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WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Theory and Methodology

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THE STUDY OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY
Some Introductory Considerations

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I address these opening remarks to four topics. The first is the construct of "the modern world-system"; the second is capital-accumulation on a world scale; the third, state-formation; and the fourth, some problems of method. The remarks are at every point abbreviated, in keeping with the notion that they are only "introductory considerations".

On the Construct, "The Modern World-System"

The kind of inquiry, and the field of inquiry, which are becoming known these days as "world-system studies"—or world-historical studies, or capitalist world-economy studies, or the study of modern social change—develop, in our generation, in a fairly straightforward way. Such studies derive directly from immediately preceding approaches to the study of long-term, large-scale social change of the past, present, and forthcoming future (in this sense "historical" change). There is nothing mysterious or exotic about it, as I shall try to suggest sketchily at the outset here.

Inquiry into long-term, large-scale social change, in the form it commonly takes today, has its beginnings in American universities in
the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. The Cold War produced area-studies programs, and decolonization expanded them. Economists resumed (or invented) studying economic development, sociologists social development, and political scientists political development, while anthropologists (deprived of “their” peoples by independence movements) rediscovered evolution, and historians belatedly recognized that North Atlantic societies had not merely “histories”, but actual “patterns of development”. These “modernization” studies, as they came to be called, were always “comparative” in approach, at first implicitly, later quite explicitly, usually with Great Britain and/or the United States serving as the anchoring point for the comparisons. In due course, in the 1960s, a procedure (sometimes then called a “logic”) for conducting comparative studies of modernization or of national societies became explicitly formulated and fairly widely accepted.

Almost simultaneously with the growth of “modernization” studies, however, their view of social change came under attack. “Modernization” studies focus on “national” units and presume, usually tacitly, that as people form “independent” national states, these “new” states start on a course of development that will eventually traverse the same stages of development which the reigning North Atlantic national societies, notably first Great Britain and then the United States, have apparently traversed historically. Those initially challenging this view (the “dependency” theorists) argued that no, the present well-being of advanced states was owing in no small measure to the advantageous relations they have had with less-developed states, which thereby were in a structurally new kind of international setting and so would in all probability have to traverse a different route of development. and probably pass through different “stages”. The controversy grew and became increasingly “historical”: The further claim was made increasingly that not merely the present well-being of the advanced states but their very development as “advanced” states had required and been dependent on their having exploitative relations with other parts of the world. This latter thesis (advanced by the “imperialism” theorists) implied still more, however. It implied that a single basic set of general economic processes underlies the world’s uneven development. It was these processes, in conjunction with national-scale and imperial-scale political processes, that had produced, and were continuing to produce, the historical development of the North Atlantic states and the historical underdevelopment of the African, Latin American, and (excepting Japan) Asian states. Two heretofore unrelated fields of scholarly inquiry, European economic history and Third-World political studies, thus became joined—to the dismay for the most part of specialists in each. It remained, though, to make the argument explicit. This was done by those advancing the thesis that a single capitalist world-economy has been developing since the sixteenth century and that its development has been the driving force of modern social change. Proposed by several current scholars, this thesis has been propounded most fully and most forcefully by Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b).

If, now, one were to try to give the main ideas informing the construct of “the modern world-system” in a highly abbreviated form, they might run as follows. First, there is the “structure” of this social system, consisting of: (a) one expanding economy; (b) expanding multiple states; and (c) the capital-labor relation. Second, there is this social system’s “development”. But before turning to that, let me briefly comment on these three “structural” features.

(a) There is one expanding economy. This conventionally appears to us, however, in the form of various “national” (and “colonial”) economies related through “international” trade. This one world-scale economy, which is progressively more global in scope, has a single or axial division and integration of labor processes (“division of labor”), which is both organized and paralleled by a single set of accumulation-processes, between its always more advanced, historically enlarging, and geographically shifting core and its always less advanced, disproportionately enlarging, and geographically shifting periphery. The terms “core” and “periphery” thus designate complementary portions of the world-economy and only derivatively pertain to its political divisions (e.g., as in the expression, “core-states”*) (Hopkins, Chapter 7, this volume).

(b) There are expanding multiple states in the double sense that particular states are expanding their jurisdictions and that the number of states forming units of the interstate system is expanding. They continually form (and are terminated) in a definite political arena, the interstate-system, through relations of rivalry and alliance with one another and externally, and they continually attempt to extend their dominion (1) in relation to one another, and (2) with considerable success overall, over external peoples and areas (“imperium”). This latter movement, however, at once sets in motion processes (“anti-imperial movements”) that recurrently result in an expansion both of
the number of states and of the number of real (not merely logical) interstate relations forming the interstate-system.

(c) There is also the capital-labor relation, which the accumulation process not only operates through but continually reproduces, and on an expanding scale. This is the social-political framework, itself developing through various forms, that progressively organizes (1) production interrelations, and (2) intra- and interstate politics, so that formally rational considerations, in specific contrast to substantively rational considerations (vide Weber; in Marx, “exchange” versus “use” considerations), thus come increasingly to govern the courses of action pursued by individuals (households), communities, organizations, and “states”.

As to the “development” of the capitalist world-economy, two general points may be briefly made. (1) The extensions of (a) the interrelations of production, (b) the state-system, and (c) the capital-labor relation converge to form definite, alternating periods (“social times”) of the system’s overall expansion-stagnation; probably, too, the chronological lengths of the periods compress as the system’s growth eliminates competing forces of social organization and social change (e.g., localism, cultural forces) (Chapter 5, this volume). (2) The inherent contradiction between the development of the “one economy” and the development of the “multiple states” continually paces, and shows itself in specific forms in the course of the social system’s long-term development (which equals modern social change). With respect to this last point—about the “inherent contradictions” between a single world-scale economy and multiple state-jurisdictions—perhaps the fundamental theoretical claim is this: It is the articulation of the processes of the world-scale division and integration of labor and the processes of state-formation and deformation (the latter in the twin context of interstate relations and relations of imperium) that constitute the system’s formation and provide an account, at the most general level, for the patterns and features of its development (hence, of the patterns and features of modern social change). The articulation of the two sets of processes necessarily results, in the theory, in the network of relations among political formations (states, colonies, etc.) being patterned like the network of relations among production-accumulation zones (core-periphery), and vice versa. The following elliptically enlarge on this last point.

Centrality in the axial economic network and centrality in the political network thus tend to coincide. Strong states, in relation to others, develop in core areas; weak states, in relation to others, develop or rather are developed in peripheral areas. Not less important, strong states, in relation both to their internal regions and to other states, develop core processes; weak states (weak in both directions: relative to internal regions and to contending states) develop, or rather have developed for them, peripheral processes. It is important to have in mind that “peripheral” does not mean marginal in the sense of dispensable: without peripheries, no cores: without both, no capitalist development.

The two sets of processes thus primarily reinforce one another over the reach of the evolving system as a whole. However, they do not do so for long in any one place, owing to several contradictory tendencies. Two important ones illustrate this general point: (1) the growing competition among states (owing to their increasing number and their increasingly competitive policies) to house centers of the production-accumulation network versus the strengthening tendency of that network toward centralization of the accumulation process (fewer centers); (2) the increasing influence of class-organized politics (resulting from capitalist development) on state-policies versus the increasingly competitive search by larger and larger units of capital for larger and larger pools of low-cost labor.

The double level of competition, among states and among capitalists, coupled with their articulation, entails the expansion of the system as a whole. Capitalists further accumulation by seeking low-cost production operations for supplies and/or high-return markets for products. States seek allies and/or resources to further or to attain competitive advantage. The result is the political process we call “imperium” and the economic process we call “peripheralization”. The extent of each is a result partly of the opposition encountered or provoked, a datum, and partly of the competition among and centralization of the states engaged in the expansion. By the overall movement, the system thus both creates and as it develops eliminates an “external arena”—one which, in the event, has turned out to be everywhere that was outside the system’s original arena.

From this preliminary sketch of the construct, several theoretical concerns can be derived. I rapidly review two here, accumulation of capital and formation of states.
Accumulation of Capital

Marx’s theory of capitalist accumulation of capital (hence the term “self-expansion of capital”) is a useful point of departure for us for two reasons. One is the centrality of the subject matter in the development of the modern world-system. The other is his angle of vision: his is virtually the only major theory of the subject not implicitly or explicitly about national (or international) development, but about capitalist development in general, i.e., as we choose to interpret it, about capitalist development on a world-scale.

The theory being well-known, a sketch of its major points seems sufficient for present purposes. Its focus is the growing extent and complexity of productive forces in the form of increasing mechanization (roughly indicated by increasing capital-labor ratios) owing to pressures on “capitalists” (owners of means of production and employers of wage-labor) to lower overall costs of production. The pressures come from two directions: from among themselves through their competition to buy cheaply and to sell dearly (their given concern being to maximize the difference in all time periods between revenues and costs); and from among workers through their demands for less dehumanizing (“improved”) working and living conditions (higher production costs). Central to the formulation are two ideas. One concerns the production (here including distribution) by the work force of commodities “of more value than that of the elements entering into” their production. Specifically of interest (since all produced commodities sell, overall, at relative prices proportionate to their embodied values) are produced commodities whose value, by virtue of the labor power expended to produce them, is greater than the value (as variable capital) of the subsistence goods replenishing (daily, annually, generationally) the labor power expended (and embodied) in their production, the difference being “surplus value”. The other concerns the “realization” and appropriation by capitalists of this surplus value in money form through the (successive) sale of the produced commodities and the use of portions of this realized surplus to pay for additions to capital, especially fixed capital.

The accumulation of capital in this way results theoretically and historically in, among other things: the growing concentration of capital; the competitive elimination of small producers and the increasing centralization of capital (the increasing size on the average of the capital owned/controlled by each); the growing proportion of people available to employment by capital, but the decreasing proportion, ceteris paribus, of those so employed by capital-intensifying branches of industry (“surplus” population); a resulting historical/political narrowing of social definitions of the employable and/or of the times of employment, but still increasing unemployment among the lawfully employable segments of national (colonial) populations; a resulting overall downward pressure on real wage-levels (costs of labor), from competition (demand) for employment, but for given (not examined) social and political reasons, a pressure that is unevenly distributed among a working population’s individuals and groups; consequently, a tendency for capital to expand labor-intensive production (countering the tendency for capital-intensive production, indicated above) in order to employ the low-wage segment of the workforce which is continually created by the growing competition for employment (the effect being to depress wage-specific employment, but to increase head-count employment); and—finally for here—the marked tendency through time for these diverse movements to occur in the form of cycles of expansion and stagnation (Schumpeter’s “great periplotas of economic life”). This, because of an increasingly complex array of “proportionalities”—such as capital/labor proportionalities, production-function proportionalities (excluding labor of course), supply-demand (hence price) proportionalities in various markets (for money capital, consumer or subsistence goods, producer or capital goods, labor), proportionalities of competition (size distribution of firms in the same industries), inter-industry proportionalities, and so forth—these proportionalities change through time at different rates and, among the set of them either at mutually reinforcing or at mutually offsetting rates, with “booms” and “busts” the result and “crises” marking turning points.

As important as the theory is for the study of the modern world-system’s operation and development, in both the detail and the scope of its arguments, it is not less important for the clarity with which its author stipulates its limits. For in this way he points in effect to places where further theoretical work is needed and extensions of the theory itself may most usefully occur. Two such fundamental points are specifically of interest here, capital-accumulation itself and the question of wage-levels.

Capital-Accumulation

The first has to do with the place which the theoretically depicted process (or complex of processes) of capitalist accumulation of
capital occupies in the world-historical or world-systemic accumulation of capital. The residual created by Marx as he constructed his theory was “original” or “primitive” accumulation in *Capital*, Part VIII. By this he specifically meant the historically original creation in Europe of the conditions for the “capitalistic” development of capital (reproduction on an expanding scale), and thus for the kind of development the theory depicts and explains. This is the issue of the “transition” from feudalism to capitalism in northwestern Europe and so lies outside our present purview. But the concept may also be interpreted as referring to the continuing counterpart of that “original” or “primitive” accumulation of capital, namely, the continuing creation (extension) of the conditions for the “capitalistic” development of capital in all branches of production (old and new) in every nook and cranny of the globe outside the geopolitical area of their initial world-historical creation. This requires elaboration.

Marx (1967) is reasonably clear about his assumptions, and since in *Capital* he is concerned only with the “self-expansion of capital”, and not also with the expansion of capital in other ways (such as the continual conversion of material means of production into capital through the expropriation of direct producers), he assumes for theoretical purposes “that capitalist production (including wage-labor) is everywhere established and has possessed itself of every branch of industry” (Vol. I, ch. 24, sec. 1). There is thus left open: one, the theoretical processes depicting and explaining the ongoing conversion of non-capitalized means of production and subsistence into capital, in the course of the outward expansion of the capitalist-world-economy from its formative locus to, today, virtually the whole of the globe; and two, the integration of these processes with those of capital’s self-expansion (so as to form an array of interrelated arguments addressed to the entirety of the accumulation of capital on a progressively wider world-scale).

In particular, the theoretically open matters concern accumulation by capitalists of surpluses from areas of the world-system or branches of production in which (1) non-wage workers of one kind or another (slaves, serfs, indebted tenants, and the like) form the dependent (employed) labor force, and (2) independent producers (family farmers, other small producers) effectively form the labor force. In the context of the capitalist world-economy as a whole, not only do such labor forces include the great majority of workers at any particular time (even today), they may also include those producing the greater part of the total of surplus and surplus-value together which, in realized form and appropriated by capitalists as additions to capital, amounts to capital’s total expansion or accumulation.

These observations are, in an important sense, not in the least novel. Before World War I, prompted by theoretical misgivings, Luxemburg wrote a treatise (*The Accumulation of Capital*) on the relations between “capitalist” and “noncapitalist” branches and areas of production. In it she devoted a full third of her study to a review of how previous authors, both pre-Marx and post-Marx, had approached these relations. The subject matter is hardly new. In the same period, although prompted more by historical developments than by reservations of a theoretical nature (Marx’s treatment of “realization” concerned Luxemburg), other Marxists were also addressing the subject —Hilferding (*Finance Capital*), Lenin (*Imperialism*), and Bukharin (*Imperialism and World-Economy* and *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital*) to name three. A generation later Sweezy considered the question (in *The Theory of Capitalist Development*), and most recently Mandel (in *Marxist Economic Theory* and subsequently *Late Capitalism*), to mention only the two best-known contemporaries. And so the theoretically open matter has not exactly been neglected.

Our interests here, however, seem to be seriously different. In the study of the modern world-system the question is not the one posed by Luxemburg, debated by her critics, and reviewed by later theorists, namely, whether imperialism is necessary for an adequate theoretical account of realization (the realization in money form of the surplus value embodied in commodities in material form) or whether, instead, one may remain entirely within a hypothetically closed world of capitalistic accumulation of capital and have no difficulty in providing an adequate theoretical account. It is evidently an important question, but it is not ours, which is entirely different. Ours breaks down into two broad queries. One, what kinds of processes, theoretically, combine with the “closed” self-expansion process to depict and account for the overall accumulation process of the modern world-system in the course of its continuing development, especially since the latter may have played (and may even now still play) a quantitatively subordinate part in accumulation, however qualitatively important its directional role in development has undoubtedly been? And, two, what
have been the relational arrangements through which the different kinds of surpluses have been combined, and how should these segments of larger relational networks be conceptualized and theoretically accounted for?

An illustration on the last point: we know that in some way in the nineteenth century some of the surplus in kind produced by Ottoman peasants and appropriated by their landlords (as tribute, rent, and so forth) eventually wound up, in the form of francs on deposit, in ledgers of European capitalists as profits; but we do not know theoretically the circuits through which such appropriated surpluses became transformed into money capital, let alone empirically the relational networks involved, the intervening commissions, or the overall estimated amounts.

Wage-Levels

The determination of wage-levels is another fundamental point where Marx expressly limits the scope of his theoretical system. Central to production, as was said, is the notion of replenishing the labor power expended in production (including distribution or circulation). In the form in which the theory is presented, this replenishment occurs through the capitalists’ paying workers money (wages) for their commodity (labor power), and the latter paying merchants the money for their commodities, namely, means of subsistence (or consumer goods). It is here that a limit to the theory’s scope expressly comes. For one of course wonders about the “level of subsistence” at which workers are assumed to live and which theoretically must be continuously reproduced and hence about the wage-level (cost of production) that needs to obtain if, in accordance with the theory, workers are to replenish—daily, annually, and generationally—the labor power they expend.

Again Marx is clear about the assumption he makes (Capital, Vol. I, ch. 6):

The number and extent of workers’ so-called necessary wants . . . depend . . . to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free laborers has been formed . . . [T]herefore . . . there enters into the determination of the value of labor-power a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the laborer is practically known [emphasis added].

Durkheim phrased the last point a bit differently though, and somewhat more inclusively, using it to state not a limit but a premise of a theory (1951, Vol. II, ch. 5):

As a matter of fact, at every moment of history there is a dim perception, in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation.

The question that arises, of course, is what happens in the overall (combined) accumulation process, and to directions of development, when the world-system’s expansion creates or “seizes upon” marked differences among its countries (Marx) or societies (Durkheim), in “degrees of civilization”, in the “conditions under which the class of free laborers has been formed’: in the “degree of comfort deemed morally appropriate . . . to workers in each occupation?” We can put the matters at issue more sharply, however, if we first briefly review theories about the origins and development of the capitalist world-economy’s axial division and integration of core-area and peripheral-area labor processes.

The relational pair of core (or center) and periphery was first extensively used in its current connotation by Raúl Prebisch and his associates in the early days of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (United Nations, 1950; Prebisch, 1959; Baer, 1962). The focus of their work was on the deteriorating “terms of trade” for agricultural and mineral products in relation to manufactured products in international commerce, and the terms were used to designate the two major kinds of participants in that commerce, the exporters of manufactures (the industrialized countries of the North Atlantic plus Japan) forming the “center” and the exporters of agricultural and extractive products (the rest of the non-Communist world) forming the “periphery”. These two poles were taken as given for the period under review, and attention was focused on a particular mechanism (the formulation of which, however, partially anticipated Emmanuel’s analysis of “unequal exchange”, discussed shortly),
whose operation accounted for the deteriorating terms. The presence of this mechanism contradicted a basic assumption of the prevalent Ricardian “theory of international trade” and therefore was said to explain why what should have been happening theoretically was not in fact happening historically. The conception thus provided a stable framework for a process which, not unlike Myrdal’s “principle of circular and cumulative causation” or, even, Nurks’s “vicious circle of poverty”, showed how the world-scale regional division of labor, once established, was maintained (Nurkse, 1953; Myrdal, 1956).

However, the analysis was not directed at the processes of division of labor through which the respective patterns of export-specialization had formed initially, had been deepened as the world-system developed, and had both anchored and been anchored by the social structures and state-formation in which they were located. It was essentially those who later became known as the “dependency” theorists (again, primarily students of Latin American conditions and history) who, drawing on Baran’s work, introduced “the long view” into the core-periphery conception and converted it from being a given condition at a particular time into a continually reproduced feature in the historical development of capitalism and, in particular, of the capitalist world-economy? The central theoretical theme in their studies was (in A.G. Frank’s phrase) “the development of underdevelopment.” In this view “economic backwardness” was not at all a matter of “starting late”, but was instead itself a condition produced in the course of and as the result of the rise of capitalism. Core-periphery thus provided these writers with the indispensable dynamic relational conditions in the countries of the periphery, in which they were setting they needed for their analyses of trends, patterns, events, and development.” In this view “economic backwardness” was not at all a condition at a particular time into a continually reproduced feature in the historical development of capitalism and, in particular, of the capitalist world-economy? The central theoretical theme in their studies was (in A.G. Frank’s phrase) “the development of underdevelopment.” In this view “economic backwardness” was not at all a matter of “starting late”, but was instead itself a condition produced in the course of and as the result of the rise of capitalism. Core-periphery thus provided these writers with the indispensable dynamic relational conditions in the countries of the periphery, in which they were setting they needed for their analyses of trends, patterns, events, and development. Among those agreeing on the persistence and operation of this fundamental process, however, how it operates and why are still matters of considerable ongoing debate. The issues, I think, are neither so obscure nor so technical as some discussions make them seem; but they are fundamental—of that there can be little doubt. To see that this is so, let us resume the discussion of wage-levels.

A fairly straightforward way of specifying the matter theoretically seems possible: one, there is the explicit limit (see above) to the theory of capitalist development, in the version of it Marx lays out and others have subsequently elaborated; and two, there is the premise Durkheim lays down in order to pursue a particular line of reasoning (about “anomie”). Wage-levels—to leave it at that for now—depend on “historical and moral” elements and in particular “on the conditions under which . . . the class of free laborers has been formed.” And the processes assuring relatively slow rates of change in markedly divergent wage-levels, whatever part narrowly market considerations might appear to play in particular times and places, are those operating to reinforce or to alter the “dim perception[s], in the moral consciousness of societies,” of the “degree of comfort appropriate . . . to workers in each occupation” (emphasis added). In short, we come upon the processes of systems of relational rank in the modern world (what is conventionally called stratification). Historically, these processes are more immediately political than (in the narrow conventional sense) economic, however much directions of economic development undoubtedly lead to, and then away from, the political benchmarks (“liberty, equality, fraternity”) and the political processes that give shape and substance to systems of relational, and thus
relative, social rank (processes such as enactment and enforcement of laws supporting or preventing relations of personal bondage, civil liberties and civil rights, progressive or regressive taxation, open or closed or discriminating immigration). Put another way, rank systems disintegrate in the face of certain economic developments—“Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground” (Weber, 1968: 938)—but they form in the modern world by virtue of either sustained state policies or sustained opposition to state policies—the “age of the democratic revolution” was not Palmer’s invention (1959, 1964).

More generally, here is a definite place where processes of consciousness and ideology enter as integral to the theory of capital-accumulation on a world scale. But it is also here that we come to an almost abrupt halt theoretically. For aside from general observations by Durkheim, some historically specific constructions by Weber, footnotes in Mannheim, Marshall’s sketch, and Ossowski’s highly original but seriously undeveloped proposals, there are no studies of a conventionally sociological nature on the theory of the formation and development of social consciousness and ideologies that bear even in an involuted way on the matters at issue here (Durkheim, 1947; Weber, 1954; Mannheim, 1936; Marshall, 1964; Ossowski, 1963). Discussions of “rising expectations”, “occupational prestige”, and the like all of course presuppose a theory of social consciousness, but none that I know of qualifies as even an elliptical, partial, orAESOPIAN statement of such a theory. Were there not important studies in other quadrants of today’s scholarly compass, we would simply have to break off our discussion at this most unsatisfactory point. There are such studies, however, particularly in two quarters, which overlap theoretically if hardly in personnel.

One might be called the Black intellectual tradition of inquiry into the relationships between, one, kinds of social structures created in the course of the modern world-system’s formation and expansion and, two, patterns of consciousness—hence “habits and degrees of comfort” expected by workers in relation to others—integral to them. Even a short review of the arguments being developed in this quarter of the scholarly world is not possible in the confines of this chapter, however, and a mere listing of leading names will have to serve as an elliptical reference to the ideas—names such as DuBois, Cox, James, Williams, Fanon, Freyre, Memmi.4 As far as current scholarly inquiry goes, the most advanced theoretical work on material conditions and consciousness is being done out of this developing tradition, and its understandings point the way toward the kind of theory of consciousness that appears to be indispensable to an adequate theoretical account of the process of unequal exchange.

The other is the line of analysis, essentially anthropological in character, emerging out of the decolonization debates of the 1950s and 1960s and embodied in such writings as George Balandier’s (1966) “The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach,” and Bernard Magubane’s (1971) “A Critical Look at Indices of Social Change.” Here the movement of economic development under given political conditions, the consequently changing material conditions, and the developing consciousness they result in and, in turn, are affected by, are brought out with special theoretical clarity. Both the specificity of the debates of which these writings were a part, however, and the details of the situations they are about, make generalized picturings of the interrelated processes they depict difficult to draw and tentative in the extreme when drawn. At the same time, their potential contribution to our theoretical understanding of the fundamental process of unequal exchange as it works on the ground seems considerable.

Formation of States

Let me now turn to some processes shaping the modern world-system’s major political arenas or networks: its historically original interstate system; its political centers, the constituent states that form or are reconstituted as the interrelated units of that system; and its imperial patterns which these states establish, in relation to one another, over peoples elsewhere in the world—patterns which are continually interrupted and transformed by the antiimperial movements they perforce set in motion and the rivalries they define and reflect.

Here there are difficulties. Most students of modern social change tacitly presume the framework of a relatively autonomous abstract state (or economy, or society) as the given locus within which the changes they are explaining take place. Our concern, in contrast, is with the formation and development of the larger and longer-enduring
setting. Put another way, today’s world of interrelated and massively unequal sovereign jurisdictions cannot be taken as a given in world-system studies — as the point of departure for picking and choosing a site or two of state-formation or nation-building — in order to construct a theory of such developments inductively. It itself is a subject matter in need of examination and explanation. There is thus no theory of the formation of states on a world-scale comparable to (let alone integral to) the theory of the accumulation of capital on a world-scale. Also there are thus no explicit basic assumptions which, when relaxed, provide sharply defined points of departure for further theoretical work on the fundamental processes of modern social change. In this section, therefore, introductory considerations in the study of the capitalist world-economy concern not theoretical issues proper, but only organizing or potentially organizing concepts and at best, some preliminary sketches for possible theoretical formulations.

The Interstate System

The interstate system (often called the international system) had its beginnings with the virtually simultaneous formation of the so-called “new monarchies” in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century — the French (Louis XI), the Spanish (Ferdinand and Isabella), the English (Henry VII), and the “Austrian” (Maximilian I) — and the subsequent novel establishment at each major European court of permanent embassies from each of the other major courts. None proved able by war or marriage to incorporate the others; and with a pair of treaties in the middle of the seventeenth century, what had perforce become practice — balance of power politics — became as well a principle and a “system”.

This European state-system formed in the developing-core area of the world division of labor, primarily as the relations among the state-in-formation there, i.e., among political communities, increasingly centralized in order to mount efforts to expand their jurisdictions over core-area processes and thus, necessarily, over and at the expense of one another. The system, in short, primarily constitutes the interstate relations among rival, and in the event stronger and weaker, core-states and their semi-peripheral state allies. It is thus a set of arrangements not so much for deterring war as for waging it. What marks it is this: the alignments or sides are so formed on each occasion (“balance of power”) as to reproduce, as the outcome of conflict, the necessary condition for the state-system to continue to operate, namely, an array of interrelated states no one of which can mobilize the force and allies needed to subjugate all the others (thus preserving the development of the modern world as a world-economy by blocking its conversion into a world-empire)! The network expands by invitation, outsiders always being brought in to help block a growing power (the Ottoman court in the sixteenth century against Charles V, the Russian in the eighteenth against the French monarchy’s moves). With the inclusion of the United States and then Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, it becomes de facto a global system, which in no way, however, impairs its operation as a system of shifting alliances among core-states and their semi-peripheral-state allies for the conduct of war. What is impaired, of course, is the relational (and relative) strength of the states in Europe. The decisive locus of interstate politics shifts out of their interrelations and into the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; and the so-called “new” and “old” state-units of the now global international system form its Third World.

Both cause and consequence of the shifting alignments, the open conflicts and their outcomes would seem to be the underlying and ongoing changes in the location of what we have been calling the modern world-system’s axial division of labor, which is what is meant by speaking of the economic reasons for the wars and alignments. In particular, focusing now on the lines of interrelated production processes that converge toward, and thus form, the respective centers of the core-area, some centers — or rather, some politically unified as well as economically interrelated centers — develop more rapidly than others usually by virtue of more rapid capital formation (which in turn usually results more or less directly from state policies). As this occurs, the existing set of political borders — which reflect and shape the directions in which interrelations of production processes develop — increasingly become constraints on the continued growth of the more dynamic core-area centers. The interstate system is the mechanism, so to speak, through which existing political borders are made more or less permissible (open or closed), and on occasion are redrawn altogether (powerless political entities are not invariably preserved), and new borders demarcating previously unincorporated areas are determined. It operates in part, then, as the reflex of the underlying changing relational strengths and weaknesses of the constituent core-states. But its operation also directly contributes to the rise or decline in the relative centrality of the stronger core-state(s); to the permeabil-
ity of their borders; and to the existence of weaker states either as continuing core-states or as progressively semi-peripheral states (through their borders’ coming increasingly to enclose peripheral areas of the axial division of labor).

Here, let me briefly mention the “hegemony/rivalry” notion. In the interstate system, the ongoing rivalries between or among existing core-states (especially between those containing the established centers of the accumulation processes and those developing competing centers) have given the interstate system its major form and phases. Two contrasting forms or configurations of these relations are as follows. In one, a core-state (or, in another language, a great power) is “hegemonic” in the sense that “all roads lead to Rome,” from which it follows that the political borders demarcating the sovereign jurisdictions within the core and semi-peripheral areas are relatively permeable (labor, money, and materials move relatively freely across them). In the other, the configuration is one of rivalry; there is no center of centers, so to speak, and the political borders enclosing the rival centers are by comparison much less permeable (or open), and the same holds for the borders of the semi-peripheral states housing regional centers that are, in effect (and usually by design), contenders. As the interstate system has developed from its shadowy origins among the unsuccessful contestants for imperium in sixteenth-century Europe, the configuration of hegemony has occurred only on three occasions, and each time briefly—the periods of Dutch hegemony, British hegemony, and U.S. hegemony. The configuration of rivalry has by definition alternated, although lasting far longer each time, and the overall development of the interstate system has thus had the form of three long cycles.

State Formation and Transformation

We turn now to conceptions of the formation and transformation of states, viewed from the outset as the sovereignties of the interstate system. There is wide agreement among comparative historians and scholars of civilizations on the historical originality of the European state-system. For example, Walter Dorn (1963: 1) begins a study by noting that the “competitive character of the state system of modern Europe . . . distinguishes it from the political life of all previous and non-European civilizations of the world.” It is thus especially disconcerting that none of the explicit theories of state-formation (nation-building and the like) takes this apparently unique setting as its point of departure.7

Perhaps the most generally used picturing of the developmental tendencies of political communities that become units (states-information) of the interstate system is something like this. The relational setting sets in motion within each claimed jurisdiction processes of centralization through which the center (the monarch, court, prince) gains increasing control over more men and resources (in order to expand and so to have access to still more men and resources, or to defend against others’ expansions). The incursion into regional bailiwicks which this entails sets up one kind of opposition, resulting in some form of parliament to mediate the center-region relation. The increased taxation it entails sets up another kind of opposition, resulting in some form of apparatus, emanating from the center, to overcome popular resistance, which in turn requires increased organization on the part of the populace, and so forth. The anatomy thus becomes a center (monarch, court), a parliament of initially regional interests (nobles, higher bourgeoisie, churchmen), an apparatus of administration (bureaucracy) and of war-making and repression (army, police), and a populace more or less able to organize for a local opposition to exactions (usually the more so, ceteris paribus, the more concentrated people are). The lines are of course seldom clear cut, and they are further blurred by other organizing forces at work (very broadly, the economic and the cultural). But such seems to be the pattern of the relational networks that in due course are formed into a “state” structure.

Historically, the most important structural transformation of such “states” comes through the revolutionary ascendancy of the bourgeoisie (whether also ennobled or not is irrelevant). They displace the regional lords (and often enough the monarchical center as well), and increasingly utilize and develop the administrative and repressive apparatuses to help with expropriating workers from means of production, securing adequate supplies of workers, and keeping workers under control. The internal operations of core-states thus become increasingly supportive of capitalists’ interests; worker opposition accordingly becomes increasingly focused on the state; and, with the growth of working-class organization, state policies increasingly become designed to deal with workers’ demands for improving working and living conditions—which over a long period of time results in capitalists both employing more and more systems of
machinery (to cut labor costs) and searching about for labor forces that are less costly to reproduce.

This rather common general picturing of internal state-formation relations and processes has, of course, a fundamental limit. It is drawn from and only holds at best for the “national” states (and deriving from the state jurisdictions, the “national” societies) that have formed in or have come to enclose core-areas of the capitalist world-system. Not only are there no sound reasons for expecting it to hold in even a loose way for political formations elsewhere in that world-system (a fortiori, outside of it altogether), but also there are good theoretical reasons for assuming it cannot. The presumption that it even could is one of the fundamental mistakes of “developmentalists”. There is, though, no comparable picturing of the relational networks and processes of political development in peripheral-areas of the world-system, let alone in areas including in them the transforming effects of (a) peripheralization and (b) inclusion as sovereign units in the interstate system remains a major theoretical task.

Imperium or Patterns of Dominance

In the development of the modern world-system, its very formation entails (1) the interrelation of productive processes between its increasingly core and increasingly peripheral areas, and (2) some form of political relation between the states-in-formation in the core-area and the political formations and peoples in the peripheral areas. It is the latter relations we designate by patterns of imperium. We are thus not specifically concerned here with the theory of imperialism, which is centrally about capital accumulation and capital centralization on a world-scale (and only incidentally about patterns of imperium per se).

What is of concern under this heading is the patterning of imperium (including, intrinsically, the opposition to it) as a feature of the political development of the capitalist world-economy. The relation, abstractly, is as old as recorded history. The term itself derives from Roman usage, and its modern usage from claims in the reign of Napoleon III. Its usage in world-system studies is weaker still. Magdoff (1969) and Nkrumah (1965) seem right: “empire” factually need not imply “colonies” formally. Each may imply the other, but they need not. Accordingly, imperium or imperial patterns are used to refer to the usually complex political networks that have been—and continue to be—coordinated and interwoven with, but distinguishable from, the production networks linking (and delimiting) core and periphery in the course of the modern world-system’s continuing development. The conception thus allows phasings of formal colonization and informal empire to be traced for the system as a whole as it develops and the interrelations between these phasings and the presence or absence of various modes or forms of opposition—“primitive rebellion” (Hobsbawm), “wars of independence”: “wars of liberation”, “nationalist movements”, and the like—to be sketched. Monographic work here is quite extensive, but theoretical work from a world-economy perspective is barely in its beginnings.

Some Matters of Method

The theoretical issues in the study of social change have thus moved forward, beginning with the objections of the dependency theorists to modernization notions and proceeding, currently, to the views of the world-system theorists on the overall wholeness and intrinsic unevenness of modern social change. In contrast, the methodological issues that have necessarily arisen in virtue of the theoretical movement, and that implicitly delineate the ground on which overt controversy has taken place, have themselves still largely to be identified, formulated, and debated. Two matters of method in particular seem in need of comment. One concerns the common distinction between statistical and historical explanatory accounts, which I shall suggest is a distinction not between kinds of inquiry but only between complementary portions of a single kind of inquiry. The other concerns the essentially relational nature, in two senses, of the information we work with in empirical inquiries.*

The Statistical and Narrative Portions of Inquiry

In opposing the “evolutionists” of their day, the then novel “functionalists” charged them with, inter alia, constructing imaginary sequences by taking a shard from here, a bone from there, a temple from somewhere else. Ours is an analogous if rather different misgiving. If one wants to construct sequences of historical change or “laws of development” that might account for them, then the place to go, it would seem, is to the actual (in the sense of “described” of
course) sequences of the changes in question in some places where they occur and in some where they do not (or do much less so). That may or may not seem reasonable, but in either case it is precisely what is not done in the “method of comparative study” which a few years ago emerged as the dominant method in the study of modern social change (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1967).

In this method a logic of inquiry, derived from survey design and analysis, organizes research and theoretical reasoning. (With respect to causal inference the logic is inherently weaker than the logic of experimental inquiry, which it formally resembles in some respects and after which it is directly modeled; but if certain key initial conditions are met and subsequently key procedural steps are taken, it can result in highly plausible results.) The cases being countries instead of individuals, the properties predicated of the cases are of course different: e.g., annual household income gives way to economic development, score on the F-scale becomes degree of democracy, and last grade of school completed is replaced by size of middle class. However, the structure of inquiry is exactly the same. Lazarsfeld (1959: 118) depicts it in his usual uncommonly clear and straightforward way:

- a. There is a set of elements (“cases,” “units of observation”).
- b. For the research purposes at hand, these elements are considered comparable. This means that the same set of properties is used to describe each of the elements.
- c. Each element has a certain value on each property (these values may be quantitative or qualitative).
- d. The propositions assert interrelationships between the properties.

The findings (“propositions”) of such inquiries thus say whether and to what extent, over the set of cases examined, ordered differences in the value of one property conjoin with ordered differences in the value of another property. What the finds do not and cannot provide is a tracing over time of such relationships as may occur, between the values of the properties, for each of the cases. The method thus omits (actually, its procedures eliminate) what Danto (1965) shows to be the essentially “narrative” logical structure of an historical explanation.

We thus have not two versions but two halves of a full account: a generalized one, statistical in nature, telling a story in the form of joint distributions of values of properties of cases, for the cases collectively, all at once; and a specific one, “historical” in nature, telling a story in the form of narrative relations among events and conditions, for the cases severally, one at a time.

At this point the concept of “cases” comes into question. As Lazarsfeld says, the cases in analyses of statistical relations are considered comparable for the research purposes at hand. In the study of modern social change, such presumptively valid comparability (each case is fully describable for the research purposes at hand by the same complex of properties) is exceedingly rare, if not epistemologically ruled out. Instead, what one commonly has are instances where the same (or, sometimes, the same sort of) processes are apparently operating, but that aside from that differ in all manner of other relevant respects. (Capital accumulation, class-struggle, and imperium all presumably operate in all manner of different settings—and differently in each.) Put sharply, the cases necessary for the statistical portion of inquiry must be presumed essentially homogeneous (members of a sample of a universe); the instances necessary for the historical portion must be presumed essentially heterogeneous (members respectively of universes of one).

Unfortunately, the differences between our two portions of inquiry widen. Next comes how we imagine our processes operating. For cases, we imagine them in some way to enclose the processes under review, or at least not to be so proximate as to have the processes’ operation in one locus (“case”) contaminate, as is said, their operation in another. (It is ordinarily safe in national polls, for example, to assume that, among the members of the sample, the opinion-forming processes of one member do not even indirectly interpersonally influence those of another.) The image is of a kind of process that operates within, or essentially within, the kind of unit or element constituting the cases. Individuals form their own opinions, corporations decide their own prices, countries choose their own political forms, and so forth. For instances, the imagery is quite different. Here the picture usually is of rather general processes going on and of an instance being just that—a place, within a far larger plane of occurrence, where the working of the processes are directly observable or clearly traceable through their effects. Alternatively, one may imagine the processes as operating not underneath or overhead, producing different effects in different settings (although thereby relating the instances), but directly through identifiable social relations
among the settings, which, though, are still only instances where one sees the processes in operation.

Finally, here is perhaps the widest difference between the statistical and historical portions of inquiry, but the one also least amenable to a strictly methodological representation. This is in the purpose of the inquiry. Concentrating attention on the statistical side---on the analysis of statistical relations among values of properties of cases---necessarily means a primary interest in the plausibility of the general propositions thereby under study and an incidental interest, if any, in one case. Alternatively, concentrating attention on the historical side---on the narratively organized sequences of events and conditions of a particular place through a particular time---necessarily means an interest, not primarily in the plausibility of the proposition(s) put to use, but primarily in the plausibility of the complex interpretative account offered of those changes in that place through that time period.

We are used to thinking that, in the study of generalized claims which are structurally incapable of experimental examination, the more we can approach the kinds of comparisons realized in experimental inquiry, independently of their individual occurrence and of their time-order, which we do by ruling out or otherwise abstracting from the disturbing details of the particular and by collapsing time intervals, the better we have “tested” the plausibility of the generalized claim as a generalized claim. It may be, however, that we are wrong to think in this way. At least, it is far from obvious that such generalized claims are better examined through an apparently frontal but inherently indirect investigation (because of the necessary abstracting) of their general plausibility than through their assessed effectiveness, in diverse interpretative contexts, in organizing a variety of narrative accounts, each of which is judged for its soundness on its own terms. Perhaps Danto’s implicit claim is correct: the narrative character of experimental inquiry is its most general form, in which case the statistical portion of nonexperimental social inquiries would serve, not to govern the structure of design as it now does, but instead, in preliminary work, to help isolate subjects for detailed inquiry or, in summarizing work, to help collate the results of several detailed inquiries.

The Relational Nature of Information

I am concerned here with two elementary points. One is that the processes resulting in observational statements are processes of social relations and are themselves part of the social system under study. The other is that the subjects of observational statements are themselves social relations or processes integral to them, however common appearances to the contrary may be (e.g., commodities “having” prices).

As to the first, I shall be brief to the point of being cryptic but I hope not obscure. There are no detached observers in world-system studies. All observers without exception are participants as well, whether the role is that of census-taker, social analyst, customs officer, historian, or bookkeeper. All information of interest is prepared (recorded, transcribed, collated, analyzed, altered, and so forth) by people in definite social relations, and produced by virtue of and as an activity of those relations, and thus is integrally of those relations. Observers thus are not and cannot be detached from the developing system whose atomic movements they monitor or assess. The weather does not produce the observations of the meteorologist; the operations of states do produce those of the census-taker and customs officer (and also, incidentally, those of most meteorologists), just as the operations of firms produce the observations of bookkeepers. More generally, so do other social processes produce, analogously, an earlier historian’s interpretative uses of recorded figures and, by the same token, such interpretative uses of them as we may make.

This claim, taken as a point of departure in a discussion of method, has many interesting implications, one of which is that a “sociology” of social inquiry is needed in the empirical study of modern social change. It is needed, however, not as still another subfield of study (whose “boundaries” would merely legitimate ignorance of what is beyond them), but as an integral part of the method informing our research and, as far as possible, being consciously developed and used in the conduct of our studies and in our commentaries on each other’s work. Thus, the whole of the usual discussion of reliability (whether predicated of observers, instruments, or their products) has to be recast and from the outset firmly grounded in understandings of the relational settings in which (really through which) observations are made. This means all records of interest, whether made tomorrow or 300 years ago, are archival in the trained historian’s sense, and their
reliability is to be historiographically estimated. What the analytic philosopher would set to one side, then, as "pragmatic aspects" of inquiry, we must consider as essential and hence as impossible to "abstract from" without eliminating our subject (here our method of inquiry). 42 Concerning the relational nature and derived quality of the information we perform use (but thereby transform), we have far more to learn methodologically from the field anthropologist, and even more from the investigative reporter, than we do from the experimental scientist.

As to the other sense in which our information is relational in nature, the point to make is simple enough: our observations in world-system studies are not only products of definite social relations, but also of definite social relations. This is a conceptual claim, to be sure, but it is, in the study of modern social change, a conceptual notion both so elementary and so often forgotten as to require dogged attention. I shall simply illustrate it here by two examples. We (and everyone else) talk about "wage levels" (see above). Any figure for this is some measure of a central tendency of some distribution (of wages paid, received, or scheduled), a distribution which itself is the totals row or column of some relational matrix of payments from capitalists, however arrayed, to workers, however arrayed. The wages, hence their level, are produced by those specific instances of the capital relations from the record as it proceeds in order to proceed—a sentence with which no one who has tried to piece together the relations constituting households following their elimination by enumerators will have difficulty.13 Accordingly, any of the normally disembedded kinds of observations we use need to have the relational settings that produced them imaginatively reconstructed. (What sort of a setting could these be of and from?"

The second example concerns the very common class of observations in our work reported as prices. Almost all of us are by training and culture disposed to see these as the data of markets (not only for us, as distant participant observers, but even more importantly for the immediate participants/observers), and of price-making markets to boot (unless we specifically know otherwise, e.g., when we know they are "administered prices"—in which case we are prone to wonder what the "real going prices" were). And we thus semiconsciously assume a very particular kind of interpretative relational setting as mechanism—even though in sociology (less so in economics) the concert is one entailing very definite, circumscribable parties ("crowds" of interchanging buyers/sellers), scope-duration, and active-latent phases. Along with the assumption that such a network was present and functioning goes its corollary that it was in fact generative of its remarkable "forces", the market forces we so ubiquitously, if vaguely, invoke. Obviously, from these comments, I would enter a note of great caution here. At the same time, let me hastily add, nothing in our work would lead me to propose that market forces have not been formed, and themselves formed integral features, in the modern world-system’s development—on the contrary. But it is precisely their growth and its everywhere simultaneous opposite, their regulation (or rather efforts at it, by all manner of acting agencies), that are to be studied. Their scope and scale cannot be defensively inferred merely from prices, which (as we know from Weber and Polanyi among many others) can be produced by, and be working data of, a wide variety of relational networks not otherwise in the least like the competitive, world-scale price-making markets so “anarchic” in Marx’s view and so productive of “anomie” in Durkheim’s.

A Concluding Comment

I began this sketch of introductory considerations by remarking that there was nothing mysterious or exotic about the kind of inquiry and the field of inquiry coming to be known as the study of the capitalist world-economy or world-system studies. I have also tried to suggest, albeit necessarily sketchily, that this way of understanding modern
social change derives in a fairly straightforward way from preceding approaches.

At the same time, and this is the concluding remark, once one begins to work from the premises of world-historical studies, it does become necessary to rethink, rather carefully, most of the conceptions and methods we have learned to work with. Put slightly differently, the basic ideas are all quite familiar: they are fairly simple extensions of widely known ideas. But once one reaches the vantage point afforded by these extensions, it becomes necessary to reconsider the very concepts used in reaching that vantage point. Let me illustrate this concluding remark with comments on two key terms, “trade” and “wage labor”.

One way we get to a notion of a world-scale social economy is by reflecting on the massive presence of “long distance trade.” But from the vantage point of that construct (world-economy), “trade” per se may or may not be of importance. Where trade between two points disposes of irregular surpluses or makes up for irregular shortages is one thing. Where it is the continuing link between two serially related production processes is of course something very different. In the latter, the end product of one may be the raw material of the other (and so “consumed” by it); or the finished product of one, may be a tool of the other (and so again “consumed” by it); or the product of one may provide not means of production, but staple means of subsistence for the labor of the other (and so “consumed” by it); and so forth. What is decisive is neither transport of goods nor exchange of “values”, but instead whether the trade in question is or is not an integral segment of a larger complex of interrelated production processes.

Analogous considerations attend the question of “wage-labor”: In thinking about the production of surplus and accumulation of capital on a world scale, “labor”, especially “wage-labor” are necessary points of departure. But once working with the idea of “accumulation on a world scale”, we need to rethink our ideas. So, one might say: Where money payments are made to workers who do not have means to produce their means of subsistence and who exchange the money payments for means of subsistence, this is integral in the development of capitalism. If:forms a phase of the circuits through which capital accumulates; but not otherwise. By the same token, other forms of social relations of production are integral to the development of capitalism if they form integral phases of the accumulation process. From the point of view of the student of modern social change, the liturgical-performing oikos or the self-provisioning latifundium differ fundamentally from the cotton- or sugar-producing plantation, for they are parts of fundamentally different systems of social relations. So also, therefore, are the seemingly “common” master-slave relations structuring each.

In effect, we use certain conceptual Schemas — interrelated concepts — to construct the notion of the modern world-system. But then it becomes a construct, a conceptual schema; and the relations among the concepts which we used to gain our new vantage point must then be reworked in the light of the increments to our understanding which our newly acquired angle of vision affords us. For our interest of course lies not in maintaining intact definitional connections among categories just for their own sake, but in comprehending ongoing processes at work at a moment in our active participation in those processes.

NOTES

1. For a much fuller sketch of these organizing ideas, see Chapter 2.
2. The writings are extensive. Key works include Baran (1957) and the subsequent writings of, among others, Samir Amin, F.H. Cardoso, Teotonia dos Santos, André Gunder Frank, Tamas Szentes.
3. The original formulation is in Emmanuel (1972). For the continuing debate, see among others, Braun (1973); Amin (1973); Somaini et al. (1973). See Samuelson (1975) for an attack on the concept and Emmanuel (1977) for a rejoinder.
4. See for one line of work formative of this tradition, DuBois (1935). For a second, see Cox (1948, 1964); James (1938); Williams (1944). For a third, Fanon (1966); Freyre (1956); Memmi (1967).
5. Work in progress by Cedric Robinson on Black Marxists elucidates the originality and continuity of many of the ideas defining the Black intellectual tradition within and against Western social thought and demonstrates their theoretical scope and coherence with such creativity that his study will in all likelihood be received as a major theoretical contribution in its own right.

In a totally different vein is James Geschwender’s (1977) account of Detroit’s League of Revolutionary Black Workers (unhappily entitled against his preferences, Class, Race and Worker Insurgency), in which one begins to see how monographic interpretative accounts can use such beginnings of a theory of social consciousness as we have to interrelate social structure, organization, and ideology and in that way to contribute to the theory’s development and eventual explicit formulation. Commonly cited sources of such theory include Marx and Engels (1947); Lukacs (1971); Gramsci (1971); and Thompson (1964).

5. Introductory accounts include Polanyi (1944: 3-30, 259-66); Dehio (1962); and Barraclough (1967: ch. 4).
6. The distinction between world-economy and world-empire is theoretically fundamental to Immanuel Wallerstein’s interpretative account of why there ever was a “transition” from “feudalism” to “capitalism” in Europe. See Wallerstein (1974a: ch. 7; 1947b).

7. Similar dismay about where “theories” of state-formation start from is expressed by Tilly (1975) in a work he contributed to as well as edited. However, the line of inquiry being pursued by Stein Rokkan (in too many scattered pieces to cite here) suggests that it may be necessary to qualify this observation in the near future.

8. Both are also taken up, though more briefly, in Hopkins (Chapter 7). It is important to be clear here. There is now a growing number of good articles on method which show how, in the authors’ views, a given method may be made use of in world-system studies as they understand them. I make no attempt to take up any of these here but pursue instead a different line of attack: given the directions which world-system studies are taking, what basic problems of method do they seem to raise? I imagine the two lines of attack will in due course meet and prove complementary, but they are still very far apart now.

9. The list of discussants is long. Three very disparate ones are Nagel (1961: ch. 14); Campbell (1963); and Zelditch and Hopkins (1961).

10. “I should be perfectly content if I had shown both that there is no intrinsic difference between historical and causal explanations, and that causal explanations do in fact all have the form of stories” (Danto, 1965:237). Analytical philosophers are of little or no help in suggesting how a researcher may or may not proceed and why. But they are extremely helpful in suggesting what one has probably done or failed to do.

11. The following remarks touch on only two matters of method implied in the profound polemic concluding Chapter I of Capital, entitled “The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof” (sect. 4). I call attention to this section of Capital here because far too few commentators on method, especially on “Marxist method”, seem to have even shuddered at, let alone grasped, the extraordinary implications for the conduct of inquiry (and definition of science) entailed by the reflexive epistemology that informs and organizes this polemic. Categories like surplus value, proletariat, and capital are way-stations on the road to transforming our world, not shrines to be prayed at every time the route our writing takes brings us to one.

12. As Hempel (1965:425) puts it, “Thus construed, the word ‘explanation’ and its cognates are pragmatic terms: their use requires references to the persons involved in the process of explaining.” What is needed, however, is the construction of “a nonpragmatic concept of scientific explanation—a concept which is abstracted, as it were, from the pragmatic one” (1965:426).

13. On that specific point, see, e.g., Hindess (1973).