SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY UNDER CONDITIONS OF
APPARENT SOCIAL STABILITY AND RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE

Melvin L. Kohn
The Johns Hopkins University

In this essay, I examine the effects of radical social change on the relationships between social structure and personality, using as the evidentiary basis for my analysis studies that my collaborators and I have conducted in the United States, Japan, Poland, and Ukraine.

I shall present this essay in three parts. In the first part, I discuss the relationships of social class and social stratification with some fundamental dimensions of personality under apparently stable social conditions--a comparative analysis of Poland when it was socialist to the capitalist societies of the United States and Japan. Then, still focusing on the psychological concomitants of social class and social stratification, I compare Poland and Ukraine under the conditions of radical social change experienced during the early stages of the social and economic transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to the apparently stable socialist society of Poland of yesteryear. All these analyses are based on the employed portions of the population. But, since the conditions of radical social change that the people of Poland and Ukraine have been experiencing during the transitions might well have affected the non-employed even more than the employed, in the last part of my essay, I discuss our analyses of the psychological effects of radical social change on non-employed people.

In a brief presentation that attempts to provide an overview of so large a body of research, it is impossible to provide much detail, either about methods of inquiry or about the findings of the research. My collaborators and I take great pride, for example, in our strenuous efforts, at all stages of research, to assure cross-national and cross-linguistic comparability of meaning and measurement (see in particular Kohn 1987; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990, chap. 2;
Kohn et al. 1997). As part of this effort, we employed confirmatory factor analysis to index all the principal concepts that we thought of as continua—in particular, social stratification, all of our measures of the complexity of people's activities, and all the dimensions of personality that we dealt with in these analyses. To describe these efforts, though, would take more space than this entire essay affords. I urge you to consult the primary publications, cited in the footnotes below, for this information.

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CLASS AND STRATIFICATION IN CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST SOCIETY

All of our studies have been designed to refine and to test a general interpretation of the relationships between social structure and personality: that social-structural position affects individual psychological functioning principally through its profound effects on people's immediately impinging conditions of life. For the dimensions of social structure we consider here—social class and social stratification—the most pertinent conditions are occupational. Thus, a more advantageous class position, or a higher position in the social-stratification hierarchy, affords greater opportunity to be self-directed in one's work, that is, to work at jobs that are substantively complex, are not subject to close supervision, and are not routinized. The experience of occupational self-direction, in turn, leads to a higher valuation of self-direction for oneself and for one's children, to greater intellectual flexibility, and to a more self-directed orientation to self and society. Although initially developed and elaborated on the basis of research conducted in only one country, the United States, the interpretation was meant to be applicable to all industrialized societies.¹

¹ The original formulation of this interpretation was presented in Kohn 1963. That formulation was elaborated, with evidence from a 1964 survey conducted by Carmi Schooler and me of a representative sample of U.S. men employed in civilian occupations, in Kohn 1969 and in Kohn and Schooler 1969. Analyses of longitudinal data, provided by a follow-up survey of a representative subsample of the men in the baseline survey, and analyses of data provided by the wives and offspring of those men, are presented in Kohn and Schooler 1983 and in K. Miller, Kohn, and Schooler, 1985, 1986, as well as in the comparative analyses cited below.
The Polish comparative study, inspired and sponsored by Wodzimierz Wesołowski, was designed to see whether the interpretation applied to a socialist society, as Poland then was. The Japanese study, sponsored by Ken'ichi Tominaga and carried out by Atsushi Naoi and Carmi Schooler in 1979, was similarly designed to see whether the interpretation, based as it was on the study of a Western society, applied to a non-Western industrialized society. The recent surveys of Poland and Ukraine, conducted in 1992-1993, were designed to see whether findings and interpretation based on studies conducted under conditions of apparent social stability continue to obtain under conditions of radical social change.

Poland Under Socialism, in 1978.

The baseline against which to compare our findings for Poland and Ukraine during the early stages of the transformation is our study of Poland when it was socialist. The data come from a survey that Kazimierz Slomczynski, Krystyna Janicka, and Jadwiga Koralewicz-Zebik conducted with a representative sample of employed men living in the urban areas of Poland in 1978, supplemented in 1980 with a survey designed by Anna Zawadzka of the wives of a subsample of these men. The information obtained from the wives strongly suggests that the relationships

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2 The principal results of the Polish-U.S. comparisons were presented in several papers (Slomczynski, Miller, and Kohn 1981, and in an expanded version, 1987; Miller, Slomczynski and Kohn 1985; Kohn, Slomczynski, and Schoenbach 1986) and, most comprehensively, in two books, the earlier one in Polish (Slomczynski and Kohn 1988), the later, and conceptually more fully elaborated one, in English (Kohn and Slomczynski 1990).

3 The principal results of this study have been reported in two papers by Carmi Schooler and Atsushi Naoi (Naoi and Schooler 1985; Schooler and Naoi 1988), one by Michiko Naoi and Carmi Schooler (1990), and one that deals with the interrelationships of class, work, and personality for all three countries (Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, and Slomczynski 1990).

4 The formulation of the research problem and the research design is presented in two papers: Kohn et al. 1992a and 1992b. A description of the problems encountered in conducting research under conditions of radical social change, and what we learned from facing those problems, is presented in Kohn 1993. The findings with respect to the employed segments of the Polish and Ukrainian populations, and our interpretation of these findings, are presented in Kohn, Slomczynski, Janicka, Mach, Zaborowski, Gutierrez, and Heyman 1997. The findings and interpretation with respect to the non-employed segments of the Polish and Ukrainian populations are presented in Kohn, Zaborowski, Janicka, Khmelko, Mach, Paniotto, Heyman, and Podobnik 1998.
between social structure, job conditions, and personality were quite similar for employed women as for employed men.

The year 1978 was, fortuitously, a splendid time for what we now regard as a baseline study, for this was just before the advent of Solidarnosc, when Poland still seemed relatively stable, and when the socialist economy still seemed to be working reasonably effectively. At that time, even though Poland was not necessarily exemplary of some ideal type of socialist society (Wesolowski 1988), and certainly not of a democratic socialist society, it did serve as a good example of an apparently well-functioning "actually existing socialist society," in that its economy (at any rate, its urban economy) was centrally planned and administered. In this, it stood in contrast to the market economies of the United States and Japan that we treated as exemplary of "actually existing capitalist societies."

In our analyses, we focused on two primary dimensions of social structure--social stratification and social class.

We defined social stratification as the hierarchical ordering of society--a single dimension reflecting power, privilege, and prestige. We measured social-stratification position with second-order confirmatory factor-analytic models, the first-order dimensions being educational attainment, occupational status, and job income. We confirmed what many Polish sociologists had shown--that socialist Poland had a system of social stratification similar to, and no less steeply graduated than, those of capitalist societies.

By social classes, we meant groups defined in terms of their relationship to ownership and control over the means of production, and of their control over the labor power of others. Social classes are distinct groups ("nominal" categories), which cannot be ranked as higher or lower along some single underlying dimension. Following the work of Erik Olin Wright (1976, 1978), we distinguished between owners and employees. Among owners, we further distinguished between those who do and those who do not employ other people; among employees, we distinguished between managers, first-line supervisors, and non-supervisory personnel. Instead of using Wright's further distinction between those non-supervisory
employees who do and those who do not have any considerable degree of autonomy in pursuing their work (which we saw as a concomitant, rather than as a desideratum, of social class), we relied on the time-honored distinction between manual and nonmanual workers. In applying this conceptualization to then-socialist Poland, we did not distinguish between those owners who employ significant numbers of employees and those who do not, there being virtually no private employers who had any significant number of employees. Under socialism, though, another class distinction seemed warranted—that between manual workers employed in the large-scale manufacturing and extractive enterprises at the core of the centralized economy, such as steel mills, ship-building, auto manufacturing, and coal mining, and those who were employed in secondary and supportive industries, such as transportation, food-processing, and repair.

These differences notwithstanding, in the main the class structure of Poland could be meaningfully conceptualized in much the same terms as that of the United States and Japan. For socialist Poland, just as for the capitalist United States and Japan, it was altogether meaningful to think of owners, managers, first-line supervisors, nonmanual workers, and manual workers as distinct social classes.

Moreover, class and stratification had much the same impact on men's personalities—on their values, on pivotal dimensions of their orientations to self and others, even on their intellectual flexibility—in socialist Poland as in the United States and Japan. In all three countries, men of more privileged social position were more likely to hold self-directed orientations to self and society—that is, to believe that they have the personal capacity to take responsibility for their own actions and that society is so constituted as to make self-direction possible, the opposite pole of this concept being an orientation system marked by conformity to external authority. Men of more privileged social position were also more likely than were those of less privileged position to value self-direction for their children and to be intellectually flexible.

Our analyses showed that the explanation of these relationships of class and stratification with personality lay in the differential opportunities for occupational self-direction
enjoyed by people variously located in the social structures of their countries. This was as true for Poland as for the United States and Japan.

By occupational self-direction, we mean the use of initiative, thought, and independent judgment in work. We see three job conditions as crucial in facilitating or limiting the exercise of occupational self-direction: the substantive complexity of the work, closeness of supervision, and routinization. Doing substantively complex work (that is, work that requires thought and independent judgment) facilitates, even requires, the exercise of occupational self-direction; being closely supervised and doing routinized work limit opportunities for occupational self-direction. In socialist Poland, just as in the capitalist United States and Japan, we found that men who were more advantageously located in the class structure and the stratification hierarchy were much more likely than those less advantageously situated to work at substantively complex jobs, and were less likely to be closely supervised or to be subject to routinized conditions of work. And these job conditions, in turn, had just as powerful an effect on men's personalities in Poland as in the United States and Japan, with occupational self-direction being conducive to valuing self-direction, to holding a self-directed orientation to self and others, and to intellectual flexibility.

There was one striking exception to this otherwise consistent pattern of cross-national similarity, an exception that is at the heart of our ongoing research: In the United States, men of more privileged class position (managers in particular) had a strong sense of well-being, while men of less privileged class position (manual workers most of all) were distressed. In socialist Poland, nearly the opposite: the managers (particularly those managers who were not members of the Polish United Workers Party) were notably distressed, and manual workers, both those who worked in the core industries of the centralized economy and those who worked in auxiliary industries, were the least distressed of all social classes. In Japan, an intermediate pattern, with managers the least distressed social class, but manual workers at about the mean level of distress for employed men.
The explanation for Polish manual workers' sense of well-being is not to be found in Polish socialism's affording its manual workers any greater control over their conditions of work than did U.S. or Japanese capitalism. Our study clearly showed that Polish manual workers had the least opportunity for occupational self-direction of all social classes in that country—a situation exactly the same as that faced by U.S. and Japanese manual workers. Polish manual workers enjoyed a sense of well-being despite their lack of opportunity for being self-directed in their work. In the United States and Japan, workers' lack of occupational self-direction contributed to their sense of distress; not so in Poland.

Instead, other occupational conditions—notably job protections and a relative absence of job uncertainties and threats—enhanced Polish workers' sense of well-being. Such protections had similar psychological effects for those U.S. workers, particularly in unionized industries, who were fortunate enough to enjoy them; but in the United States of 1974—and even more, today—such workers were in the minority. In Poland in 1978, not only did all workers have these job protections, but manual workers had come to enjoy these protections only in the few years immediately prior to our survey. Polish manual workers could with good reason consider themselves comparatively well off—better off than they had been, and in an improved situation as compared to members of other social classes. By contrast, Polish managers, particularly those who were not members of the Polish United Workers Party, experienced uncertainties, risks, and insecurities greater than those experienced by managers in the less centralized systems of capitalist societies. The Polish system in socialist times held these managers responsible for accomplishments they had neither the leeway nor the resources to achieve.

One central fact that emerges from these findings is that Polish manual workers were anything but psychologically oppressed. Although they had little actual or perceived control over the conditions of their occupational lives, they had other bases for a sense of well-being and for the hope that the future might yield better things to come. This was a working class that could respond to leaders who called for dramatic action to reform the system.
The pattern brings to mind a considerable body of sociological research, primarily dealing with race relations in the United States, which has repeatedly affirmed that it is not the truly downtrodden who challenge their oppression, but those who have some stake in the system, some fear of losing the stake that they do have, and some hope that improvement is possible. The classic statement, written half a century ago (Williams, 1947, p. 61), reads as if it had been written of the shipyard workers in Gdansk two years after our survey: "Militancy, except for sporadic and short-lived uprisings, is not characteristic of the most deprived and oppressed groups, but rather of those who have gained considerable rights so that they are able realistically to hope for more."

A NEW THEORETICAL CONTEXT: RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE

Our studies of the United States, Poland, and Japan, and the many replications that buttress their conclusions (see the review in Kohn and Slomczynski 1990, chap. 9) had all been done under conditions of apparent social stability. Even the Polish survey of 1978 had been conducted two years before the advent of Solidarnosc, before there were any decided signs of impending change. The massive changes that began in the late 1980's, first in Poland, later throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, inevitably raised the important theoretical question of whether our interpretation of the relationship between social structure and personality applies also during times of radical social change.

I follow Williams (1970) in conceiving social change as change in the structure of the society, not merely as an eventful or dramatic period in the life of that society: "Change occurs when there is a shift in pattern, when new relationships emerge..." (pp. 620-21). By radical social change, I refer not to the pace of change but to the nature of the change--the transformation of one political and economic system into a quite different system.

The idea of a relationship between social structure and personality implies a dynamic interchange. What we learn about this interchange during times of social stability offers a static slice of a dynamic process. Whether what we learn is typical of a more general process or is
specific to times of social stability is an open question. The null hypothesis, so to speak, is that our general interpretation of the relationships between social structure and personality will prove to be valid even during periods of radical social change. Contrary hypotheses would predict that radical social change might greatly modify the relationships between social structure and personality: either because the social structures of these countries were themselves in process of change; or because the relationship between social-structural position and occupational self-direction may weaken during periods of transition from one system to another, when the occupational structure itself may be in flux; or because the pivotal role of occupational self-direction as an explanatory link between social-structural position and personality may be challenged under conditions of change and uncertainty; or simply because the experience of radical social change--particularly the uncertainties and fears that it engenders--may itself have such wide-ranging psychological consequences as to overwhelm all else.

How does one test these hypotheses? Poland certainly has been experiencing radical social change, and for our purposes a restudy of Poland was strategically central. We studied Ukraine for much the same reason that my collaborators and I originally studied Poland and Japan--to differentiate social-structural universals from single-nation particularities (see the discussion of strategies of cross-national research in Kohn 1987). My collaborators therefore carried out surveys of representative samples of the urban adult populations of Poland and Ukraine--this time, samples fully representative both of men and of women. The Polish survey was conducted by Kazimierz Somczynski, Krystyna Janicka, Bogdan Mach, and Wojciech Zaborowski in the fall and early winter of 1992, the Ukrainian survey by Valeri Khmelko, Vladimir Paniotto, and their associates in the winter of 1992-1993.

At the time these surveys were conducted, Poland clearly was moving toward some form of market economy; the Parliament had long since passed the necessary enabling legislation and the populace was generally, albeit with growing reservations, in favor of such a transformation. A vibrant private sector had developed, mainly small enterprises, most of them devoted to import and distribution rather than to production and export--but nonetheless a vibrant private sector.
The high inflation rates that had been true of the earliest stages of the transition were coming under control. For the first time since World War II, though, there was true unemployment and the specter of much more to come. For Ukraine, there was considerably greater uncertainty about what form the economy would eventually take. The political situation at that time was still indecisive, with the Government not yet having made a fundamental decision about what type of economy it envisioned. The private sector was not nearly as developed, and unemployment was mainly a fear rather than a present reality. Inflation was astronomical. The Ukrainian economy might have been better characterized as chaotic than as transitional.

Clearly, the people of Poland and Ukraine were experiencing radical social change in very different ways. Poland had passed the most difficult period of transformation and could be relatively confident of the ultimate outcome. Ukraine may have embarked on the same process, but no one could be confident about the ultimate outcome. For the people of Ukraine, social change had to mean great uncertainty. The contrasting situations of the two countries give us two distinct opportunities to assess whether the conditions of radical social change brought about by the transformation of the social and economic systems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union alter the relationships between social structure and personality.

The Relationships of Class and Stratification with Personality

Because people’s class and stratification positions are based on their roles in paid employment, we limit these analyses to men and women who have paid employment of at least 15 hours per week. Later in this essay, I shall extend the analyses to the non-employed.

For Poland and Ukraine in transition, Somczynski’s and my conceptualization of social class for socialist Poland is no longer quite appropriate. Poland and Ukraine were no longer socialist but had not developed the class structures of fully capitalist societies. We therefore attempted to conceptualize and measure social class as we understand it for transitional Poland and Ukraine. We preserved all but one of the distinctions made for Poland under socialism, the exception being the distinction between manual workers in core and secondary sectors of the
economy, which had become less appropriate to the changing Polish and Ukrainian economies. We continued to distinguish employees from those who own their own enterprises, but now it is sometimes not entirely clear what constitutes ownership. In Ukraine, for example, members of "collectives" are nominally co-owners of the enterprises that employ them, but in most cases this is a formal rather than a real designation. In time, members of collectives may become true owners, perhaps even a distinguishable social class, but for Ukraine in late 1992 and early 1993 we consider it more appropriate to classify them as employees.

Two further distinctions highlight the transformation of the Polish and Ukrainian economies: With an emerging class of employers, it is now possible to differentiate employers from other owners who have few or no nonfamily employees, whom we term the self-employed. There are relatively few employers in our samples, particularly in Ukraine. It is nevertheless desirable to differentiate a social class that may play an important part in the transformation and that will undoubtedly grow in numbers and importance. We also differentiated "experts"--professionals whose work is based on control over knowledge--from other nonmanual, nonsupervisory employees. We had not treated professionals as a distinct social class in our earlier analysis of socialist Poland, considering the distinction between the "intelligentsia" and other nonmanual employees at that time to be more a difference in status than a true class distinction. In the transitional period, though, the experts have a distinctly different employment situation from that of other nonmanual workers, one with greater responsibility but also greater control over the conditions of their own occupational lives. Many experts have attained or retained crucial positions in major economic and social organizations where they are playing a pivotal role in the transformation of the economy (Weso owski 1995).

There being no reason to believe that the structure of the social stratification system has been greatly affected by radical social change, we relied on the conceptualization that we had employed for Poland under socialism.

The findings for Poland are unequivocal. Insofar as the earlier findings for Polish men under socialism were similar to those that my collaborators and I had found for U.S. and
Japanese men under capitalism--notably, the relationships of social structure to self-directedness of orientation and to intellectual flexibility--nothing has changed. As in all prior studies, including Poland under socialism, members of more advantaged social classes, and people of higher social-stratification position, have more self-directed orientations and are more intellectually flexible than are people of less advantaged position. Even the magnitudes of relationship are about as large for Polish men in 1992 as they were in 1978. Making some allowance for the small numbers of women managers and employers in Poland in 1992, the pattern is essentially the same for employed Polish women as for employed Polish men, and the magnitudes of relationship are even stronger for women than for men.

With the changing class structure, two new features have emerged: Employers outrank the self-employed in self-directedness of orientation and in intellectual flexibility, and experts outrank even the managers.

As we had earlier found for Poland under socialism, occupational self-direction largely explains the relationships of social class and of social stratification with self-directedness of orientation and with intellectual flexibility. People of more advantaged class position, or of higher stratification position, have much greater opportunity to be self-directed in their work, the correlations of class and stratification with the job conditions determinative of occupational self-direction being just as strong for Polish men and women in 1992 as they had been for Polish men in 1978 and for U.S. and Japanese men. Moreover, just as we had found in all prior studies, occupational self-direction is conducive to holding a self-directed orientation and to being intellectually flexible. In all these respects, nothing has changed.

But, insofar as the earlier findings for Polish men under socialism differed from those for U.S. and Japanese men--that is, in the relationships of class and stratification with a sense of well-being or distress--there has been very great change indeed.

What made these relationships so interesting in the original U.S.-Polish-Japanese comparisons was not the magnitudes of the relationships, which were modest, but that the patterns differed so dramatically. As we have seen, U.S. managers were likely to have a strong
sense of well-being and manual workers to be distressed. For Poland when it was socialist, nearly the opposite. For Polish men in 1992, the magnitude of relationship between social class and distress is still only modest, albeit somewhat stronger than in 1978. The pattern of relationship, though, is a nearly complete reversal from what it had been under socialism: Manual workers are now the most distressed social class and managers the least distressed. For the manual workers of a country to be transformed in just a few years from the least distressed to the most distressed social class, and for managers to move from being decidedly distressed to having a strong sense of well-being, means that the psychological effects of the transformation have been not only dramatic, but astonishingly rapid.

Another dramatic manifestation of radical social change is provided by a change in the sense of well-being or distress of the intelligentsia. The men we would now classify as experts were in socialist times even more distressed than were the managers. The situation of such people was akin to that of the non-Party managers in that they had considerable responsibility but their positions entailed great insecurity. Our now finding that the experts of current Poland are among the least distressed social classes accords nicely with the decided improvement in their circumstances.

The pattern for Polish women is similar to that for Polish men in the crucial respect that, for women, too, manual workers are the most distressed social class. We cannot say with any degree of assurance just how distressed female managers are, for our sample contains only seven female managers; but they do appear to be less distressed than are most employed Polish women. In any case, if we focus on the social classes for which there are an appreciable number of female respondents, the pattern of relationships between social class and distress is much the same for Polish women as for Polish men, with experts being the least distressed and manual workers the most distressed of these social classes.

Similarly, there has been a reversal in the relationship of social stratification with distress: whereas higher social-stratification position was earlier associated with a greater sense of distress in socialist Poland, now it is associated with a greater sense of well-being. Again the
current findings are much the same for Polish women as for Polish men, albeit stronger in magnitude for women.

Moreover, whereas occupational self-direction played little or no role in explaining the relationships of social structure and distress for Polish men under socialism, it now is of decisive importance, as important for explaining the relationships of social structure with distress as it is for explaining the relationships of social structure with self-directedness of orientation and with intellectual flexibility. This is as true for Polish women as for Polish men. Occupational self-direction has assumed even greater importance in transitional Poland than in the capitalist United States. This is another respect in which radical social change has had a very great effect.

Not only is occupational self-direction surprisingly important in explaining the relationships of class and stratification to distress in post-socialist Poland, but conditions of uncertainty—which we had hypothesized would become more important in mediating the relationships of social structure and distress during the transitional period in Poland—have declined in importance to virtual irrelevance. Some of these conditions—notably concern about economic well-being and the direct experience of organizational or technological change in the workplace—are conducive to feelings of distress. But, because people throughout the social structure have experienced these conditions, none of them contributes much to explaining the relationships between class or stratification and distress. Here, too, the findings are much the same for Polish women as for Polish men. Post-socialist Poland, under conditions of radical social change, fully exemplifies our general interpretation of social structure and personality, in some respects even more strongly than does the United States.

The findings for Ukrainian men and women in 1992-1993 are in all respects similar in pattern to those for Polish men and women, but the magnitudes of the relationships between social structure and personality, and particularly of those between occupational self-direction and personality, are consistently smaller for the Ukrainians. Only the relationships between social structure and occupational self-direction are as strong for Ukrainian men and women as they are for Polish men and women.
It is possible that the weaker magnitudes of the Ukrainian relationships represent a residue of Ukraine's past history as part of the Soviet Union, where the relationships between work and personality may not have been as pronounced as in Poland and the capitalist countries. Or--a contrasting possibility--it may be that conditions of life in Ukraine were so chaotic during this early period of transformation that conditions of work mattered less for personality than in more stable times. Whichever explanation is correct, the facts remain that at the time of our surveys Ukraine was at an earlier stage of transformation than was Poland, and that the findings for Ukraine differ from those for Poland not in kind but only in degree. Dramatic changes in the relationship between social structure and personality--in particular, a nearly complete reversal of the relationship between class position and a sense of well-being and distress--had already occurred in Poland by the time of our 1992 survey. Much the same process appeared to be underway in Ukraine in 1992-1993, but the process was still ongoing.

In short, our expectation that the process of radical social change might well undermine the relationships of social structure and personality earlier found in countries enjoying apparently stable social conditions is not borne out. Instead, radical social change seems to affect the relationships of social structure and personality primarily in that social structures in process of transformation come to exhibit the patterns characteristic of the type of society they are in process of becoming. By late 1992, Poland already exhibited the capitalist pattern. As of late 1992 and early 1993, Ukraine seemed to be following a similar trajectory, although at a slower pace and from a further-back starting point.

THE NON-EMPLOYED

The foregoing analyses of the employed portions of the adult populations of Poland and Ukraine answer only part of the question of whether radical social change has affected the relationships between social structure and personality. The people who might be most decidedly, perhaps most adversely, affected by radical social change are the non-employed. Radical social change attendant on the transformation of the economic systems of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union may have affected the non-employed in at least two distinct ways. One is by creating essentially new categories of the non-employed or by enlarging existing categories. The other is by changing the conditions of life of people already in the existing categories. Both processes have occurred, the first most notably in the virtual creation of a category of the formally unemployed and in the considerable expansion of the category of housewives, the second most notably in the radically changed economic conditions of the pensioners, whose pensions have failed to keep up with inflation.

In both Poland and Ukraine, we differentiated five major segments of the adult population: those men and women who were employed, either as employees or self-employed, for at least fifteen hours per week; those who were out of work and seeking employment; those who were pensioners, whether because they had retired for reasons of age, had willingly or otherwise taken early retirement, or had suffered some disability; housewives; and students. Taking cognizance of a rapid increase in the number of housewives, many of whom were seeking employment, the Polish inquiry made an additional distinction, between those housewives who were seeking employment ("unemployed housewives") and those who were not ("pure housewives"). This distinction would not have made sense in Ukraine at that time.

For our assessment of the relationships between people's locations in the economies of their countries and their personalities, we used analysis of variance to compare the mean ratings of people in the several sectors of the economy with respect to their self-directedness of orientation, distress, and intellectual flexibility. We did this separately for men and women.

The most general lesson of this analysis is that the relationships between people's locations in the economies of their countries and their personalities are statistically significant and are non-trivial in magnitude. The magnitudes of relationship are roughly similar for Poles and for Ukrainians of each gender and for men and women of each country. Perhaps as important: the differences between the employed and the non-employed are no greater than the differences among the several categories of the non-employed.
Although the magnitudes of relationship between location in the economy and personality are much the same for Poles and Ukrainians, and for men and women, the patterns of relationship differ considerably by country and gender--reflecting, I think, the substantial differences in what it meant, for example, to be an unemployed man or an unemployed woman in the Ukraine of 1992-93, or--more striking still--what it meant to be unemployed in the Poland of 1992, when there was already substantial unemployment, in contrast to what it meant to be unemployed in the Ukraine of 1992-1993, when there was much less unemployment.

The unemployed--those who do not work as many as 15 hours per week and are actively seeking employment--differ greatly for Poland and Ukraine. Unemployed Poles are a little less self-directed in their orientations and somewhat less intellectually flexible than are other Polish men and women--which is about what one would expect if one extrapolated from fully capitalist societies. The Ukrainian unemployed, however, are somewhat more self-directed in their orientations and somewhat more intellectually flexible than are other Ukrainian men and women.

The difference between unemployed Poles and Ukrainians can be understood in terms of the very different stages of transformation of the two countries at the time of our surveys. Formal unemployment is a largely new phenomenon in both countries, because it had been the practice under socialism to keep people on the payrolls of the state industries even when there was no work for them to do. By the time of our surveys, there was much more unemployment in Poland than in Ukraine. The Polish unemployed in our samples were older, less educated, and less skilled, had worked longer at their previous jobs, and had been unemployed longer than the Ukrainian unemployed. The contrast is not great, but it is sufficient to explain the cross-national differences in the self-directedness of orientation and intellectual flexibility of the unemployed. At that stage of the transition, a younger, more educated cohort of Ukrainians was feeling the initial brunt of unemployment.

The most striking finding for the unemployed, though, is that despite the compositions of the unemployed populations being so different for Poland and Ukraine, the common denominator, across country and gender, is that the unemployed are more distressed than are
other adults of their country and gender. Clearly, something about the conditions of life of the unemployed resulted in very similar adverse effects on unemployed people's sense of well-being or distress, regardless of country or gender. The explanation of just what it was about their conditions of life that resulted in the greater distress of the unemployed, though, is not as obvious as it may appear to be--as will be evident in our further analyses.

The housewives, too, are quite different for Poland and Ukraine. The Polish housewives are, by comparison to other Polish women, relatively low in self-directedness of orientation and in intellectual flexibility, and the "unemployed housewives" (but not the "pure housewives") are relatively high in their degree of distress. The Ukrainian housewives are above average in self-directedness of orientation and intellectual flexibility and less distressed than the mean for women in their country. These cross-national differences in personality must be seen in context of the equally great differences in the social forces that led to women being housewives in the two countries at the time of our surveys.

In Poland, being a housewife was, if not a new phenomenon, then certainly much more prevalent than it had been during socialist times. Women, even mothers of young children, had previously been pressured to work outside the home--and the state-provided child-care facilities and services at their places of employ were generally quite good. But by 1992 such women were being laid off, and the provision of child-care facilities and services had greatly deteriorated as the large state enterprises floundered. Although a similar process may have begun in Ukraine, it was much less far along--as evidenced by a much smaller proportion of housewives among Ukrainian than among Polish women in our samples.

Many of the Polish housewives in our sample--particularly, but not only, the "unemployed housewives" who were actively seeking employment--expressed a strong preference for being employed outside the home. Those housewives who did are nearly as self-directed in their orientations and nearly as intellectually flexible as are Polish women generally. It is only the housewives who express a strong preference for being full-time housewives who are decidedly not self-directed and are lacking in intellectual flexibility. As for distress: the only Polish
housewives who are decidedly distressed are those "unemployed housewives" who strongly prefer to be employed--a rather large group in the Polish sample. In short, it is mainly the Polish housewives who prefer to be housewives who account for Polish housewives' relative lack of self-directedness of orientation and intellectual flexibility; and it is solely the Polish housewives who would much rather be employed outside the home who account for Polish housewives' relatively high degree of distress.

For Ukraine, there were no significant relationships between preferences for outside employment and the components of personality we examine here. The main fact that emerges from the Ukrainian data about housewives, though, is that few of the Ukrainian housewives preferred to work full-time, so we are dealing almost entirely with women who were housewives by choice. Such women were more self-directed, more intellectually flexible, and less distressed than were other Ukrainian women, even the employed.

Thus, the cross-national difference with respect to housewives' degree of distress is entirely a function of the proportions of housewives who really want to be housewives: It is only the housewives who would prefer to be employed outside the home who are distressed. But the cross-national differences with respect to housewives' degree of self-directedness of orientation and intellectual flexibility remain perplexing. We now know that only those Polish housewives who prefer to be housewives--and not those who would prefer to work outside the home--are lacking in self-directedness of orientation and distress. But why the contrast to the Ukrainian housewives--nearly all of whom prefer to be housewives--who are more self-directed and more intellectually flexible than are most other Ukrainian women?

The pensioners, who are mainly people who have retired at the mandatory retirement ages for their country and gender, but include some people who became disabled or were retired at an earlier age as state industries released redundant workers, are the most consistent cross-nationally and across gender of any category of the non-employed. They are less self-directed in orientation, less intellectually flexible, and more distressed than the means for their nation and gender. Likely explanations come readily to mind: the pensioners are older and less educated
than are people in other segments of the society, and they have been subject to extreme financial duress. As we shall see, though, more than this is involved.

The relatively small numbers of students in these adult samples are conspicuous for being by far the most self-directed in their orientations and among the most intellectually flexible of all segments of the economy. These findings leave unanswered the question of whether the students excel because of selection or because of the influence of higher education—or, most likely, both. What is surprising are the cross-national and cross-gender differences with respect to distress. The male Polish students are notably distressed, nearly as distressed as are the unemployed; the female Polish students are close to the mean for their gender and nation; and the Ukrainian students, male and female, are less distressed than are most other Ukrainian adults. We are puzzled at these findings, particularly because the employment prospects for Polish students seemed (to us) to be better than those for Ukrainian students at that time.

The Processes by Which Radical Social Change Affects the Relationships between Location in the Economy and Personality

Further analyses confirm that one important reason why the transformation of the Polish and Ukrainian economies has been important for the relationships between location in the economy and personality has been that it has created essentially new categories of the non-employed and has greatly enlarged existing categories. This is reflected, for example, in our finding that statistically controlling age and education largely explains the relationships between location in the economy and self-directedness of orientation, and also, to a lesser but still substantial degree, the relationships between location in the economy and intellectual flexibility.

We had expected that another major reason why the transformation of the Polish and Ukrainian economies would affect the relationships between location in the economy and personality is that people in some segments of the economy—particularly the unemployed and
the pensioners—were subjected to severe economic deprivation. But statistically controlling either household income, or an index of perceived economic well-being, only partially explains why unemployed Poles were distressed, does not explain why Polish pensioners, either men or women, were distressed, and does not explain the distress of either the Ukrainian unemployed or the Ukrainian pensioners. Something is missing—something that would provide a more complete explanation of why the unemployed and pensioners are so distressed, and might also provide a more general explanation of the relationships between location in the economy and all three facets of personality.

On the basis of our previous research, we hypothesized that this variable is the complexity of people's activities. Unfortunately, we are unable to make a definitive test of this hypothesis, because we do not have a single index of complexity of activities that is applicable to people in all segments of the economy. Lacking such an index prevents us from statistically controlling complexity of activities, to assess the degree to which this reduces the correlations between location in the economy and personality. But we do have sufficient information to provide prima facie evidence that the complexity of people's activities is a key explanatory variable. This evidence consists of finding that correlations between the complexity of non-employed people's activities—variously measured for the unemployed, the pensioners, and the housewives—and their self-directedness of orientation, intellectual flexibility, and even their sense of well-being or distress, are generally as strong as are the correlations between the substantive complexity of employed men's and women's paid work and corresponding facets of personality.

One might reasonably ask whether the correlations between complexity of activity and personality are a reflection of the undoubted connection between people's educational levels and the complexity of their activities. We find, though, that while statistically controlling educational level does reduce the magnitudes of all the pertinent correlations, in some cases substantially, nearly all the correlations remain statistically significant and non-trivial in magnitude. Education does affect the complexity of people's activities, but the psychological concomitants of
complexity of activity can be ascribed only in part to educational attainment. By the same token, the explanatory role of educational attainment can be ascribed in part—but only in part—to the decided relationship between educational attainment and the complexity of people's activities.

One might also ask whether the correlations between complexity of activities and personality are a reflection of the undoubted connection between the complexity of people's past work in paid employment and their current activities—the rationale being that people whose past jobs were substantively complex are more likely to engage in complex activities even when no longer employed. We can test this hypothesis only for the Poles, for we lack data about the past jobs of the Ukrainians. For the Poles, the expectation that there would be a positive correlation between past job complexity and current complexity of activities is valid for people in all segments of the economy, but for the non-employed the correlations are only weak to moderate. This being the case, it is hardly a surprise that statistically controlling the complexity of past jobs does not appreciably reduce the correlations between complexity of people's current activities and personality. It is the complexity of current activities, not that of their past jobs, that matters for the personalities of both the employed and the non-employed.

What is thus far lacking in our interpretation is systematic evidence that the activities of the non-employed were less complex than the work done by the employed. This lack results from our having separate and not altogether comparable indices of complexity for people in each of the segments of the economy. The indices of complexity of activity for the Polish unemployed and pensioners, though, are sufficiently similar to that for the employed that we are able to assess the average levels of complexity for the unemployed and the pensioners relative to that of the employed. For both groups, the mean level of complexity is lower—to a highly significant degree—than is the mean level of the substantive complexity of work for the employed. We cannot make similar assessments for the Polish housewives, or for the Ukrainians, for whom we lack sufficiently comparable indices of complexity. But, since the unemployed and the pensioners are crucial groups for our interpretation, this information strongly supports our belief that the activities of the non-employed (other than the students) are decidedly less complex than
is the substantive complexity of work of the employed. If this interpretation is correct, then a
major consequence of the early stages of the transformation was that it not only exposed more
people to conditions of economic duress, but also and more importantly, resulted in many people
engaging in less complex activities than those ordinarily experienced in paid employment.

Even if our finding that the complexity of activities of the Polish unemployed and
pensioners was less than that of the employed does not apply to the Polish housewives, or to the
Ukrainians, we think we have demonstrated something of considerable importance for
understanding the relationship of social structure and personality. We have long known that the
substantive complexity of work in paid employment is of considerable importance for the
personalities of employed men and women under conditions of apparent social stability. There is
evidence for the United States that the complexity of housework is of considerable importance
for the personalities both of women employed outside the home and of full-time housewives, and
that complexity of schoolwork is of considerable importance for the personalities of both high
school and college students. Our new data--collected when the people of Poland and Ukraine
were experiencing radical social change--show that even under these conditions the substantive
complexity of work in paid employment continues to be important for personality, in some
respects even more important than under conditions of apparent stability. Our analyses of the
non-employed demonstrate as well that the complexity of people's activities is of considerable
importance for self-directedness of orientation, intellectual flexibility, and even distress in
circumstances where one might least expect it to be--in the lives of people in the non-employed
segments of the economy during a period of radical social change.

There is one further implication of our findings, an implication of profound significance
for understanding the relationships between social structure and personality. Our studies of
radical social change have illuminated the dynamics of social structure in a way that studies
done under conditions of social stability could not have done. The theory that guided our
research is that social-structural position affects individual psychological functioning primarily
through its effects on the proximate conditions of people's lives. Our studies of radical social
change have shown that the very meaning of being in one or another social-structural position—
in terms both of who are exposed to the conditions of life attendant on being in any particular
position and of changes in the conditions themselves—depends on particular historical
circumstances. In our analyses of social class, for example, we have seen how being a manager
or being a manual worker had strikingly different implications for people's conditions of
occupational life—and thus for their sense of well-being or of distress—under socialism from what
they had in the transitional period after socialism ended. In the analyses of the non-employed,
we have seen how different are the situations of the unemployed at two different stages in the
transition from socialism to capitalism, and what different conditions of life are implied by the fact
of being unemployed at different stages of transition in Poland and Ukraine. Similarly, and in
some respects even more dramatically, being a housewife proves to have very different
implications for women's sense of well-being or of distress in the circumstances of Poland and
Ukraine at the time of our surveys. What has not changed is that social-structural position has
profound effects on personality as a result of the proximate conditions of life attendant on those
positions. The moral of the story is that one must never assume that the proximate conditions of
life attendant on any particular social-structural position are invariant, whatever the historical
times or socio-economic conditions.
REFERENCES


