’ mobilizations has been deeply interconnected with mobilizations along racial, gender, ethnic, and citizenship lines. In a nutshell, mobilization based on class and mobilization based on status have been and will continue to be deeply intertwined.8

Throughout the twentieth century, the results of such mobilizations have sometimes been to draw status-based distinctions among workers within a country; but at other times these mobilizations have taken the form of worker-citizens demanding protection from their own states vis-à-vis workers of other states, contributing to the growing salience of status-based distinctions among workers across countries.

Social scientists witnessing the escalation of imperialist rivalries and war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pointed to multiple links between mounting interstate and domestic conflict, including mass labor unrest. On the one hand, rulers facing intense social conflict at home were tempted into what they hoped would be short, popular wars—for example, the Spanish-American War for the US and the South African War for the UK—that would create a diversionary “rally-around-the-flag” effect as well as have a more direct material effect on boosting employment by opening up protected markets, cheap sources of raw materials and/or new colonial areas to which surplus labor at home could be exported.9 According to E.H. Carr (1945: 204) the collapse of labor internationalism on the eve of the First World War was at least in part due to the success of states in convincing the mass of workers that “their bread was buttered” on the side of their own state’s power. Yet observers from Lenin (1916) to Skocpol (1979) noted another empirical regularity—that is, that lost or otherwise unpopular wars opened up the space for major rebellions and revolutions. The result was a “vicious circle” of war, mass labor unrest, and revolution in the first half of the twentieth century—that is, during the crisis of British world hegemony and transition to US world hegemony (Arrighi and Silver 1999: ch. 3; Silver 2003: ch. 4).10

This brings us to our seventh and final theoretical element: workers and workers’ movements have been and will continue to be shaped by (and shape) the dynamics of geopolitics and interstate war. To be sure, in order to understand the nature of this linkage today we have to take into account the major changes over the past half-century in the nature of warfare and the incorporation of the mass of workers and citizens into the war-making strategies of states—in the “global North” most notably the increasing automation of war (e.g., pilotless drones and cruise missiles), the elimination of mass compulsory conscription, the expanding reliance on private military contractors and mercenaries rather than citizen-soldiers (Silver 2015). But particularly as we move into a period of deepening crisis of US world hegemony (Silver and Arrighi 2011), the salience of the links between labor, war, and world politics will become increasingly apparent.
In this chapter we have argued for the importance of returning both capitalism and labor movements to a prominent position in the social movement literature. Moreover, since profit-making and warmaking have been intimately intertwined in the history of capitalism—a point emphasized in key works on the historical sociology of capitalism including Charles Tilly’s (1990) Coercion, Capital and European States and Giovanni Arrighi’s (2010) The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (see also Wallerstein 1983)—in advocating bringing labor and capitalism back into the social movement literature we are also advocating making geopolitical dynamics—including interstate conflict, war, and the rise/decline of world hegemonies—a central concern of the social movement literature.

References


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**Notes:**

(1) On the alliance between the main trade union federation in the United States and the US government in the sphere of foreign policy, see Kim Scipes (2011); on the link between labor rights, welfare states, war, and geopolitics more broadly, see Silver (2015).

(2) The focus of this chapter is on labor/class-based movements; however, it is important to point out that the call for bringing capitalism back in to the social movement literature has broader relevance. Transformations over time in the structure, institutions and ideologies of capitalism have been crucial in shaping the trajectories of non-class-based social movements. Indeed, as Hetland and Goodwin (2013: 91) point out, if we look to the enduring classics of the social movement literature from the 1970s and early 1980s, the dynamics of capitalism formed a central (and highly productive) part of their theoretical frameworks, including for those studies focused on understanding what were largely non-class-based movements such as the US civil rights movement (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982); second wave feminism (Klein 1984; see also Fraser 2013), and the LGBT movement (D’Emilio 1983; see also Valocchi 1999).

(3) In many ways, the strong labor movements in the 1970s and 1980s in Poland (Singer 1982) and Iran (Abrahamian 1982) also fall in this category (see Silver 2003: ch. 4).

(4) An indication of the strength of this resurgent scholarly interest—as well as the fact that it was largely taking place outside the existing centers of social movement research—was the formation in 2000 of a new section on Labor and Labor Movements of the American Sociological Association (ASA)—distinct from the already existing ASA section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements.

(5) Among the useful resources for constructing a relevant theory of world capitalist development see: Arrighi 2010; Arrighi and Silver 1999; Fraser 2014; Harvey 2011; Silver and Arrighi 2011, Wallerstein 1983.

(6) See, e.g., chapter 25 of volume 1 on the “general law of capital accumulation” and the reserve army of labor.

(7) See Marcel Van der Linden (2014) for a particularly broad definition of the working class; see also Silver (2003: Appendix A) for an expanded definition of both the “labor” and “unrest” components of the concept of “labor unrest.”

(8) For theoretical elaborations along these lines see Bonacich 1972; Saxton 1971; Arrighi 1990; Silver 2003.

(9) In the words of Cecil Rhodes (quoted in Lenin 1916: ch. 6): “... in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.”

(10) See Stohl (1980) for a review of the literature on the international–domestic conflict link.

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