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in a Peripheral Region of Southern Italy

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Capitalist Development in Hostile Environments:

**Feuds, Class Struggles, and
Migrations in a Peripheral Region
of Southern Italy**

Giovanni Arrighi
Fortunata Piselli

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the formation of a wage-labor force in a peripheral environment. The peripheral environment on which we have conducted our research¹ is one of the poorest regions of southern Italy

1. This article is based on the findings of a research project coordinated by Giovanni Arrighi and funded by the Istituto per lo Sviluppo delle Attività e delle Ricerche Scientifiche in Calabria on behalf of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Research started in 1974, and initially focused on labor migration from Calabria. Soon, however, the focus shifted to the different patterns of social conflict/cohesion that had characterized Calabria in its recent past. The working hypotheses of the group were elaborated, on the basis of secondary research, in various unpublished papers by the coordinator and other members of the group (Laura Ammannati, Pino Arlacchi, Vito Barresi, Giancarlo Carloti, Piero Fantozzi, Luigi Luini, Marta Petruszewicz, Antonello Pucci, Fortunata Piselli, Franco Santopolo, Daniela Versace). Arlacchi (1983) made extensive use of this unpublished material. Most of the fieldwork (archival research and participant observation in three villages—one for each of the zones discussed in

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(Calabria). From the point of view of our object of analysis, the significance of Calabria lies in its long and diversified history of labor-market formation. As early as 1450, people in Calabria were free to move about and to sell their labor power where they wished or where they best could (Galasso, 1967). Yet, as Aymard (1982: 133) has pointed out, “[the] freedom of the individual to move was not sufficient to create a labor market.” For over five centuries, the territorial mobility of labor has been associated with the successive appearance and disappearance of a whole variety of relations of production and exchange.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, a system of land tenure known as the *latifondo contadino* (peasant latifundium) had come to predominate throughout the region. The system was not the same everywhere. Arrangements between peasants and landlords showed great variations from place to place, but all these arrangements had one characteristic in common: large landed estates were partly farmed by the landowner, predominantly with wage labor, and partly subdivided into plots and farmed by peasants who paid rent in cash or kind. In the second half of the nineteenth century (roughly from the 1860’s up to the First World War), the *latifondo contadino* tended to disappear, giving rise not to one but to three distinct social formations.

In the Crotonese (see Figure 1), the peasant latifundium was transformed in a way that resembled Lenin’s (1936) “Junker or Prussian road”: the landed estates were transformed into large capitalist enterprises (known in the literature on Calabria as *latifondi capitalistici*) run by the landlords (directly or through one of their employees) who employed wage labor, produced for the market, and aimed at a maximum profit. The tenants were evicted and either left the estates for good or continued to reside on them as wage workers.

the text) was carried out by Fortunata Piselli between 1975 and 1984. The main results of this investigation were published in Piselli (1981) and Piselli & Arrighi (1985). The present article is based on the published and unpublished findings of the research group, and was written in this form after we had read the article by Carol Smith reprinted in this issue of *Review*. We would like to thank Piero Bevilacqua, John Casparis, Camillo Daneo, Terence K. Hopkins, Marta Petruszewicz, and Beverly J. Silver for useful comments and criticisms at various stages of preparation of the article.




Figure 1: Map of Calabria and the Three Areas Analyzed in the Article

In the Plain of Gioia Tauro, in contrast, the peasant latifundium evolved in a way that resembled Lenin's "farmer or American road": the peasants became farmers producing for the market—some turning into small capitalists who employed wage labor to supplement family labor, and others turning into semiproletarians who hired out part of the family's labor to supplement the incomes derived from the sale of produce. In this instance, the landlords generally sold part of their land to

the more well-to-do peasant-farmers, continued to collect rent on another part, and became medium-sized capitalist entrepreneurs on yet another part.

In the Cosentino, the peasant latifundium evolved in neither of the above two directions. Here, it evolved toward a system of peasant holdings that employed family labor, produced predominantly for direct consumption, and sold in the market both their surplus produce (subsistence produce over and above the consumption requirements of the household) and, above all, their surplus labor (labor power that could not effectively be used within the technical and institutional arrangements of subsistence production). The key characteristic of this transformation was that a good part of the income, derived from the sale of labor power in distant labor markets, was saved and eventually invested in the purchase of land and other means of production. As a result of this tendency, the burden of rent on the direct producers was progressively reduced (and the landlords eliminated from the social and economic scene), and the viability of subsistence production was reproduced or even enhanced. We shall label this transformation the “migrant-peasant or Swiss road.”²

The three transformations are schematically shown in Figure 2. In the first part of this article we shall show that, while all three transformations were associated with the further development of a wage-labor force, they generated different

2. The idea of designating this path as the “Swiss road” has occurred to us from a reading of Casparis (1982; 1985). As John Casparis has pointed out to us, Switzerland itself was characterized by three different agricultural regions. The region that most closely parallels the Cosentino was that of the alpine pastoralists who lived at the highest altitudes, derived their subsistence from meat and dairy production (part of which was exchanged for grain and salt), and had engaged in long-distance migration since the sixteenth century (e.g., through the mercenary system). However, migration played a role also in the other two regions. In the region of dispersed homestead of the midlands, subsistence from a mixed agriculture was supplemented by wage labor in cottage industry (e.g., watches in the west, textiles in the east), and there was some long-distance migration to exploitative situations such as coffee plantations in Brazil. In the region of villages of the fertile lowlands, the shift out of grain into meat and dairy production in the nineteenth century was accompanied by migration to the U.S. midwest. It should be noticed that Lenin’s Prussian and American roads were also ideal types that resembled closely only developments in certain regions of Prussia and of the United States, respectively.




Figure 2: The Three Transformations of the Peasant Latifundium

social structures. In the Crotonese, the Junker road produced a landed bourgeoisie with a tight monopoly over the means of production and a landless proletariat with access to means of subsistence only through the sale of labor power and the purchase of commodified means of subsistence with the proceeds. In this case, the sale of labor power was the expression of *full proletarianization* of the formerly peasant household. In the Plain of Gioia, the farmer road produced a stratified rather than a polarized structure: The full-bourgeois and the full-proletarian poles were far less important than in the Crotonese, and the weight and number of intermediate

strata were far greater. Almost everybody had access to the means of producing an income, but only a minority had access to means sufficient to produce a full-subsistence income, let alone to save and accumulate. In this case, the sale of labor power for a wage was the expression of *semiproletarianization*: the condition of petty producers who could eke out a subsistence only by supplementing the sale of produce with the sale of labor power. Finally in the Cosentino, the migrant-peasant road produced neither a stratification nor a polarization, but a leveling of the social structure. Most established households came to have access to means of production sufficient to provide fully for their subsistence (or nearly so). The sale of household labor power, therefore, was only secondarily or not all the expression of proletarianization or semiproletarianization. Rather, it was the expression of a process of *petty accumulation*, in the form of an initial fund with which to establish a new household and occasionally in the form of an increase in the productive and unproductive wealth of established households.

These differences in social structure had important implications for the welfare of the peoples involved and for the patterns of social conflict and cohesion that became dominant in the three situations. Thus, in the Crotonese, the extreme polarization of the social structure was associated with an extreme impoverishment of the majority of the population and with an endemic state of class struggle over cultivation and property rights between the landed bourgeoisie and the landless proletariat. In the Plain of Gioia, the stratification of the social structure was associated with less widespread poverty and more diffuse wealth than in the Crotonese and with endemic struggles among rival patronage groups that were more akin to feuds than to class struggles. Finally, in the Cosentino, long-distance/long-term migration contributed to the formation and consolidation of relatively prosperous rural communities in which social conflict tended to decline both horizontally (i.e., among kinship groups) and vertically (i.e., between landlords and peasants).

This tripartite pattern of development poses some interesting questions, which we shall try to answer in the second part of the article. In the first place, systems of production that are often construed as successive stages in the development of capitalism (subsistence production, small-scale commodity production, and large-scale commodity production) developed in Calabria next to each other and at about the same historical time. A first problem, therefore, is to explain how and why in the second half of the nineteenth century a single system of land tenure gave rise, within the same region, to three distinct patterns of social change.

In the second place, if none of the three roads to wage labor can be construed as successive stages of capitalist development, neither can any of them be construed as a feature of core positions or as a feature of peripheral positions. The very labels we have used to designate them (Prussian, American, Swiss) underscore the fact that elsewhere these paths have been associated with economic development/ascent to core position. Yet, in Calabria they were *all* associated with economic underdevelopment/peripheralization. As we shall see, the forms of peripheralization were different in the three instances, but in all instances social and economic actors were increasingly confined to the performance of subordinate roles in the competitive struggles of the world-economy.

This is a major difference between our account of regional differentiation in Calabria and Carol Smith's account of regional differentiation in western Guatemala. The two regional configurations are strikingly similar, but, while in Carol Smith's account there is an identification on a priori grounds of "capitalist agriculture" with a core position, of "trade" with a semiperipheral position, and of "peasant agriculture" with a peripheral position, in our account the identification of specific relations of production with specific structural positions of the world-economy is done on *empirical* grounds. As it turns out, all three systems of production seem to perform peripheral roles (see "Patterns of Peripheralization" below). A second problem, therefore, is to explain how and why paths of social

change that elsewhere have been associated with core development, in Calabria were associated with peripheralization.

Finally, as shown in Figure 2, after the Second World War the internal differentiation of Calabria became increasingly blurred as the three roads to wage labor merged into a system of production in which, one, a large proportion of previously cultivated land was no longer put to agricultural use, and, two, the land that did remain under cultivation came to be exploited throughout Calabria by a combination of vertically integrated agrobusinesses, full-lifetime farmers using capital- and skill-intensive methods of production, and part-lifetime wage workers who integrated their wage incomes with agricultural production for sale and/or direct consumption. The task of the third and last part of the article is to explain how and why, after a century of divergence, the three roads to wage labor suddenly (in historical time) began to converge toward a single pattern. A brief concluding section will then sum up the main results of the analysis and point out its theoretical implications.

Part I: Three Roads to Wage Labor

1. The Migrant-Peasant (Swiss) Road

The migrant-peasant road as it developed in the Cosentino had three main features.³ First, it was subsistence oriented. The direct producers owned or had control over the use of the means of production (land, livestock, tools, and so on). Market exchange played a marginal role in the disposal of the households' products and in the procurement of inputs, particularly but not exclusively current inputs. The bulk of the means of subsistence and of production were either produced directly within the household or obtained through forms of barter and ceremonial exchange, which often included exchange of labor services among kin and neighbors. Cooperation aimed at self-sufficiency was the organizing principle that

3. Evidence for the account of the migrant-peasant road given in this section can be found in Piselli (1981) and Piselli & Arrighi (1985: 379-92, 424-28).

dominated social and economic action, and was enforced through interlocking networks of kinship, coparenthood, and neighborhood.

Secondly, the migrant-peasant road was strictly regulated by customary rules. Particularly significant for our present purposes were the customary norms that regulated inheritance and marriage. Various forms of primogeniture prevented the fragmentation of productive units, and, combined with norms that restricted the right to marry, they generated an abundant supply of subordinate domestic labor over and above the requirements of the household. This surplus of labor was not allowed to overburden the household's resources. Traditionally, it was absorbed unproductively by the Church or the state, but in the period under consideration it came to be mobilized productively through long-distance migration.

This brings us to the third main feature of the migrant-peasant road. As underscored by its very designation, it relied heavily on migration. Three types of migration, each corresponding to a different kind of labor surplus, must be distinguished. The first type was seasonal and short-distance. It consisted of individuals or, more often, groups of kin and neighbors who took advantage of the territorial differences in regimes of agricultural production to sell labor power outside their territory within Calabria or neighboring regions. Through this type of migration, established peasant households transformed the surplus of labor associated with seasonal fluctuations in agricultural activities into command over monetary means, which could be used for purchases and payments outside the subsistence economy.

The second kind of migration was permanent emigration and was largely toward urban rather than rural areas of Calabria and neighboring regions. In contrast to seasonal migration, it was individual in character, and it involved almost exclusively the lower strata and the deviant members of the peasant community. More specifically, those who emigrated permanently were impoverished peasants, illegitimate children (identified in the local culture as *proietti*, literally "outcasts") who were excluded by birth from family and

kinship rights, and other individuals (illegitimate or not) who could not bring themselves to respect the strict customary rules and obligations—rules that denied to many the right to marry and start a household of his or her own. Through this kind of permanent migration, overpopulation was drastically reduced, deviance expelled, and the structures and rules of subsistence production correspondingly strengthened.⁴

The third type of migration, and the most important for the development of the migrant-peasant road, was long-term/long-distance migration. In contrast to permanent emigration, long-distance migration was not predominantly undertaken by impoverished peasants, outcasts, and deviant individuals. Rather, it was undertaken by individuals of intermediate social status (intermediate, that is, between landlords and impoverished peasants) who fully accepted the rules and obligations of the communities from which they came and to which they intended to return. Being long term, this kind of migration involved long periods of absence from the community (10-20 years), and, being long distance, it involved costs and risks that made it a real “enterprise.” As a consequence, only those who belonged to cohesive and extended kin-groups, and accepted the rules and obligations that regulated such groups, could mobilize the material and moral resources necessary to undertake the enterprise: to pay the expenses of the journey, to ensure the survival/adjustment of the migrant in the locales of immigration, and to ensure the survival of the migrant’s nuclear family which, as a rule, was left behind for a good part of, or for the entire period of absence.⁵

4. The most relevant phenomenon of deviance, both on the quantitative and qualitative level, was without doubt the *figli proietti* (i.e., illegitimate children). The custom of primogeniture, the rigid family/social hierarchy, and the subordination of children to the priorities of the family, suffocated the aspirations of many individuals. As a result, the community produced an extremely high number of illegitimate children. In the community of Altopiano (a fictitious name for the village of the Cosentino where Fortunata Piselli did fieldwork), for example, from the late 1880’s until the early 1950’s the percentage of legitimate children oscillated between 70% and 80% of those born. The other 20%-30% were composed of those given to wet nurses, those put in foundling hospitals, and children of overseas emigrants whose fathers were absent for many years and to whom, therefore, physiological paternity could not be attributed.

5. While overseas emigration was generally of long duration and concluded with the return of the migrant in about 80% of the cases, for a small percentage of the

In this connection it should be noticed that long-distance migration became the main, if not the only way in which the male members of the communities in question could solve the contradiction that inevitably arose between adherence to the customary rules of the community and the “natural” desire, upon reaching adulthood, to escape a subordinate position in the household. The contradiction was solved through the widespread custom of getting married on the eve of the departure and of leaving the wife behind (in his or her family’s household) until the migrant had accumulated sufficient savings to form a new viable unit of subsistence production.⁶

This arrangement had two immediate effects, irrespective of whether the migrant actually returned or not: One, it strengthened social networks of kinship and neighborhood in the locales of emigration, and two, it projected such networks into the locales of immigration, thereby facilitating further rounds of migration.⁷ In the longer run, if and when the migrants actually returned with enough savings to set themselves up as independent householders (as many did), the structures of independent subsistence production would be further consolidated and expanded via the purchase of land from absentee

emigrants it became a permanent phenomenon. Those who rejected the prescribed model of behavior (for example, younger sons who wanted to marry against the will of their parents) or those who wanted to escape their situation of material and social marginalization (for example, illegitimate children) showed a greater predisposition both to emigrate and to consider it as a definite break with the community of origin.

6. Not everyone made a fortune or managed to accumulate the money necessary to return to the village and initiate a new productive activity. Above all, of those who emigrated to South America (where money-making possibilities were, in general, scarcer than in North America) many did not return. For this reason, South America was known in popular parlance as “*l’America e d’u scuordu*” (i.e., the America of oblivion). In this context, the phenomenon of the “white widows” emerged, that is, the wives of those emigrants who neither returned nor sent news about themselves. These were married women without husbands, de facto widows without the possibility of contracting a new marriage and thus obliged to suffer the constrictions of both marriage and widowhood. Emigration could also be a particular form of “divorce Italian-style.” Some young men, after marrying the woman that family exigencies had imposed on them for the rest of their lives, emigrated to America never sending news as to their whereabouts again.

7. Thus originated the phenomenon of the so-called *catene di richiamo* (migration chains), which were progressively strengthened and enlarged. An emigrant “called” kin and neighbors in the area of immigration, and these in turn “called” others.

landowners and investment in land improvements and better means of production.

It follows that long-term/long-distance migration from the Cosentino not only reduced demographic pressure and social tensions (as did permanent emigration) while increasing the command of subsistence producers over monetary means (as did seasonal migration). It was also a powerful factor of continuity and generational expansion of the local social networks in which subsistence production was embedded and through which it was carried on. These networks, in turn, provided an increasingly solid base from which to “raid” the world-economy in search of the most rewarding opportunities to transform a surplus of labor into a command over monetary means.⁸ The wage labor produced by the migrant-peasant road, therefore, was only in small part the wage labor of proletarians selling labor power in order to procure means of subsistence. This was the case for permanent migrants but not for long-term and seasonal migrants, who were in fact protoentrepreneurs selling labor power in order to accumulate.

One of the most important consequences of the development of the peasant-migrant road was the demise of social conflict in all its traditional forms. Historically, the Cosentino had been even less “peaceful” than the Crotonese or the Plain of Gioia (see II.1). Social conflict had taken three main forms: brigandage, periodical seizures of lands to reaffirm customary arrangements on the use of common land (*usi civici*), and feuds among kin-groups and territorial communities. With the development of long-distance migration, however, these forms of conflict either declined (brigandage) or acquired a ritual character that emptied them of most or all of their violent components (occupation of lands and feuds). To be sure, repressive state action played a major role in the determination of both tendencies. Equally important, however, was the fact that, as landlords were “bought out” with the proceeds of long-distance migration, the scope for class struggle between peasants and landlords was increasingly narrowed. And as

8. On migration as a factor of social continuity in other peripheral contexts, see Watson (1958) and Van Velsen (1960).

absolute scarcity and social tensions were lessened by all three types of migration, occasions for sustained feuding became fewer.⁹ Brigandage, being a composite form of conflict that combined elements of the feud and of the class struggle, declined correspondingly.

This does not mean that other types of conflict did not arise. Apart from the conflicts that arose in the sites of immigration, to which we shall turn in part III, the peasant-migrant road entailed, and continuously reproduced, a highly oppressive and repressive form of patriarchalism. The particular conflicts generated by this endemic oppression were either made moot by migration or played out within a strained domestic sphere that community norms constrained to stay intact. In any event, when we speak of the demise of social conflict and of the evolution of a peaceful and cohesive society, we do so comparatively—in comparison, specifically, to what had previously been in the Cosentino itself and to the developmental tendencies evident in the other two locales under investigation.

2. *The Junker (Prussian) Road*

Developments in the Crotonese, along what resembles Lenin's Junker or Prussian road, offer the sharpest contrast to the migrant-peasant road of the Cosentino.¹⁰ None of the three main features of the latter was in evidence. There was little subsistence production by peasants and few socially enforced customary rules and obligations. Massive emigration had accompanied the eviction of the peasantry (i.e., so-called primitive accumulation in classic form), and the disintegration of community that this once-and-for-all depopulation of the countryside entailed, left the growth of the new institutions unshaped by virtually any of the once-customary relational rights or obligations.

The typical and all-encompassing unit of production was the so-called capitalist latifundium (*latifondo capitalistico*), which

9. On the connection between feuding and absolute scarcity, see Black-Michaud (1975).

10. Evidence for the account of the Junker road given in this section can be found in Piselli & Arrighi (1985: 405-14, 420-24).

employed wage labor and produced for profit by sale in the market. Production switched back and forth between arable and pasturage according to the prices of grain versus those for wool and cheese on the one hand and (given the greater labor intensity of grain production) the availability of cheap labor on the other.

Paradoxically, the closer a unit was to rationality in market terms, the more “primitive” (i.e., land and labor intensive) its agriculture. As Rossi Doria (1948: 7-9) has pointed out, in order to switch quickly from herding to sowing grain, the enterprise had to be kept as simple as possible. Fixed investment was avoided because it impeded rapid switching of capital from one sort of rural land-use to the other. When assessed against the standard of the ideotypical capitalist enterprise, therefore, the capitalist *latifundium* was only “half-capitalist.” It was capitalist in the formal sense of being market and profit oriented in its choices of inputs and outputs within a given production function. It was not capitalist (or very partially so) in the substantive historical sense of continuously revolutionizing the production function itself (see Schumpeter, 1961).

The surplus commanded by the *latifondisti* (a combination of rent and profit) as well as their entrepreneurial energies were mobilized, not to dominate market conditions impersonally and indirectly via revolutions in production functions, but to dominate such conditions personally and directly via political mechanisms. At the national level, the most conspicuous results of this strategy were the protectionist measures taken by Italian governments from the late 1880’s up through the Second World War (see “Development of Regional Differentiation” and “Peripheralization and the Crisis of Commodity Production” below). At the local level, however, the most conspicuous and most consequential measures were in the sphere of labor relations.

The static nature of the production function and the related strategy of keeping the use of land as flexible as possible called forth, as a necessary complement, a strategy aimed at keeping wages low (because of the labor intensity of grain production)

and, simultaneously, at preventing human settlement on the lands of the latifundium. In part, this double objective had been attained through the original eviction of tenants, the process that at the outset transformed the *latifondo contadino* into the *latifondo capitalistico*. The expropriation, through the unilateral elimination of long-term leases, cleared the land of most peasant settlements and transformed the inhabitants of those that remained into rural proletarians who could not piece together even the most meager of subsistences without selling their labor power to the estates on a continuous basis.¹¹

This full proletarianization, however, had two broad negative effects so far as the development of the estates and capitalist enterprises was concerned. First, the depeasantization of the latifundium curtailed and “flattened” the local supply of labor. It curtailed the labor supply because it induced a large wave of once-and-for-all *permanent* emigration, which depopulated the countryside and produced a structural deficiency of labor in the whole area.¹² In addition, the local supply of labor also became “flatter,” that is, devoid of seasonal and skilled components. When part of the latifundium was cultivated by tenant-peasants, the landlord could draw from the stock of skills that peasants developed as producers on their subsistence plots, and he could take advantage of differences in the regimes of production of the two parts of the latifundium to obtain an abundant labor supply during seasonal peaks. As peasants were turned into full proletarians, the seasonal variability of their labor supply was immediately lost, and after a generation or two the wide array of agricultural skills was lost as well. The flexibility gained in the use of land resources by expropriation was lost in the narrowed capacities, and full-time dependence of the labor supply thereby formed.

11. On the process of formation of the capitalist latifundium in the Crotonese, see the important case study analyzed by Petruszewicz (1979).

12. At the turn of the century the Crotonese generated long-distance migration flows, which were quite large, although not as large as those originating in the Cosentino (see Appendix I). Our findings contradict Arlacchi's contention (based on an inadequate analysis of insufficient official statistics) that the migratory flows from the Crotonese were insubstantial in comparison with the strength of the migration from the Cosentino (1983: 173ff).

Secondly, the depeasantization of the latifundium workers transformed the latter's surly compliance in the lord-peasant relation into the straightforward antagonism of the capital-labor relation, with negative effects on disciplined work and respect for land and property. A regime of agricultural production that prospered by depriving labor of cultivation rights (in order to preserve flexibility in the use of land) and by granting wages grossly insufficient to guarantee a full-lifetime physical subsistence to its work force could never become, and never did become, legitimate in the eyes of workers. On the contrary, it fed a deep resentment that, whenever the occasion arose, was translated into widespread theft, damage to property, infringement of the rules denying cultivation rights, and pervasively poor work performance.

These contradictions of full proletarianization were never resolved. They were, however, kept in check, from the point of view of capital, by two related developments. One was the development of a symbiotic relation between the capitalist latifundium and the agricultural regimes that were emerging in neighboring territories such as the Cosentino and the Plain of Gioia. Under these other regimes the structures of rural production were being strengthened or stratified, but in either case preserved. The *latifondisti* of the Crotonese could therefore fill the local deficiency of seasonal and skilled labor by drawing from the labor surplus of the other areas. As a matter of fact, they developed the practice of recruiting more labor than was strictly necessary to fill the local deficiency so as to keep up the pressure of competition on the local proletariat.

This pressure was particularly intense owing to the fact that the peasants who sold labor power to the capitalist latifundia not only commanded skills that the proletarianized workers of the Crotonese were losing or had lost; they also expected a wage level sufficient only to supplement, or to complement, a subsistence produced or earned elsewhere. In a sense, many of them could be said to have been practicing a form of "dumping" through which their labor surplus was sold under cost in the labor market of the Crotonese. As a consequence of this intense competitive pressure, the local rural proletariat

was forced to sell its labor power at wages below the level necessary for it to pay even for the foodstuffs needed for subsistence.¹³

This was only a partial and short-term solution to the labor problems of the capitalist latifundium. For one thing, by keeping the rural proletariat below the level of physiological subsistence, it tended to degrade and further deplete the latifundium's internal labor supplies. In the long run, this tendency would increase the dependence of the *latifondisti* on external supplies and, therefore, their vulnerability to competition for the peasants' labor surplus. Moreover, the strategy to intensify competitive pressures on the rural proletariat through heavy recruitment of non- and semiproletarianized outsiders provided only a very limited solution to the other problem posed by full proletarianization—that is, keeping the antagonism of the rural proletariat under control.

To some extent, the intensification of competition, combined with the segmentation of the labor force into groups drawn from different communities and class situations, did provide a solution to this problem by preventing the coalescence of class

13. In Campolungo (a fictitious name for the village of the Crotonese where Fortunata Piselli did fieldwork) there were on average 600-700 local workers (including some children under 14 years of age), and during the high labor-demand season (harvest, thrashing, etc.) another 300-400 workers arrived from outside. Given the greater competitiveness of the external labor force this policy of the *latifondisti* maintained, even during the season of high agricultural labor demand, conditions of unemployment among the local proletariat that fed mobility and internal competition. The local workers only worked for a few months a year and lived in uncertainty as to whether they would even be able to secure these months. They were forced to complete various successive steps to ensure their employment, including the activation of clientelistic networks.

Not only did the workers of the Crotonese work for just a few months per year, but their wages were also among the lowest in all of Calabria: at the beginning of the twentieth century in Campolungo a worker earned 1 lira and 25 cents, while in other areas of Calabria a worker earned 2-3 lire, or even as much as 4 lire. In Olivara (our site of fieldwork in the Plain of Gioia) the wage of a worker ranged from a minimum of 1 lira and 75 cents to 3 lire (see *Inchiesta Parlamentare*, 1909: 276, 280).

The miserable living conditions of the laboring population of the Crotonese had a devastating effect on their physical health. This was evident above all in comparison with the more robust and healthy population of the Cosentino, who had at least the means to produce their physical subsistence (see Arlacchi, 1983: 177ff).

solidarity.¹⁴ However, the strategy of keeping class antagonisms in check through competitive pressure alone was ineffective insofar as noncooperation and indiscipline were concerned and, moreover, was unpredictable in its capacity to forestall collective action: “Explosive social material” tended to accumulate and at a favorable conjuncture would easily detonate.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the *latifondisti* never relied exclusively (or even principally) on the intensification of intralabor competition to discipline the work force and keep class antagonism in check. Rather, the development of a symbiotic relation between the capitalist latifundia of the Crotonese and the peasant communities of neighboring territories was paralleled and sustained by the development of an internal repressive apparatus, which made the latifundia assume the twofold character of capitalist enterprises and quasimilitary organizations.

14. In Campolungo, for example, the shepherds all came from certain villages (from Castel Silano, Caccuri, Cerenzia, San Giovanni in Fiore, Carlopoli); likewise, the cattle-drivers tended to come from certain villages; the day-laborers came from Reggio Calabria and the villages of the Cosentino. Certain residential communities were integrated first, others later; some were stable latifundio workers (cattle-keepers, shepherds), others were mobile and seasonal (agricultural workers). Shepherds, cattle-keepers, and day-laborers formed so many residential subgroups of the agricultural work force. They constituted separate groups, distinct in their dialect, in their customs, in their kinship and neighbor networks, and in their occupations and relations with the boss.

Competition between the work forces (local or seasonal) was a consequence of the general scarcity of resources: scarcity of work, of food, of land. The condition of scarcity restricted the development of the sphere of generalized and balanced reciprocity while enlarging the sphere of negative reciprocity. Each one could find himself in the circumstances of maximizing his own interests and of defending his own subsistence and security at the expense of another. The most friendly form was that of a game of chance, the famous “*tirare a tocco*” conducted by common agreement; the agricultural workers pooled together all of their food rations, which the most expert divided into unequal parts (from the most abundant to one that received none), and then they drew lots. The winner had the right to satiate himself at the expense of the others. In other instances, the methods used for maximizing one’s own interests were even more direct and explicit, such as robbery and the denouncing of co-workers. Thus, for example, the day-laborers were obliged to keep the bread on their belt so that their fellow-workers could not steal it. Likewise, if they were driven to steal by hunger, they could expect to be denounced by a companion, ready to do anything in order to protect himself against the accusations of others and to put himself in a good light in the eyes of the landlord.

15. The metaphor is borrowed from Hobsbawm (1964).

Many of the wage workers employed on a stable basis (*salarinati fissi*) became armed guards who performed the double role of private police and supervisors of the labor process. They imposed the orders of their masters on the laborers who were employed on a daily, weekly, or at most monthly basis. They threatened (and when necessary executed) harsh sanctions against transgressors, and they assured the security of persons and property on the estates. The reproduction of the landowners' monopoly over the use of land resources thus went hand in hand with the enforcement of a territorial monopoly over the use of violence.

This double monopoly could of course only be exercised with the connivance and ultimate backing of agencies of the state. Conscious of this dependence, the landowners pursued an active policy of monopolization of local administrative and judicial power either directly or through kin and clients. Normally, this repressive apparatus (complemented by the intense competitive pressures discussed above) managed to keep the antagonism of the rural proletariat under control. When state power was disorganized, however, or the organic links that connected agrarian capital to the state were disrupted, which was true at the end of the First World War and again at the end of the Second World War, the Crotonese was shaken by sudden explosions of class struggle that had no parallel in other parts of Calabria.

On these occasions, occupations of land had nothing of the ritual and peaceful character of the periodic occupations typical of the Cosentino. They were accompanied by street demonstrations, seizures of public buildings, violent clashes with both the private police of the landowners and the state's military and police forces. These struggles temporarily undermined the territorial monopoly over the use of violence on which the economy of the capitalist latifundium rested, and, as we shall see, they eventually precipitated its demise (see the section on peripheralization and the crisis of commodity production, see II. 3, below).

From the point of view of the evolution of social conflict, therefore, the Junker road produced quite different results

from the migrant-peasant road. Far from leading to a demise of the class struggle, it made class contradictions more explosive. With the transformation of the peasant latifundia into capitalist latifundia, the actors, objectives, and forms of struggle changed: The confrontation between landlords and peasants was displaced by the confrontation between a landed bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat; the object of the confrontation was no longer confined to cultivation rights and property rights but came to include also the right to a subsistence and to decent working conditions; and the struggle took on a more political character as the organic links between the national state and the "internal state" of the latifundia were implicitly or explicitly challenged. Notwithstanding these changes, the conflict retained the character of a "class struggle," and a comparison of the wave of conflict that followed the Second World War with all previous waves suggests that the Junker road not only reproduced but even intensified and enlarged class conflict (see II. 3).

The difference with the Cosentino is brought out starkly by the fact that the intensification of the class struggle was accompanied by a decline of long-distance migration. At the turn of the century the Crotonese had almost as much experience in long-distance emigration as the Cosentino. Migratory flows largely originated in the interior where the expanding capitalist latifundium clashed with the structures of subsistence peasant production. We may suppose, therefore, that long-distance migration from the Crotonese was analogous to that from the Cosentino. What scanty evidence is available seems in fact to support the hypothesis that the subjects of this emigration could rely on the same individual and group resources as the long-distance migrants of the Cosentino.

The analogy, however, did not go much further than this. Particularly significant were the differences in the immediate causes and temporal patterns of migration originating in the two areas. In the Crotonese the push to emigrate did not come so much from the customary norms that restricted rights to inherit and marry as from the growing difficulties of preserving

one's productive and reproductive capabilities in the face of the landlords' centralizing tendencies. The difference was reflected in the fact that long-distance migration from the Crotonese tended to be *permanent*, rather than long-term (10-20 years) as in the Cosentino. Moreover, in the Crotonese, long-distance migration did not have any of the positive feedbacks on the autonomy and social cohesion of peasant households it had in the Cosentino. On the contrary, emigration was often the final blow for community and kinship networks, which had already been weakened by the ongoing process of forced proletarianization.

As soon as the process of proletarianization was completed, long-distance migration fell sharply (see Appendix I). The rural proletariat of the Crotonese did not command the individual and collective resources necessary to undertake the costs and risks of this type of migration. As a matter of fact, the moral and material impoverishment of the rural proletariat were such that even its ability to compete effectively in the regional labor markets was undermined. And as the scope of "exit" narrowed, "voice" became the only option open to the rural proletariat to escape the exploitation and oppression of the landed bourgeoisie and its repressive apparatus.

3. *The Farmer (American) Road*

The farmer road, as it developed in the Plain of Gioia, had some traits in common with both the Junker and the migrant-peasant road.¹⁶ However, these traits and others that were absent in the other two roads were combined in a distinctive way. As in the Junker road, outputs were sold and inputs were bought in markets, but, as in the migrant-peasant road, the direct producers generally had some control over the use of the means of production. It was regulated neither by the visible hand of the landlords and the state (as was the Junker road) nor by customary rules and obligation (as was the migrant-

16. Evidence for the account of the farmer road given in this section can be found in Piselli & Arrighi (1985: 393-404, 415-20).

peasant road), but by a combination of market competition and power struggles among rival patronage groups.

It generated neither the polarized social structure typical of the Junker road nor the homogeneous social structure typical of the migrant-peasant road. Instead, it produced a highly stratified social structure, which included: (1) an upper stratum of landowners turned into medium-sized capitalists, who were also part-rentiers since they leased land to farmers and other capitalists; (2) an upper-middle stratum of farmers turned into small-to-medium-sized capitalists, who systematically accumulated in excess of what was necessary to reproduce their households' capacity to generate a subsistence income; (3) a middle stratum of independent farmers, who accumulated more or less what was necessary to reproduce over time their households' capacity to generate a subsistence income; (4) a lower-middle stratum of semiproletarianized farmers, who did not accumulate enough to reproduce over time their households' capacity to generate a subsistence income; (5) a lower stratum of fully proletarianized laborers.¹⁷

17. The much greater social stratification in the Plain of Gioia can also be seen from the distribution of land in the three areas. For example, landownership was more fragmented in Olivara (a fictitious name for the village of the Plain of Gioia were Fortunata Piselli did fieldwork) than in Altopiano and far more fragmented than in Campolungo. According to the 1947 INEA survey on the distribution of landed property in Italy, 32.5% of the agricultural land in Olivara was concentrated in the hands of large landowners (6 landowners occupied 1,682 hectares); 21.9% was in the hands of medium-sized farmers (10 landowners occupied 619 hectares and 15 occupied 513 hectares); while the remaining 45.6% was fragmented into small and very small property (69 landowners occupied 751 hectares; 170 occupied 516 hectares; and 2,265 occupied 1,092 hectares).

In Altopiano 53% of the agricultural land was concentrated in the hands of large landowners (22 landowners occupied 6,383 hectares); 12% was divided among medium-sized producers (28 landowners possessed 1,392 hectares), and the remaining 35% was fragmented into small and very small plots: 169 peasants possessed 1,631 hectares while 3,802 possessed 2,563 hectares.

Finally in Campolungo, where land concentration was the greatest, 76.7% of the agricultural land was concentrated in the hands of only 3 landowners (who possessed 9,505 hectares); another 19.2% of the land was concentrated in the hands of other large landowners (2 occupied 1,531 hectares and 4 occupied 854); and only the remaining 4.1% of the land was divided among medium, small, and very small properties (INEA, 1947).

In addition, the farmer road was characterized by a much greater differentiation of economic activities than the other two roads since the development of market exchanges within the Plain and between the Plain and core markets was sustained by, and gave rise to, a whole variety of trading and manufacturing activities. The households involved in these activities were stratified more or less in the same way as the households involved in agricultural activities. The lower strata of this diversified structure (corresponding to strata 4 and 5 in the above ranking) continuously generated a supply of, and the upper strata a demand for, wage labor. As a consequence, something closer to a competitive labor market than anything that had ever existed in the Cosentino or in the Crotonese came into existence in the Plain of Gioia.

This labor market had important direct and indirect linkages with the economies of neighboring territories as well as with core regions. The main determinant of conditions in the labor market of the Plain were conditions in the markets of its main crops (olives and citrus fruit). When conditions in the export markets were booming, so was the demand for labor in the Plain, not only because capitalist landlords and farmers would be keen on expanding agricultural output, but also because some of them, or entrepreneurs from outside the Plain, would be induced to develop forward and backward linkages between agricultural and other activities.¹⁸

At the same time, however, the supply of labor from local sources, far from expanding to match demand, would stagnate or even contract because the semiproletarianized households that were the main source of such supply could meet their

18. In Olivara, for example, thanks to the impetus from a nucleus of "foreign" capitalist entrepreneurs, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a large number of small and medium-sized firms emerged, not only in export-oriented agriculture, but also in commerce and manufacture. One of these entrepreneurs was Marco Pontillo, who at the age of 20 moved to Olivara from Atrani and set up a successful commercial enterprise, which prospered and rapidly expanded. In 1904 he constructed, in the vicinity of the train station, "a complex of warehouses for food and colonial goods, including abundant olive oil cisterns constructed according to the best technical and hygienic norms" (*Delibera della Giunta*, September 14, 1912). The success of his initiative encouraged the emergence of new firms which set themselves up by the freight yard of Olivara.

subsistence requirements by selling produce as easily as (or more easily than) by selling labor power. An opposite imbalance would occur when export markets were depressed: While profit-oriented production and investment would be cut down both in agricultural and complementary activities, leading to a contraction of labor demand, labor supply would expand owing to the difficulties encountered by semiproletarianized households in procuring the means of subsistence via the sale of produce.

In addition to these world-market induced fluctuations, the labor market of the Plain of Gioia would experience other fluctuations connected to the production cycles of its main crops (seasonal fluctuations, two-year cycles in the fertility of olive trees, pluriannual cycles in labor-intensive investment necessary to restore fertility of land and plantations, etc.) and to the vagaries of climatic and ecological conditions. The overlapping of all these fluctuations continuously produced excess demand or excess supply in the local labor market, which generated partially countervailing migratory movements: Excess demand would generate inbound flows, and excess supply outbound flows.

Both inbound and outbound flows were of two kinds: seasonal and long-term. Seasonal flows were similar to those already discussed in connection with the migrant-peasant and the Junker roads, with one important difference. While the former generated exclusively outbound flows and the latter predominantly inbound flows, the farmer road in the Plain of Gioia generated both inbound and outbound flows. In the months of slack activity in the Plain and peak activities in neighboring areas of small- or large-scale commodity production, members of the lower strata (and to some extent even of the intermediate stratum of independent farmers) would go to sell labor power in the latter areas in competition with local rural proletarians and with migrant-peasants from the interior. In the months of peak activity in the Plain, migrant-peasants from the interior and rural proletarians from coastal areas would come and compete in the Plain's labor market with the local labor force.

This combination of inflows and outflows could also be detected in longer-term migratory movements. In periods of expansion, the Plain of Gioia turned into a site of immigration, not only for the impoverished peasants and outcasts of the interior, but also for a stratum of medium and small entrepreneurs from other Italian regions, who played an important role in the spread of market networks within the Plain and between the Plain and core markets. In periods of contraction, the immigration from other Italian regions would subside, and long-distance migration from the Plain would experience a sharp upturn (see Appendix I).

On average, however, long-distance migration from the Plain of Gioia remained well below the levels attained in the Cosentino. In the latter zone, solid kinship structures and related customary norms provided individuals from intermediate social strata both with the incentives and with the means to undertake long-distance migration. In the Plain of Gioia, in contrast, the looseness of kinship structures and the pervasive influence of market competition generally meant that those who had the means did not have the incentive to emigrate, and those who had the incentive did not have the means. Thus, the vast stratum of semiproletarianized households typical of the Plain (as well as the less numerous but still large stratum of fully proletarianized households) undoubtedly had a strong incentive to emigrate. Generally, however, they could neither count on sufficient means of their own, nor mobilize among relatives and neighbors the resources and assistance necessary to cover the costs and risks of long-distance emigration. Their position was somewhat better than, but similar to, that of the rural proletariat of the Crotonese. As a consequence, they would continue to sell their labor power in the local and regional labor market even under relatively unfavorable conditions.

As for households of the middle and upper-middle strata they undoubtedly had the means but normally had no incentive to undertake long-distance emigration. To be sure, in periods of unfavorable conditions for the activities they were involved in, the incentive would increase, and it was quite common for

them to sell land and other assets to finance emigration. However, these departures were always partially or wholly balanced by incoming settlers who bought the land from those leaving, either to start with new lines or techniques of production, or to continue with the same lines and techniques but with lower expectations.¹⁹

This account of migration to and from the Plain of Gioia underscores the fact that it was a factor and an expression of market regulation. The pervasiveness of market regulation was indeed the *differentia specifica* of the farmer road as distinct from the migrant-peasant and the Junker road. Market regulation, however, did not take place in a social and political void. On the contrary, it took place and was embedded in a context of struggle/domination among rival patronage groups.

In the Plain of Gioia, as in other parts of the Italian south where the peasant latifundium was transformed along the farmer road, the development of market competition did not lead to the withering away of the feud but to its transformation. Kinship groups were progressively displaced by patronage groups as the main actors of the feud, and the feud became interwoven with market competition. Notwithstanding these changes, however, the struggles continued to be carried out with means, and to be legitimated by values, of the “traditional” type.

19. The emigrants from Olivara were continuously replaced by immigrants from nearby internal zones. The emigration of peasants and proprietors following the viniculture crisis at the end of the 1880's, for example, was more than compensated by the immigration of peasants from Serre, from Monte Poro, etc. This replacement mechanism reached its height at times of land redistribution, as in the second half of the nineteenth century and after the Second World War. The land grantees, in order to finance emigration, sold their plots of land to peasants descending toward the coast from the internal regions. In Olivara, for example, in the decade following the occupations initiated in 1946, almost two-thirds of the plots changed ownership, many even before the definitive assignment had been made. “Renouncing occupants” (artisans, employees, etc.) and indebted peasants profited from the inflation of land prices that accompanied the arrival of new immigrants; they ceded their land and emigrated to France or Liguria. Above all, from Melicucco and from Polistena new peasants came who possessed some savings and descended to the plain in order to better their position. These new arrivals, together with the peasants of Olivara and returning emigrants, carried out the first projects of deforestation and land reclamation of the occupied land.

Each round of open struggle ended with the formation of an authority of the mafia type holding a territorial quasimonopoly over the use of violence. Once established, this authority tended to exercise informal governmental functions: it guaranteed order; mediated conflicts; ensured reciprocity in transactions and the respect of contractual obligations; regulated competition by occupying key nodes in the local ramifications of commodity chains; set limits to profit-making and the exploitation of labor; and protected local interests against the powers of the landlords and the state.

Both phases of the struggle/domination cycle, which continuously reproduced the mafia-type authority, derived their legitimacy from a widely shared "code of honor." Whatever the actual origins of this "code," the social consensus commanded by the mafia-type authority can be traced to the fact that it protected local society from the disruption of unfettered market competition on the one hand and from the abuses of an absentee central state on the other. By partially transferring competition from a strictly economic terrain to personalized struggles for status and power; by submitting "outsiders" to its own rules of the competitive game; by hampering a strictly capitalist utilization of the surplus; by displacing the authority of the central state—in these and other ways the mafia-type authority held in check the polarizing tendencies of capitalist production, thereby contributing to the preservation of intermediate social strata.

The feud and the reproduction of a mafia-type authority were thus integral aspects of the farmer road as it developed in the Plain of Gioia. In this respect, the contrast with the declining significance of the feud in the Cosentino is striking. With the development of long-term/long-distance migration, the expansion and consolidation of peasant ownership, and the consequent relief of the situation of absolute scarcity, the feud in the Cosentino became more and more a factor of solidarity rather than an instrument of competition for scarce resources. In its active phase, the feud tended to strengthen loyalties within the counterposed factions. When it ended, its resolution generally involved the marriage or coparenthood (*compar-*

aggio) among members of opposed factions. The development of long-term/long-distance migration and the leveling of the social structure thus created a social environment favorable to the peaceful resolution, and eventually the demise, of both the feud and the class struggle.

In the Plain of Gioia, the conditions for this kind of evolution were missing. The intensification of competitive pressures associated with the development of commodity production, and the related weakening of kinship and neighborhood structures, meant that occasions for feuding multiplied, and that the resolution of the feud continued to be predominantly if not exclusively based on the overpowering of the weaker factions.²⁰ As a consequence, far from deepening and widening solidarity among kin and neighbors, the feud in the social context of the Plain fostered resentments that were bound to generate new rounds of open conflict as soon as relationships of forces among old and new factions changed.

The evolution of social conflict in the Plain of Gioia was also quite different from that experienced by the Crotonese. Notwithstanding some similarities of form, the territorial quasimonopoly of the mafia-type authority over the use of violence differed substantively from the territorial monopoly of the *latifondisti*. The former monopoly was under a constant threat from actual and potential *competitors*, and in this sense it was a *quasimonopoly*. The competitors, however, did not question the rules of the game—that is, that there should be a mafia-type authority and that this authority should be the outcome of feuding. They played the game by its rules, and, as suggested earlier on, by so doing they contributed to the stability of the social structure of small-scale commodity production.

The territorial monopoly over the use of violence enjoyed by the *latifondisti*, in contrast, was not under a competitive as much as a *subversive* threat—the threat, that is, that the rural

20. The mafia phenomenon developed in symbiosis with market activities. In Olivara, for example, the first official testimony on the phenomenon appears in the *Delibere del Consiglio comunale* in 1910, when the mercantile activities of the zone had reached their high point of expansion.

proletariat would not play by the rules of a game according to which the territorial monopoly of violence was a condition of the reproduction of a monopoly over the use of land. Outbreaks of class struggle in the Crotonese were the *memento mori* of the capitalist latifundium: They temporarily revealed the impossibility of the latifundium's survival if the landowners lost their monopoly over the use of violence.

In other words, while the monopoly over the use of violence of the *latifondisti* was essential to, and so an expression of, domination of one class over the other class (and the class struggle was a challenge to such domination), the quasi-monopoly over the use of violence of the *mafiosi* was essential to and so an expression of the partial transfer of competition from the terrain of peaceful market exchange onto the terrain of violent struggle among patronage groups that cut across class divisions. Far from using their quasimonopoly over the use of violence to create or support *class* domination, the *mafiosi* could legitimate and consolidate their power positions only by protecting local society from the disintegrating tendencies of unfettered market competition on the one hand and from the centralizing tendencies of state and capital on the other hand.

Part II: Regional Differentiation and Peripheralization

Having shown that the three roads to wage labor were embedded in, and reproduced, distinct social structures and patterns of social conflict, we shall now advance some hypotheses concerning their historical development: how they came into being, how they unfolded, and how they came to an end. In order to understand this development our focus must shift from the inner dynamics of the three roads to their interrelationships with the dynamics of the world-economy and of the nation-state of which they were integral parts. We shall begin by briefly discussing the historical conjuncture that in the second half of the nineteenth century sustained their "takeoff." We shall then show in which way each of the three roads was associated with "peripheralization" within the wider

context of the world-economy. Finally, we shall discuss how peripheralization had a different impact on the three roads and prepared the ground for their convergence into a single regional pattern after the Second World War.

1. The Development of Regional Differentiation

The differentiation of Calabria along the three roads analyzed in part I became evident in the particular conjuncture of the 1860's characterized by a boom of agricultural prices on the world-market and by the incorporation of Calabria in the newly formed Italian state. The differentiation was consolidated in the subsequent 50 years, which were characterized by a long depression and then recovery of agricultural world prices, and by growing market exchanges within the territory of the new Italian state. Under the impact of the 1860's boom in agricultural prices, capitalist and would-be capitalist producers in Calabria greatly expanded production and sales of traditional staples of regional agriculture, such as grain, olive oil, and wine, as well as of what had previously been marginal crops (citrus fruit and, for a short period, cotton).²¹

The boom of the 1860's was short lived, tied as it was to the interruptions of North American supplies of primary products to the European markets during the Civil War. But the subsequent long depression, which became acute in the 1880's, did not reverse the trend toward an increased commercialization of Calabria's agriculture. Indigenous entrepreneurs of the most diverse extractions (including many landowners), supplemented by traders from other Italian regions, began to innovate and to rationalize production operations and marketing practices to take advantage of the benefits offered by the creation of new routes and means of transport and by the elimination of other obstacles to exchange within the new national economic space and across its boundaries. In addition, the transformation of relations of production in agriculture was induced and sustained by the greater mobility of labor

21. On Calabrian agricultural exports before the nineteenth century, see Chorley (1965).

associated with more secure, faster, and cheaper transports, and by a growing demand for migrant labor within Calabria and immigrant labor overseas (North and South America). When demand for agricultural products in the world markets picked up again in the 1890's, and expanded up through the First World War, the differentiation of Calabria into distinct paths of development was well entrenched, and the new favorable conjuncture simply made the three paths diverge further.

These conjunctures in the development of the world-economy and of the Italian state are essential to an explanation of why the three paths of development unfolded when they did. They cannot, however, explain why three locales with roughly the same beginning social structure and geopolitical location should have developed along divergent paths. Robert Brenner (1977), in his polemic against what he labeled "neo-Smithian Marxism," has counterposed an explanation of divergent paths of development based on geography and ecology (which he attributes to Wallerstein and Frank) to an explanation based on history and sociology. Translated into our own terminology, the essence of his argument seems to be as follows. According to the "neo-Smithians," the development of the world-market creates opportunities for profitable production that vary among different places according to their geographical position, physical environment, and the relation of human groups to such an environment. Profit-maximizers seize these opportunities and by so doing produce different paths of development, that is, different social structures and different histories. Against this position, Brenner (1977) maintains that social structures and their histories are not the dependent but the independent variable, so to speak. Relations among social groups and the outcome of their struggles determine where profit maximizers and opportunities of profitable production arise or do not arise. The action of profit-maximizers, in turn, reshapes economic geography and ecology.

It is not our purpose here to assess the adequacy of this account or the relative merits of the two positions with

reference to the wider issues of the transition from feudalism to capitalism and of contemporary processes of development and underdevelopment in the world-economy as a whole. Nevertheless, the experience of Calabria shows that, *when dealing with agrarian environments*, it may make little sense to counterpose sociology to ecology and geography to history. The inappropriateness of such counterpositions can be illustrated with reference to both the prehistory and the history of the three paths of development outlined in part I.

On the eve of the transformation of the peasant latifundium along divergent paths, social life in Calabria was dominated by three circumstances: the uninhabitability of many coastal areas in the summer because of malaria; the physical difficulties of traveling in the mountainous interior in the winter owing to the fact that hardly any roads were passable; and the dangers of moving almost anywhere in winter or in summer because of brigandage, which in Calabria took the form of “an endemic social criminality” (Bevilacqua, 1985: 120). Since Calabria had been one of the most prosperous colonies of ancient Greece, this situation can hardly be described as an “original state.” Rather, it was the outcome of a long history, stretching over two millennia, of sociological and ecological “degradation” in which the geographical position of Calabria made its coastal areas vulnerable to piracy and the threat of piracy drove the population toward the interior. The shift of population created the conditions on the one hand for the spread of malaria in the coastal areas and on the other hand for the development in the inhospitable interior of an ecological environment in which an agricultural surplus was difficult to produce and, if produced, difficult to alienate from the direct producers. Given a physical and social environment conducive to guerrilla warfare, attempts to extract a surplus from the direct producers simply resulted in an endemic state of social criminality. This situation, in turn, seriously hampered movements of goods and persons outside the narrow confines of isolated villages, thereby contributing to the reproduction of absolute scarcity. In this two-millennia-long path from prosperity to absolute scarcity, geography and history, ecology and sociology, are interwoven in a vicious

circle that has produced both the physical and human unruliness of the environment.

The same interpenetration of sociology and ecology can be observed in the process of internal differentiation of Calabria that fully materialized in the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century. As already mentioned, when the particular conjuncture of the mid-nineteenth century created new profit opportunities in agriculture, landowners (as well as individuals of bourgeois, proletarian, and peasant extraction) showed no reluctance in seizing such opportunities or in widening them through innovations. In all instances, however, they had to overcome the sociological and ecological obstacles to profit-oriented activities posed by malaria in the coastal areas, a harsh physical environment in the interior, and brigandage everywhere. The Junker road, the farmer road, and the migrant-peasant road represented different outcomes of the struggle of capitalists and would-be capitalists (particularly landowners) to overcome these obstacles.

The prospects of overcoming these obstacles were most hopeless in the mountainous areas of the interior, such as the Cosentino, where ecology and sociology militated against any easy solution of the problems of enforcing law and order and of establishing a viable system of transport and communications.²² Any attempt to reorganize relations of production, exchange, and distribution to the disadvantage of the peasantry was bound to be self defeating, because it heightened the endemic state of class warfare that was a key component of brigandage. Here, the peasants won. They won informally, to be sure, but they won nonetheless. They retained control over a good share of their labor surplus, organized its sale in nearby and distant markets, increased their command over resources, and further freed themselves from the exploitative hold of absentee landowners.

22. The lack of security for persons and property in the interior was such as to discourage, not only transport and trade, but also the planting of trees and crops anywhere except in the immediate vicinity of villages. The concentration of the population in villages was itself the product of this state of extreme insecurity (see Bevilacqua, 1985: 118-21).

The situation for the would-be capitalist landlords was more favorable along the coastal areas where transport of commodities could be more easily organized (at first by sea and later by railway) and where the sparse and transitory character of human settlements—owing to piracy earlier and malaria later—made it easier to control land tenure. However, it was not equally favorable everywhere. It was most favorable in the Crotonese where the soil and climate were such that large-scale commodity production could be organized without any major fixed investment in land and infrastructure. A centralization and rationalization of the previously existing system of the *transumanza*, whereby production switched from pasturage to arable according to the season, was all that was required.²³

Rationalization consisted in gearing the production cycle as closely as possible to market fluctuations in prices—an adjustment that generally meant relaxing human constraints on the use of land. It therefore required centralization of control over the activities and resources of the estates in order to prevent the formation of permanent settlements or to eradicate existing ones—an objective that, as we have seen, was attained by creating a powerful repressive apparatus (see section I. 2). In building this repressive apparatus the landowners did not shun the cooptation of the social bandits of the interior as overseers of the capitalist latifundium in formation. In this way, they killed two birds with one stone: They pacified the countryside and created an instrument of centralized control over production. Here, the landlords *qua* capitalists obviously won, and the road was open for large-scale commodity production.

The situation was not so favorable in other coastal areas such as the Plain of Gioia. Soil and climate were not as conducive to large-scale commodity production on the basis of existing techniques and product mix as in the Crotonese. At the same time, they were conducive to even more profitable production (per unit of land), provided that the techniques of

23. On transhumance with specific reference to Calabria, see Rossi Doria (1948: 7 ff) and Bevilacqua (1980: 191 ff). On transhumance in the Mediterranean more generally, see Braudel (1972, 1, 85-102).

production and the product mix were radically transformed through heavy investment in land and infrastructure (including land reclamation). More specifically, in the case of the Plain of Gioia, a strong competitive advantage could be developed in the production of olive oil (traditionally a secondary cash product), wine (traditionally a secondary cash and noncash product), and citrus fruit (traditionally a marginal noncash crop). Land reclamation was a prerequisite of all these productions. In addition, they required heavy labor-intensive investment in land improvements and planting of trees, expertise in the selection and improvement of varieties, skilled manual labor in many stages of production, and processing and marketing facilities.

It is immediately obvious that this kind of production process posed far more complex problems of labor control than the relatively simple ones of the Crotonese. In the early stages of development of plantations, large and labor-intensive initial investments meant that relatively permanent settlements had to be induced, rather than discouraged, as was done in the Crotonese. While the supply of labor from the interior on a seasonal basis was relatively abundant, the supply on a year-round basis in the unhealthy environment of the coast was extremely scarce. This meant that extraordinary inducements (such as much higher wages or a piece of land) had to be offered to attract the necessary labor power.²⁴

Apart from this, land had to be given to the work force for

24. Recruitment of labor through various special incentives was typical of the zone from the first years of its development. The first famous case was that of the Marquis N. who in 1818, with the authorization of the Bourbon government, undertook land reclamation for the Comune of Olivara, obtaining in exchange from the Comune, when the work was done, three-quarters of the reclaimed land. Given the fact that the village was still underpopulated as a result of malaria, the Marquis N. was faced with a problem of labor supply. To deal with this problem he took the first important demographic initiative. With public announcements offering advantageous conditions he attracted "new" men from wherever they could be found: teams of workers from nearby villages and teams of Consentine diggers who specialized in digging ditches and draining lands; peasants who could not earn a subsistence income in the mountains; youth who wanted to avoid military service; convicts who had expiated a third of their sentence; poor artisans; tramps and vagabonds who lived from hand to mouth; and finally peasants and laborers of surrounding nobles who, out of deference, offered the services of any excess workers to Marquis N. (Piselli & Arrighi, 1985: 395).

two other reasons. In the first place, the requirements of unskilled labor in the later stages of development of the plantations were high but largely seasonal so that a good proportion could be met by recruiting labor from the interior. In these later stages, however, the demand for skilled agricultural labor also increased. The only way to ensure the reproduction over time of a pool of skills large enough to cover the requirements of the plantations was to make concessions to labor concerning cultivation rights. That is to say, it was necessary to allow petty commodity production to develop side by side with larger-scale commodity production.²⁵

In the second place, the far greater value invested in the crops of the Plain (compared with those of the Crotonese) made their owners correspondingly more vulnerable to the state of social criminality endemic in Calabria at the time. This meant that agrarian capitalists in the Plain could ill-afford the level of class antagonism associated with the full proletarianization of the labor force. While sheer repression would have been too costly and uncertain in its results, the reproduction of intermediate strata of petty commodity producers ensured the dilution of class antagonisms and produced the less subversive forms of social conflict discussed earlier (section I. 3).

It goes without saying that the stratified social structure of the Plain (and the related pattern of social conflict/cohesion) was not the outcome of some capitalist “master plan” but the cumulative result of daily confrontations among the various social personifications of labor and capital that populated the Plain of Gioia at different stages of its development. This outcome represented neither a victory of the peasantry (as in the Cosentino) nor a victory of the landlords (as in the


25. Transoceanic emigration facilitated the expansion of investment and the restructuring of landholding and enlarged the area devoted to “rich” products for exportation. In Olivara, for example, the medium-sized and small farmers who had invested their modest earnings in vineyards, lacking capital for reconversion, abandoned their uncultivated fields and emigrated. When they returned from America they replanted their fields with vines or converted them into olive groves or citrus orchards; they founded and developed an agricultural agency; they bought uncultivated land, and they cultivated it; they increased the total area of fields that they possessed and transformed them into olive groves and citrus orchards; or they initiated a commercial or artisanal business.

Crotonese). It represented, so to speak, a “draw” that opened the way for the farmer road in its peculiar Calabrian form.

It would appear, therefore, that the emergence within Calabria of three distinct roads of social change in the second half of the nineteenth century was due to the different outcomes of the struggle of landowners and other surplus appropriators or would-be appropriators to establish large-scale commodity production in response to a particular stage of development and to a particular conjuncture of the world-economy on the one hand and to the formation of the Italian nation-state on the other hand. As we have seen, the outcome of this struggle was closely related to the social ecology of the terrain on which it was fought. The three outcomes, however, were not independent of each other. It should be clear from our account of the structure and genesis of the three roads that their viability was dependent on the flows of labor that linked them.

These flows are schematically summed up in Figure 3, in which the width of the arrows is meant to convey some sense of the size (in terms of numbers involved) of the flows. The most important links are the large seasonal supplies of nonproletarianized labor generated by the migrant-peasant road and absorbed by the Junker road and, to a lesser extent, by the farmer road. The chart also emphasizes the reliance of the Junker road and of the farmer road on “external” labor supplies, and the reliance of the migrant-peasant road on the other two roads in the procurement of monetary means (through the seasonal sale of labor power) and in the expulsion of overpopulation and deviance (through the permanent emigration of impoverished peasants, *proietti*, and deviants).

It is plausible to assume that without these linkages the “takeoff” along the three roads would have been far more problematic than it actually was. It is hard to conceive, for example, how the landlords of the Crotonese could have established their twofold monopoly over the use of land and of violence without the strong competitive pressures brought to bear on the local rural proletariat by the seasonal labor supplies of semiproletarians and nonproletarians from the



- a. Seasonal supply of nonproletarian labor.
 b. Permanent supply of fully proletarianized labor (impoverished peasants, *proietti*, deviants).
 c. Permanent supply of overseers and other members of the latifundia's repressive apparatus.
 d. Seasonal supply of fully proletarianized labor.
 e. Seasonal supply of semiproletarian labor.
 f. Long-distance migration: (1) permanent; (2) long-term; (3) cyclical.

Figure 3: Short- and Long-distance Migration Flows

neighboring areas. Nor is it easy to imagine how small-scale commodity production could have taken off in the Plain of Gioia without the initial inflow of permanent immigration from the areas of the interior. And the peasant-migrant road in

the Cosentino probably would not have taken shape so rapidly and firmly without, one, the initial relief from demographic pressures brought about by the permanent emigration of the poorest peasants, *proietti*, and deviants to the areas of small-scale commodity production, and, two, the easy opportunities for procuring monetary means through the sale of seasonal labor surpluses in neighboring areas of small-scale and large-scale commodity production.

These interconnections further clarify why three divergent roads to wage labor and social change developed at about the same time in three neighboring areas. In our view, however, the fact that the Crotonese was an importer of labor power, the Cosentino an exporter, and the Plain of Gioia both an importer and an exporter does not warrant their designation as the regional core, periphery, and semiperiphery—a designation that would parallel Carol Smith's hierarchical ordering of the three areas of western Guatemala. As already suggested, in the Calabrian context all three roads were roads to peripheralization, even though the nature of peripheralization was different in the three cases.

2. *Patterns of Peripheralization*

By “peripheralization” we understand a process whereby some actors or locales, that participate directly or indirectly in the world division of labor, are progressively deprived of the benefits of such participation, to the advantage of other actors or locales.²⁶ This redistribution of benefits can take different forms, and each of our three roads to wage labor—as they unfolded in Calabria—illustrates a specific form of peripheralization: transfer of surplus, unequal exchange, and direct surplus appropriation.

26. The main reason for assuming this unequal distribution of benefits is that profit-oriented innovations continuously isolate a minority of activities, actors, and locales from the competitive pressures of the world-economy, and simultaneously intensify those pressures on all other activities, actors, and locales. (See Arrighi & Drangel, 1986).

By “transfer of surplus” we refer to a situation characterized by two conditions. The first condition is that the benefits derived by a given locale from its inhabitants’ participation in the world division of labor take the form of a surplus of revenues over costs of production, and the second condition is that command over this surplus is routinely transferred from the hands of residents of that locale to the hands of nonresidents. Both conditions were clearly present in the Crotonese.

The combination of high revenue prices relative to unit labor costs and low capital requirements of the labor process resulted in a large surplus over and above what was necessary to keep the capitalist latifundia in business as profitable enterprises. Given the high concentration of production typical of the capitalist latifundia, only a small part of this surplus was absorbed by the consumption of the landowners to whom it accrued.²⁷

Command over most of the surplus was transferred out of the Crotonese in the form of taxes and, above all, in the form of funds placed by the *latifondisti* in national and international financial markets. Once transferred, this command over resources had little, if any, positive feedback on the economy of the Crotonese. Its main function was to expand markets and productive facilities in northern Italy, thereby further widening the developmental gap between core regions and peripheral locales such as the Crotonese (Meyriat, 1961: 117-124).

As often emphasized in the literature on the Mezzogiorno, this transfer of surplus was part of a political exchange mediated by the state between southern *latifondisti* and northern capitalists.²⁸ The surplus was itself the outcome of a double protection granted by the state to the *latifondisti*: the protection of national cereal production from the competitive pressures of the world-market, and the protection of large-

27. Even that part of the surplus that was consumed by the *latifondisti* was not principally consumed in the Crotonese since the *latifondisti* spent a good part of the year in the metropolitan centers of the center-south (principally Rome and Naples). There are numerous testimonies to this effect. See, for example, Meyriat (1961: 145).

28. For a critical analysis of the phenomenon (the so-called *blocco storico*) see Salvadori (1976), Sereni (1968), Rossi Doria (1982), and Villari (1976), who cover all the vicissitudes of the bloc.

scale landownership from the subversive threats of a rebellious rural proletariat. This double protection raised labor costs to northern industrial capital because the latifundia absorbed large and competitive labor supplies and, above all, because a key subsistence good (grain) was overpriced relative to world-market prices. However, the transfer of the surplus created profitable business opportunities for financial intermediaries and reduced real interest rates for private and public investment in industry and infrastructure. What northern industrialists lost in terms of higher labor costs, they probably gained in terms of infrastructure, lower interest rates, and easier credit; financial intermediaries, of course, had nothing to lose and everything to gain from this arrangement.

This political exchange furthered the reproduction of the regime of low wages and low fixed-capital requirements typical of the capitalist latifundium. This regime, in turn, restrained the growth of the local market, discouraged innovative differentiations of the economic structure of the Crotonese, and thus contributed to the progressive peripheralization of the territory. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that neither the specific relations of production of the Crotonese nor the political exchanges between *latifondisti* and northern capitalists were sufficient or necessary conditions of peripheralization.

They were not sufficient conditions because elsewhere, namely in Prussia, similar relations of production and a similar political exchange between Junkers and nonagrarian capitalists produced that marriage of "rye and iron," which was instrumental in counteracting peripheralizing tendencies. And they were not necessary conditions because peripheralization occurred in Calabria under relations of production and exchange that were radically different from those obtaining in the Crotonese.

Thus, in the case of the Plain of Gioia there was no significant transfer of surplus other than through taxation.²⁹

29. Owing to the commercialization of agriculture and the high yield of land in value terms, the taxable yield per hectare cultivated was much higher in the Plain of Gioia (556 lire per hectare) than in the Crotonese (229 lire per hectare) or in the Cosentino (178 lire per hectare). See Arlacchi (1983: 71).

Unit returns to land were significantly higher than in the Crotonese, but wages and unit labor costs were also higher. Labor processes required heavy investments in land improvements and processing facilities, and, given the relative small size of estates and holdings, the revenues that did not go to cover costs of production were consumed locally by a large crowd of small and medium-sized capitalist producers.

In this case, peripheralization took the form, not of a transfer of surplus, but of unequal exchange. By “peripheralization through unequal exchange” we understand a situation in which the benefits of the world division of labor are transferred from some locales to other locales through the terms at which commodities are exchanged. Generally speaking, peripheralization through unequal exchange occurs when competitive pressures on the sale prices of a given locale increase faster than competitive pressures on its purchase prices.³⁰

The experience of the Plain of Gioia provides a very good illustration of the process in question. As happens often in instances of peripheralization through unequal exchange, the process went through stages. The first stage (from the 1860's through the 1880's) was characterized by rapid expansion of productive capacity for export and by favorable terms of trade. Relatively simple innovations and heavy labor-intensive investment in land gave the Plain a strong competitive advantage in the production of olive oil, low-quality wine (*vino da taglio*), and high-quality citrus fruit. In at least one of these lines of production (oranges), this strong competitive advantage put the Plain of Gioia in a temporary monopolistic position on world-markets, which allowed the Plain's producers to reap significant benefits from participation in the world division of labor. Since in this period free trade enforced competitive pricing in most of the activities that supplied the Plain with its

30. In the case of the Crotonese, it makes little sense to speak of unequal exchange for the simple reason that the capitalist latifundium attained its high point of development in a regime of state protection, which kept the price of its main product well above the supply price of other regions of the world-economy, core regions included.

means of subsistence and production, we can assume that at this stage there was no unequal exchange between the Plain and other regions.

The second stage went from the late 1880's to the early 1920's. This was the period of most rapid expansion of production for export (as opposed to productive capacity), and of greatest development within the Plain of backward and forward linkages between agricultural and other activities. The prosperity associated with this expansion and diversification of activities induced, and was further sustained by, a boom of immigration in the area. In this same period, however, the bases of the Plain's prosperity were already being undermined. For one thing, the temporary monopolistic position of the Plain in some export markets was eliminated by the appearance of strong competitors (mainly Spanish and U.S. producers) that enforced an increasingly competitive pricing of citrus fruit. In addition, access to important and remunerative export markets (such as France) was being closed or restricted by the wave of protectionism that swept Europe in this period. At the same time, the growing protection of the national market restricted the freedom to purchase supplies from the cheapest sources, and led to the monopolistic pricing of many of the commodities purchased by the Plain. As a consequence, a pattern of unequal exchange between the Plain and its trading partners began to develop.

In the second stage, therefore, prosperity was based on advantages that were being progressively eroded both by normal processes of capitalist competition (such as the emergence of new competitors), and by a particular conjuncture of the world-economy (the crisis of free trade). In the third stage, which went from the middle 1920's up to the Second World War, prosperity itself disappeared as the negative effects of unequal exchange were compounded by the final breakdown of the world market.³¹ When a system of multilateral exchanges

31. In the middle and late 1930's, production and trade recovered on the basis of bilateral exchanges between Italy and other European states. This system of trade gave greater security to the producers of the Plain but, insofar as we can tell, brought no improvement to their terms of trade with the rest of the world.

was reestablished after the Second World War, competitive pressures on the activities that supplied the Plain with its means of subsistence and production increased again, but, as we shall see in greater detail in part III, competitive pressures on the producers of the Plain increased even more. As a matter of fact, they became so intense as to provoke a long crisis, and eventually the demise, of small-scale commodity production in the area. This period of crisis represented the fourth and final stage of the process of peripheralization of the Plain.

If transfer of surplus was the specific form taken by peripheralization in the Crotonese, and unequal exchange the specific form in the Plain of Gioia, direct surplus extraction was the form in the Cosentino. In this case, there was no surplus to be transferred because what was produced in the area was either consumed or invested locally by the direct producers. Nor was there much room for unequal exchange because little was bought or (except for the fictitious commodity “labor power”) sold outside the area. Nonetheless, the substantial migratory flows that linked the Cosentino to nearby and distant labor markets were definitely the expression of participation in the world division of labor. Moreover, this participation was peripheral in the sense that the labor power sold in nearby or distant markets fetched prices that left a large surplus in the hands of the buyers. In this case, therefore, a surplus was not transferred after it had been produced in the peripheral locale (as in the case of the Crotonese). Instead, it was produced and directly appropriated in core locales by purchasing labor power from a peripheral locale.

If we ignore the fictitious character of the commodity labor power—emphasized in different ways by Marx (1959) and Polanyi (1957)—our case of “direct surplus extraction” becomes a special case of “unequal exchange.” In so doing, however, we would forgo a distinction between different mechanisms of peripheralization that has important social implications—a distinction, that is, between peripheralization through the mobility of capital (or transfer of surplus), peripheralization through the mobility of goods (or unequal

exchange), and peripheralization through the mobility of labor (or direct surplus extraction). It should be noticed that Emmanuel's (1972) classic definition of unequal exchange is also based on the assumption of the immobility of labor power across political boundaries.

As we have repeatedly emphasized, the reason why migrant-peasants could sell their labor power "below cost" is that costs of reproduction were largely or wholly covered by subsistence-oriented activities. The predominant function of the sale of labor power was to transform a large surplus into accumulation of unproductive and productive wealth. Paradoxically, therefore, the "superexploitation" of the migrant-peasants was based on a nonproletarian condition. It was the expression, not of proletarianization, but of extreme peripheralization. That is to say, there was nothing (other than labor power) that could be produced in the Cosentino economically (i.e., that could be sold competitively in the world market), let alone profitably (i.e., that could be sold competitively and also allow for an entrepreneurial income). As a consequence, the only way in which the peasants of the Cosentino could partake of the benefits of the world division of labor was to "export" their surplus labor power at prices that involved an extremely unequal distribution of those benefits between themselves and the "importers" of their labor power.

The peculiar relations of production and exchange of the Cosentino and the demand for migrant labor that developed both in nearby and distant markets were necessary conditions for peripheralization to take the specific form it did. Once again, however, they were neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for peripheralization to occur. They were not necessary because, as we have argued, peripheralization could and in neighboring territories did occur under quite different conditions. They were not sufficient because they only explain why labor power *could* be sold at ultracompetitive prices, but they do not explain why it continued to be sold at such prices over a long period of time. It is perfectly conceivable that, once the demographic pressure on the land and the exploitative pressure of the landowners on the peasants had been relaxed,

the peasants might have entered the labor and the produce markets from a position of strength, and that, through innovations, they might even have been able to counteract peripheralization. The experiences of Switzerland in earlier periods (and possibly of Sweden in the same period) show that this was not just a theoretical possibility but an historical possibility as well.

In sum, Calabria provides a good illustration of the fact that peripheralization may occur under the most diverse relations of production, and that the same kind of relations of production may be associated in one place with peripheralization and in another place with ascent to core position. This conclusion should not surprise us since peripheralization and its obverse are macroprocesses of the world-economy, which have only indirect and partly indeterminate connections with the microstructures of production and reproduction. As a macroprocess, peripheralization is determined primarily by the relations in time and space among microstructures and only secondarily by the nature of the microstructures themselves.

Spatial relations among microstructures matter at different levels. The most important is undoubtedly the level defined by the territorial jurisdictions of states. These jurisdictions define the extent to which commodities, factors of production, means of payments, and information are spatially mobile. By decreasing mobility in some directions and increasing it in others, state jurisdictions dampen or intensify competitive pressures, weaken or strengthen complementarities, sustain or undermine hierarchies of command. The level of the state, however, is not the only one and sometimes not even the most important. The particular way in which microstructures of production and reproduction are combined territorially at the substate level (for example, in a region like Calabria) may matter just as much in determining whether a given microstructure experiences peripheralization or not. And of course the same is true of the geopolitical position of the state within which the microstructures are located.

An analysis of the processes of peripheralization experienced by our three areas of Calabria in terms of their regional, national, and supranational aggregations falls beyond the scope of the present article. However, a simple thought experiment grounded in the historical experience of the Crotonese can illustrate the point. Take for example the peripheralization of the capitalist latifundium. Very early in its development, the landowners of the Crotonese experimented with various forms of mechanization that might have counteracted peripheralization. The main reason why the experiments failed, and were abandoned until it was too late to rescue the latifundium from a peripheral position, was that the services required for the maintenance and repair of agricultural machinery were too costly and unpredictable (Bevilacqua, 1985: 227). We may very well conceive of a regional situation in which the socio-ecological terrain for the development of capitalist latifundia was vaster than it actually was in Calabria, or of a regional situation in which mechanical industries (even of an artisanal kind) were more developed than they actually were in Calabria. All other things being equal, these two relatively small differences in the regional mix of activities might have meant more reliable and cheaper maintenance and repair of agricultural machinery, greater mechanization of activities at the right time, and effective resistance against peripheralizing tendencies.

Thought experiments of this sort can be easily conceived with reference to the other levels of aggregation (national and world-regional) and to the other two types of microstructures (small-scale commodity production and subsistence-oriented production). The point would remain the same: The chances that a given relation of production will experience peripheralization is not primarily determined by the nature of the relation itself but by the regional, national, and world-regional context in which it is located. As emphasized throughout this section, microstructures of production and reproduction do determine the *forms* of peripheralization. But peripheralization itself is the outcome of the interrelationships among microstructures that constitute the world-economy.

In this connection, relations across time are as important as relations across space. The key to counteracting peripheralization is the capability of a given actor or locale to participate in as wide a division of labor as possible and still be able to isolate itself *temporarily* from the competitive pressures of the world-economy. This implies a capability to shift promptly from one set of activities and of relations of production to another set, not only in response to, but in anticipation of, world-economic cycles and trends. By so doing, an actor/activity/locale can sell outputs at monopolistic prices and purchase inputs (be they real commodities or fictitious commodities such as land, labor, and money) at competitive prices, and thereby appropriate a disproportionate share of the benefits of the division of labor.

It should be evident from our previous discussion that shifting from one set of activities and relations of production to another set is not an easy undertaking. Actors, activities, and locales are shaped by history and geography, ecology and sociology, in complex ways and, once a locale has entered a given path of development, the direction of change, if not its speed, is pretty much set for long periods of time. Heavy investments with long gestation lags have been made (as in the Plain of Gioia); a complex repressive apparatus has been created (as in the Crotonese); networks of recruitment for, and assistance to, migration have been developed (as in the Cosentino)—these and other developments define the directions along which opportunities of gainful employment of labor, land, and money are sought and exploited. That is to say, economic activities become embedded in social relations that form a cultural totality and can only change as a totality.

This is of course also true of economic activities in core locales. However, it is plausible to assume that the greater command over world-economic resources of the actors that operate in and from core regions endows them with better possibilities to do two things: one, to establish new activities in addition to, or in substitution for, existing activities; and, two, to overcome social constraints and resistance to innovations. If we accept this assumption, peripheralization seems to con-

sist—to borrow Myrdal's (1959) expression—of a process of “circular and cumulative causation.” Actors in core locales find it easier than actors in peripheral locales to generate a stream of innovations that *temporarily*, when taken as single events, but *continually*, when taken as a stream, isolate actors in core locales from competitive pressures and intensify such pressures on actors in peripheral locales (see Arrighi & Drangel, 1986).

The consequent inability of peripheral locales to reap more than marginal benefits from their participation in the world division of labor has important implications for their social evolution. We have been arguing that relations of production in Calabrian agriculture developed along paths that were not inherently “peripheral” in the sense that they could have been, and in different historical instances actually were, associated with ascent to core position. This argument should not be understood to imply that a given path of development is not affected by its association with coreness or peripherality. On the contrary, the experience of Calabria seems to suggest that the chances of survival in a peripheral environment are not the same for all relations of production and exchange and that, in any event, peripherality leaves its mark on all such relations. In order to realize this, let us look at the way in which the three roads to wage labor attained their historical limits in Calabria.

3. Peripheralization and the Crisis of Commodity Production

In the world political and economic context determined by the outcome of the Second World War our three roads to wage labor began to converge toward a common pattern. The path of development that proved to be the least stable in the new situation was the Junker road, which came to an abrupt and complete end.

The capitalist latifundium had reached its highest point of development on the eve of the Second World War. Under fascism, the organic links between the *latifondisti* and the state

had been greatly strengthened. The protection and active encouragement of national grain production on the part of the state had attained unprecedented levels. At the same time, the landowners' hand vis-à-vis labor had been strengthened both by the repressive antilabor stance of the regime and by the restrictions imposed on migration within and across national boundaries.³²

As a result of this double protection (in product and labor markets), the capitalist latifundia experienced a period of relative prosperity, particularly after the worst of the great depression of the early 1930's was over. Nevertheless, serious problems were lurking below the surface of this relative prosperity. The capitalist latifundia were becoming increasingly dependent on state protection and, therefore, on the particular national and world political-economic conjuncture that favored protectionist and labor-repressive policies. At the same time, the squeeze on labor incomes tended to accumulate explosive social material ready to detonate at the first favorable conjuncture.

Both tendencies came to a head with the collapse of the Fascist regime and the subsequent establishment of new hegemonies at the national and interstate levels. As soon as the Allied armed forces occupied Calabria in 1943, a wave of acute and widespread social conflict swept the region.³³ In the Crotonese the wave of conflict was more intense and lasted longer than anywhere else. It took its usual form of a confrontation between landowners and rural proletarians over property and cultivation rights. This time, however, the confrontation acquired a new political connotation because it

32. Migrations within national boundaries were restricted by the so-called *Leggi contro l'Urbanesimo* (Laws against the movement into the cities) introduced in the 1930's and repealed only in 1961. Migration abroad was discouraged by the fascist regime, but restrictions imposed by recipient countries in the interwar years were by far the most important obstacle (see Treves, 1976). While restrictions on migration buttressed the *latifondisti's* oligopsonistic power over the regional supplies of labor, the repressive stance of the regime vis-à-vis labor unrest gave a new edge to the *latifondisti's* private repressive apparatus.

33. For an overall view of the land occupation struggles in the Crotonese and all of Calabria see Alcaro & Paparazzo (1976), Cinanni (1977), and Bevilacqua (1980). On the activities and role of the Communist party see Tarrow (1972).

became part and parcel of the postwar struggle for national hegemony between the Communist and Socialist parties on the one side, and the Christian Democratic party and its allies on the other.

The Communist and Socialist parties saw in the struggles of the landless peasants an excellent opportunity to make a political and organizational breakthrough in the traditionally conservative south. They supported from the start the demand for land of the rural proletariat, and through this policy they did in fact succeed in developing close ideological and organizational links with its ranks.³⁴ Since a powerful movement of protest developed at about the same time in the factories of the north, also under Communist/Socialist hegemony, the Leninist (or for that matter Gramscian) scenario of an alliance between industrial workers and landless peasants mediated by the leadership of the workers' party seemed to materialize in almost ideotypical fashion. This alliance posed a serious threat to the Christian Democratic party and other political forces that were trying to anchor the Italian state firmly within the U.S. sphere of influence. The threat was perceived by these forces to be serious enough to induce them to yield to the pressures for a land reform.

34. The coalition government of Badoglio, which contained communist and socialist ministers, did not respond with the traditional repressive policies to the land occupation movement, which spread spontaneously through the latifundia of the Crotonese from the morrow of September 8, 1943. Instead of the usual defense of the large landowners, the government responded with a series of decrees formulated by the Communist Minister Gullo which, among other things, conceded uncultivated or badly cultivated land to peasants organized in cooperatives. Fausto Gullo, a Calabrian and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, issued Decree no. 279 on October 1944. This decree, "in view of the requirements of national production," conceded for cultivation "to peasant associations, regularly constituted into cooperatives or other entities," the "lands of private owners and public firms, which are not being cultivated or are insufficiently cultivated."

The Gullo Decree gave a powerful stimulus to the land occupation struggles. It provided an incentive for the organization of workers in cooperatives and their enrollment in those parties and unions that most actively supported the movement for the redistribution of the land. In Campolungo, for example, on December 2, 1944, the first concession of land gave rise to the first cooperative: the "Agricultural Proletariat Cooperative," managed by the PCI. A second cooperative, named "Red Star," emerged in 1945 in a fraction of Campolungo. On the measures taken in the Fausto Gullo period, see Rossi Doria (1983), and Barresi (1983).

The implementation of the reform began in 1950, and within a few years the redistribution of land broke up the latifundia, largely attaining the political objective of containing and then rolling back Communist influence over the peasantry.³⁵ We shall later discuss the particular social structure that emerged out of the land reform. For now, all we need to note is that the capitalist latifundium disappeared very rapidly and left little trace of its once powerful organizational structures.

The Plain of Gioia, and to a lesser extent the Cosentino, also experienced a wave of social conflict following the downfall of the Fascist regime. Notwithstanding some formal similarities, however, the substance and outcome of the wave of conflict in these other areas were quite different from those of the Crotonese. Far from challenging existing social structures, protest movements in the Plain of Gioia and in the Cosentino were reactions against the hindrances created by the fascist regime to the reproduction of such structures. Implicitly or explicitly they aimed not at subverting but at strengthening existing social structures through a restoration of the *status quo ante*.³⁶

35. The expropriations and land assignments provoked the dissolution of the "red" cooperatives, which were formed during the 1940's. With the land reform, the function of the cooperatives—to force the expropriation of uncultivated lands—progressively decreased, signaling the decline of the hegemony of the left political forces over the rural proletariat. The effects of the clientelistic policy of the Christian Democrats (D.C.), to be discussed in the next section, were evident from the first years of the agrarian reform. In Campolungo, for example, in the elections for the municipal council in 1946, the Socialist-Communist list alone received 1,180 votes out of 1,565 valid votes (that is 75.4%) and 14 members of council out of 20. In contrast, by the municipal elections of 1952, the PCI obtained 1,185 votes out of 2,101 (that is 56.4%) while the D.C. obtained 916 (that is, 43.6%). Finally, in the 1956 municipal election, of 3,138 votes the PCI obtained only 1,384 (44.1%), while the D.C. obtained 1,754 (or 55.9%). For the first time there was a Christian Democratic Council (Piselli & Arrighi, 1985: 434-36; for a comprehensive appraisal of the phenomenon in the south, see Tarrow, 1972).

36. In the Cosentino, the restoration of the *status quo ante* meant above all the elimination of the restrictions on long-distance migration that had been introduced under the fascist regime. As we shall see, this elimination was all that was required for the new Christian Democratic regime to establish its hegemony in the area (III.1). In the Cosentino there were occupations of land right after the war, but they were far less extensive and violent than in the Crotonese.

In the Plain of Gioia, the restoration of the *status quo ante* meant above all the elimination of the restrictions enforced by the fascist regime on the struggles among

As a consequence, there was no immediate crisis of small-scale commodity production or of subsistence production to match the crisis and disappearance of the capitalist latifundium. On the contrary, in the immediate postwar years small-scale commodity production enjoyed a short period of prosperity as the acute shortages of agricultural supplies on the national markets greatly inflated the prices of some of the Plain's products. The crisis of small-scale commodity production came later when the reactivation of national and international transport, the liberalization of trade, the expansion of supply, and the emergence of new competitors with lower costs of production increased competitive pressures and squeezed many producers out of the market (see Section III. 1).

rival patronage groups and on the exercise of mafia-type authority. Here, social conflict exploded right after the war in forms as acute as in the Crotonese. There were occupations of land, demonstrations, seizures of public buildings, red flags and revolutionary songs, violent clashes among opposed factions and between demonstrators and the police. At first sight, there does not seem to be that big a difference between the wave of conflict that shook the Plain and other areas of small-scale commodity production and the wave that shook the Crotonese.

A closer look, however, reveals important differences. For one thing, occupations of land were not always present, and, when present, they were not as central to the struggles as in the Crotonese. For example, in one of the most conspicuous episodes of conflict (the establishment of a short-lived "Republic of Caulonia" in a cash-cropping area with a social structure similar to that of the Plain of Gioia), there was no occupation of land but just a takeover of governmental functions (including justice) by the "people." "Fascists" were brought to trial, and one or two were executed (see Alcaro & Paparazzo, 1976). Even where the occupation of land was central to the struggles, as in Olivara, the lands were not privately owned estates. They were public domains that had been closed off to private use during the fascist period. Last but not least, the factions opposed in the struggles had almost the same social composition, in sharp contrast to the confrontations of the Crotonese, which invariably had the landless peasants on one side, and the hirelings of the *latifondisti* on the other (see Piselli & Arrighi, 1985: 442-44).

One cannot avoid the impression that what was actually happening behind the trappings of a class struggle was a revival of the feuds among rival patronage groups that had been typical of the area. The fascist regime had, so to speak, frozen the recurrent struggles for mafia power in a centrally enforced order, from which some factions benefited and others lost. The collapse of the regime became the occasion, not only for the settlement of scores, but for a general revival of the competitive struggle for mafia power. It also became the occasion for the beginning of a phenomenon (the "politicization of the feud") that soon turned into a major characteristic of social conflict in the Plain (see III.1 below).

The crisis of subsistence production in the Cosentino came even later. The movements of protest of the 1940's further strengthened the hold of the peasantry on the land and other means of production, and the intensification of competition in the markets for agricultural commodities could not and did not affect producers that sold very little on those markets. At the same time, the reopening of the channels of long-distance migration, which had been closed or narrowly restricted during the war and the interwar years, injected new vitality into the structures of subsistence production. When the crisis came in the middle 1960's, it was the result of the success rather than the failure of migrant-peasants in coping with the new conjuncture at the national and world level (see III. 2 below).

These developments are the subject matter of the third part of the article. The only reason for mentioning them here is to emphasize the much greater stability of the migrant-peasant road, in comparison to the farmer road and even more to the Junker road, in a peripheral region such as Calabria. This is tantamount to saying that, in a peripheral context, subsistence-oriented production has better chances of survival than small-scale commodity production, and far better chances than large-scale commodity production.

This is hardly surprising since peripheralization, as defined in the previous section, implies aggregate returns for economic activities only marginally higher than what the factors of production involved in the activities would fetch outside the world division of labor. As a consequence, within peripheralized activities there is little room for surplus appropriation—particularly in the form of profit. If by any chance micro-level capitalist relations of production actually develop in a peripheral context—as they did in Calabria and as they do all the time in other peripheral locales—they are subject to extreme competitive and or subversive pressures that undermine their viability. It is not the absence of micro-level capitalist relations of production that produces peripherality; it is peripherality that makes the development of such capitalist relations of production problematic.

To retain their viability, capitalist relations of production in a peripheral context must either develop a symbiotic relation

with subsistence activities, or supplement the invisible hand of the market with the visible hands of repressive apparatuses, or both. Even then, however, they cannot develop very far because the effectiveness of repressive systems of labor control decreases with increases in the sophistication of technology.³⁷ As a consequence, capitalist relations of production in peripheral regions tend to reproduce themselves as enclaves that never manage to displace (and always run the risk of being displaced by) small-scale commodity production and subsistence-oriented activities.

Part III: Proletarianization and Redistributive Struggles

In the foregoing account of regional differentiation, the world-economy and the Italian state defined the wider political-economic context within which social actors in Calabria shaped and played out their cooperative, competitive, and antagonistic roles. But the institutions of the world-economy and of the Italian state did not play any direct role in the shaping of the social structures of Calabria. Their influence was indirect and mediated by local actors. Even if some of these actors were immigrants from other regions, and many were migrants who spent long periods of their lives outside Calabria, the story of regional differentiation could be told with little reference to the background of the immigrants or to the experiences of the migrants outside Calabria.

To some extent, this focus on local actors as they related to each other within Calabria was simply an analytical device meant to emphasize the importance of the social ecology of the

37. The hypothesis that the effectiveness of repressive systems of labor control decreases with the increase in the sophistication of technology goes back to Smith (1961) and Marx (1959). It underlies our explication of the establishment in the Crotonese of a more repressive system of labor control than in the Plain of Gioia where a more sophisticated agricultural technology was developed. It will be formulated more explicitly later on to account for the increase in the bargaining power of southern migrants as they came to monopolize semiskilled jobs in technologically advanced industries (III.3). For an analysis of the relation between technological change and the bargaining power of labor in world-historical perspective, see Arrighi & Silver (1984).

region in determining territorial differentiation. To a large extent, however, the focus was justified by an effective autonomy of local actors from the wider context within which they operated. The extent of this autonomy can be gauged by comparing developments before the Second World War with developments after the War, when organs of the state and political parties became major social actors directly involved in shaping everyday life within Calabria itself.

Moreover, as we approach and then enter the 1960's, labor migration and urbanization become the central facts of everyday life throughout Calabria. Their significance is no longer restricted to specific locales and social strata. They become mass phenomena that shift the locus of social conflict/cohesion from rural-agricultural settings to urban-industrial settings outside Calabria and to urban-bureaucratic settings within Calabria. In order to understand the new patterns of social conflict/cohesion, the situations in which the migrants found themselves in the places of immigration become as relevant as the situations from which they emigrated.³⁸

The analysis that follows is premised on a point that will be made explicit only at the end of part III, but which should be borne in mind all along: the position of the Italian state in the world-economy. Ever since its incorporation as a nation-state, Italy has oscillated between the lower reaches of the core zone and the upper reaches of the semiperipheral zone (see Arrighi, 1985). This rather anomalous position, which probably no other state has occupied for such a long period, has created a political terrain for the redistributive struggles of the peoples of Calabria that few other peripheral regions of the world-economy have enjoyed.

1. The State as Social Actor

The land reform in the Crotonese was carried out by a public institution (*Opera per la Valorizzazione della Sila*, henceforth

38. Evidence for the account of social transformations in Calabria since the Second World War given in this part of the article can be found in Piselli & Arrighi (1985: 428-92).

OVS). Plots of land were granted to most, if not all, the individuals who applied for land, but the majority of the plots could not support a family. Even though the former landowners were left with large quantities of the more fertile land, the loss of the marginal lands prevented them from continuing with the practice of large-scale shifting agriculture based on low fixed investments and a changing combination of grazing and extensive cereal cultivation. For this reason, the land reform dealt a death blow to the economy of the capitalist *latifundium*. In order to turn a smaller quantity of land to profitable use, the former *latifondisti* had to introduce new product-mixes and new techniques of production that generally required heavy investments in land improvements and means of production. That is to say, they had to become full-fledged capitalists rather than the “half-capitalists” they had previously been (see Section I. 2).

Faced with this challenge, a few of the former *latifondisti* actually used the generous indemnities received from the OVS for the expropriated lands to turn their estates into modern agrobusinesses. Others did not stand up to the challenge: They leased or sold the remaining land (often to their former administrators, overseers, hirelings, etc.) and placed the rents or the proceedings from the sales, as well as the indemnities, in financial and urban speculative investments. In either case, the *latifondisti* as such disappeared from the social scene, and the social structure of the Crotonese became as stratified as that of the Plain of Gioia.

The top of the new agrarian hierarchy was occupied by the small stratum of landowners who had become full-fledged agricultural capitalists. Next, came an upper-middle stratum of small-to-medium-sized capitalist farmers who had obtained from the OVS or had purchased/extorted from the landowners and from the newly created peasantry more land than was necessary to support their families. After a middle stratum of independent farmers, who had just enough land to support a family, came a large stratum of semiproletarianized peasants, who had not obtained enough land to support a family. And, at the very bottom, there was a small stratum of full-fledged

proletarians, who either had received no land from the reform or had sold or lost what they had received.³⁹

It is interesting to notice that, as the polarized structure of the capitalist latifundium was replaced by this stratified structure, not only previous forms of class struggle/solidarity withered away, but forms of conflict analogous to those typical of the Plain of Gioia developed also in the Crotonese. The individuals who had staffed the repressive apparatus of the latifundia began to use violence on their own account. The *latifondisti's* monopoly over the use of violence was thus replaced by a competitive use of violence by their former hirelings and by newly formed patronage groups.

The struggles among these patronage groups resembled the feuds typical of the Plain of Gioia with two important differences. In the first place, the use of violence was aimed far less at attaining positions of authority of the mafia type than at attaining economic power. It was not an expression of the self-protection of society against the disintegrating tendencies of the market and the centralizing tendencies of the state (see Section I.3); rather, it was a means through which individuals and their kin and clients enriched themselves at the expense of other individuals and social groups.

39. The OVS operated in 114 municipalities in Calabria and was in control of about 573,000 hectares, or 38% of the regional land. Of about 38,000 requests examined and of 25,080 families selected as having the necessary prerequisites for participating in the reform on December 31, 1957, the OVS assigned 76,011 hectares in small holdings to 18,902 families (another 1,362 hectares were assigned to institutions). Thus, the assignments covered only 49.7% of the 38,000 requests. In Campolungo, however, all the requests were satisfied, and, furthermore, plots were also assigned to peasants who were resident in other municipalities. Likewise, the land allotments were extended to include groups not strictly tied to the land, such as artisans.

The lands were given by the OVS to the assignee as individual private property, conditional on full payment of the sum owed to the OVS for the price of the land and any improvement works carried out. Payment was to be made in annual installments over a 30-year period, during which time dominion was reserved by the OVS that could evict the defaulting assignee at any time (e.g., for not cultivating the land, for falling behind on the installments, for emigrating, etc.). A large part of the costs of the reform fell on the assignees who were from a social class that was almost completely without capital. Thus, the beneficiaries of the reform found themselves in a situation of continuous indebtedness to the OVS, and therefore with the permanent threat of eviction hanging over their heads (see Pezzino, 1977: 66 ff).

In the second place, in the Plain of Gioia the mafia-type authority and the struggles to attain it had developed in relation to a centralizing, exploitative, and absentee central state. In the Crotonese after the Second World War, in contrast, the state became an increasingly powerful presence engaged (mainly through the OVS) in activities of production, administration, and redistribution. The redistribution of land was only the first step in a process of growing involvement in the restructuring of social and economic relations. The OVS also provided the new system of land tenure with the necessary infrastructure (roads, irrigation, rural dwellings, electricity, and so on); it supplied technical assistance and credit for investments in land improvements, livestock, tools, and other means of production; it set up processing and marketing facilities and developed many other auxiliary activities.

In the process, the OVS grew into a huge bureaucratic apparatus with unparalleled power in the everyday life of the Crotonese and neighboring areas. This growth was chiefly motivated by the need of the political parties in government (first and foremost the Christian Democratic party) to break the hegemony that opposition parties had established in the area during the phase of acute class confrontation—the hegemony, that is, of Communists and Socialists over the rural proletariat and of monarchists and neo-fascists over the *latifondisti* and their hirelings.

In order to extricate themselves from this situation, which left little room for the legitimacy and electoral growth of governing parties, the Christian Democrats followed a three-pronged strategy: They established a firm control over the OVS; they transformed the social structure through the redistribution of land; and they resorted to widespread patronage to win votes and legitimacy. Little or no political discrimination occurred in the assignment of the expropriated land, but, as soon as the land had been assigned, the provision of infrastructure, technical assistance, credit, subsidies, marketing facilities, etc., became conditional on political allegiance to the Christian Democrats. Thus, whereas the redistribution of land undermined the structural roots of the hegemony of Com-

munists and Socialists on the peasantry, the subsequent activities of the OVS built networks of political patronage that tied the peasantry to the ruling party.

In building networks of political patronage, the bureaucrats of the OVS came to rely heavily on former members of the repressive apparatuses of the capitalist latifundia. Partly out of fear, partly out of convenience, the bureaucrats of the OVS favored these people in more than one way: More and better land was granted to them than to the landless peasants; their encroachments on the property of other grantees through violence and intimidation were tolerated; many were recruited as guardians of OVS property, as watchmen, and as bodyguards. An organic relation thus developed between the OVS and a new class of "primitive" accumulators whereby the political clienteles of the OVS and the economic clienteles of this new class interlocked in complex configurations of reciprocal instrumentality.

The activities of the OVS also contributed to a *rapprochement* between the ruling party and the former *latifondisti*. As already mentioned, the trauma of expropriation was softened by generous indemnities. In addition, the former *latifondisti* who had turned into full-fledged agricultural capitalists benefited more than anyone else from the heavy investments in infrastructure and from the technical assistance of the OVS. And those who sold their land and had turned into real-estate speculators benefited both from the increase in land value that accompanied the change in land tenure, and from the support of the OVS and other state institutions for real-estate speculation in urban and tourist areas.

In sum, the land reform transformed the social structure of the Crotonese into something similar to the social structure of the Plain of Gioia with the important difference that the state rather than the market had the largest influence on social relations. As a consequence, the upper strata of the Crotonese came to include not only capitalists of various kinds but state bureaucrats and party bosses as well. Access to the upper strata was regulated by violent conflicts, which formally resembled the struggles for mafia-type authority. Substantively, however,

the object of these struggles was not mafia-type authority—an informal institution that derived its strength and function from the weakness of, and opposition to, formal state institutions. Rather, the object of the struggles was political-economic command within (or in symbiosis with) formal state institutions.

This all-pervading influence of the state differentiated the social structure of the Crotonese from what had previously existed in the Plain of Gioia. The social structure of the Plain of Gioia, however, was itself evolving toward greater state involvement in everyday life. The social conflicts that followed the downfall of the Fascist regime did not lead in the Plain to any significant change in the system of land tenure. This was neither the objective nor the outcome of the struggles (see Section II. 3). The distribution of public-domain lands simply strengthened and widened the structures of small-scale commodity production, and the cultivators themselves supplied what was required in terms of infrastructures (far less than what was required in the Crotonese) and of land improvements.⁴⁰ Under these circumstances there was little room for a large bureaucratic institution such as the OVS, and in fact no such institution came to operate in the Plain of Gioia.

The all-pervasive influence of the state was established more gradually than in the Crotonese, and through quite different channels. Whereas in the Crotonese the influence of the state worked its way up from the structures of property and production, in the Plain of Gioia it worked its way down from the “superstructures” of social conflict and redistribution. The first step was the “politicization” of the feud and the establishment of organic links between national political institutions and mafia-type authorities. When the Fascist regime collapsed, many “scores” had to be settled and the struggle for power and authority among rival patronage groups, partly frozen under Fascism, was reactivated (see section II. 3 above). This revival of the competitive use of violence took place in the highly politicized context of the middle 1940’s. Partly as a spontaneous tendency, partly as a result of the practice of

40. See note 19.

appointing mafia bosses to public office—a practice inaugurated under U.S. military occupation—rival patronage groups were driven into opposite political factions. Local party politics thus began to be turned into a new powerful instrument in the settlement of scores and in the struggle for power and authority.⁴¹

This tendency went hand in hand with the incipient use of mafia power as an instrument of accumulation. Toward the end of the war and in the immediate postwar years, the *mafiosi* began to use their power in the monopolization of activities (such as transport and wholesale trade) that were strategically placed in the struggle for benefits. At first the benefits consisted of the large gains that, in the context of acute scarcity of the immediate postwar years, could be reaped by trading in open and black markets and through smuggling. Later, when shortages lessened and competitive pressures increased, the benefits came to consist of monopsonistic gains, rents, or outright extortions imposed on the local producers. In both situations, violence was used as an instrument of economic competition and domination rather than as an instrument of social regulation as it had been.

In the 1950's, the relationship between national political actors and local patronage groups remained the same as that established in the 1940's: The latter delivered votes to the former, and the former connived with the use of violence and the abuses of power of the latter. This exchange had important indirect effects on the social structure of the Plain of Gioia since the emergent "entrepreneurial mafia" (Arlacchi, 1986),

41. Mafia bosses immediately understood the instrumental benefits of politics and directed their energies toward the aim of establishing their own authority over the political parties. They began by supporting one of their own relatives or affiliates for administrative elections, so that their business at the local level would be protected. They then sought to concentrate their votes on individuals who would commit themselves to becoming the custodian of their interests at the provincial, regional, and national levels.

The economic struggle was thus transferred to the political terrain; the clientelistic feuds entered into the municipal, provincial, and regional councils. Assassination attempts against politicians (which in Olivara resulted in at least one actual assassination) marked all the critical moments of political life; they became expressions of threats and mafia vendettas, and instruments for the rise and replacement of political elites.

instead of protecting local society from the disintegrating tendencies of the market and the centralizing tendencies of state and capital, tried to turn these tendencies to its own advantage. As a consequence, the intensification of competitive pressures in the product markets increased the centralization of production and the polarization of the social structure.

In the 1960's, the relationship between local patronage groups and national political actors came to impinge even more directly and radically than in the 1950's on the social structure of the Plain. The number of state agencies operating in the south multiplied and, what's more, the public financial resources earmarked for the modernization and relief of the southern economy increased manyfold. Since competitive pressures on the producers of the Plain had become so strong as to threaten the viability of all but the most efficient productive units, accumulation or just survival came to depend on a privileged access to these resources—an access which, in turn, required control over the local articulations of the state and of the political parties.

Two results followed. On the one hand, the struggle for benefits among patronage groups shifted from control over strategic nodes of market networks to control over strategic nodes of political networks. The overlap between political and economic patronage became almost complete and the feuds among rival groups turned into conflicts that were simultaneously political and economic. On the other hand, local patronage groups were induced to extend nationally (or even internationally) the scale of their operations in order to ensure the most profitable reinvestment of the capital accumulated in the Plain of Gioia and to establish a more direct influence on the national centers of economic redistribution.

As we shall see, the fusion of the networks of economic and political patronage, and the stretching of these networks toward the decision-making centers of the state, had important implications for the pattern of social conflict/cohesion that emerged in Calabria in the late 1960's and early 1970's (see Section III. 3). Equally important in this respect were developments in the Cosentino where similar outcomes were

produced via a different route. Here, the influence of the state did not work its way up from the structures of property and production (as in the Crotonese), or its way down from the “superstructures” of social conflict and distribution (as in the Plain of Gioia). The absence of acute class conflict or of violent struggles among patronage groups meant that there were fewer opportunities and lesser incentives than in the other two areas for the state and political parties to seize upon local social processes in an attempt to secure legitimacy. As a matter of fact, in the Cosentino the reopening of traditional channels of long-distance migration and the opening of new ones were sufficient to create a widespread consensus in favor of the new republican state and the ruling-party coalition.⁴²

This “enclave” of legitimacy and social peace provided the Christian Democrats with a source of reliable cadres to whom they could entrust the performance of state and party functions in the rest of Calabria and beyond. Most functionaries of the OVS, for example, came from the Cosentino. By recruiting in the Cosentino, moreover, state and parties could exploit the dense and extensive networks of kin and neighbors typical of the area to create and consolidate chains of political patronage.

This instrumental use of kinship networks was by no means unidirectional. As the functions of state and parties multiplied, individuals who occupied strategic positions in these networks used them to step into, and establish command over, the state and party bureaucracies. At the local level, party life, governmental functions, and bureaucratic employment came to be completely dominated by patronage based on kinship. On this basis, strong local-power positions were created from which to climb the hierarchies of party and state bureaucracies, both as an end in itself and as a means to securing control or influence over the centers of allocation of public resources.

The same mechanisms that had given the Cosentino a clear advantage over neighboring areas in long-distance migration were thus activated to create a similar advantage in the occupation of positions of power and bureaucratic employment

42. The Cold War furthered legitimation; almost everybody in the Cosentino had a relative in the United States.

in state and party apparatuses.⁴³ Whereas in the other two areas the state and political parties had subverted (Crotonese) or infiltrated (Plain of Gioia) social relations, in the Cosentino social relations were projected into the state and the political parties.

2. *Mass Migration*

As the state came south, the peoples of Calabria went north. The transformations outlined in the previous section were matched by the development of mass migration. The prelude to this development was a drastic increase in the propensity to emigrate from all over Calabria. In the Crotonese, the land reform changed radically the relationship between the demand for and the supply of labor. On the one hand, the redistribution of land brought about a sharp contraction in the demand for labor because it reduced the amount of land in the hands of capitalist producers and, simultaneously, induced the latter to switch to more capital-intensive techniques of production. In the short run, this contraction was partly compensated for by the increase in the demand for labor associated with heavy private and public investments in land improvements and in infrastructure. But this increase was transitory and subsided as soon as the switch to the new system of land tenure was completed.

On the other hand, the land reform did not bring about a reduction in the supply of labor commensurate with the contraction of demand. Since most peasants had not received enough land to support/employ a family, they continued to sell part of the household's labor power on the market. They did so, however, from a radically changed condition. Their competitive position vis-à-vis the migrant-peasants of the interior and the semiproletarianized peasants of the areas of

43. Cosenza became the hometown of politicians of great influence, such as the Christian Democrat Misasi and the Socialist Mancini. These were long-time ministers who followed an active policy of using trusted men to occupy and control key bureaucratic and political posts. For a comprehensive evaluation of their political activities and their clientelistic strategy, see Cappelli (1985: 567 ff).

petty commodity production had greatly improved. Since part of the household's subsistence was now covered by production on the plots obtained through the reform, wages were no longer required to cover the full costs of reproduction. A major disadvantage in competing with nonproletarianized and semi-proletarianized peasants from neighboring territories was thus eliminated, and the elimination of this disadvantage brought to the fore the advantages associated with closeness to the centers of employment (better knowledge of demand conditions and shorter transfer times from residence to workplace).

At the same time, the land reform reduced the dependence of the labor force of the Crotonese on the local labor market. One of the main reasons why the rural proletarians of the Crotonese had been only marginally involved in long-distance migration was that they lacked the material and nonmaterial resources necessary to undertake it (see Section I. 2). The redistribution of land provided them with some of these resources. To be sure, the newly created peasantry of the Crotonese never had the historical opportunity to create the extensive kinship networks through which the longer-established peasantry of the Cosentino had succeeded in organizing long-distance migration. Yet, through a variety of arrangements (such as selling or renting their land or leaving part of the family on the land to produce part of the subsistence), and often by exploiting the patronage networks that had grown out of the reform, the labor force of the Crotonese was now in a position to compete for jobs in extraregional markets.

The upshot of all these changes was that the Crotonese tended to turn from a net "importer" into a net "exporter" of labor power—that is to say, it began to generate a surplus of labor capable and willing to seek remuneration outside Calabria. For quite different reasons, the propensity to engage in extraregional migration increased also in the other two areas. In the Plain of Gioia, the incipient crisis of small-scale commodity production transformed the cyclical alternation of excess supply and excess demand in the local labor market (due to the ebbs and flows of competitive pressures in the product markets) into a structural disequilibrium of cumulating excess

supply. More specifically, as had been usual in previous cyclical contractions, the fall in agricultural prices that followed the immediate postwar boom induced capitalist producers to cut down their demand for labor and semiproletarianized producers to increase their supply in the local market. This time, however, competitive pressures from abroad (Spain, Israel, Greece, Morocco, the United States) on the agricultural activities of the Plain, and from northern Italy on auxiliary activities (sawmills, coopers, basketmakers, and so on), was so strong that it induced capitalist producers either to give up production and emigrate or to undertake radical rationalizations of activities.

This thinning of the capitalist stratum and the rationalization of economic activities further depressed the local economy leading to new rounds of divestment (particularly in retail and wholesale trade) and of emigration.⁴⁴ The semiproletarianized strata of the Plain of Gioia were thus faced, not only with remunerative prices for their cash crops, but also with steadily worsening opportunities to sell labor power locally. As a consequence, in the Plain the propensity to emigrate was increasing, not because of an improvement in the living conditions of the labor force (as in the Crotonese), but because of a worsening in their conditions.

As for the Cosentino, the traditional high propensity to engage in long-distance and seasonal migration was further enhanced by two circumstances. In the first place, the restrictions imposed on interstate migration in the previous twenty years had created a "backlog" of would-be long-distance migrants ready to leave as soon as circumstances allowed. In the second place, the intensification of competition in nearby

44. In Olivara there were 154 manufacturing enterprises at the time of the 1951 census but only 112 in 1961; the number of wood-based enterprises declined from 35 in 1951 to 22 in 1961; clothing and furniture enterprises fell from 62 in 1951 to 30 in 1961. The number of wholesale traders declined from 30 in 1951 to 20 in 1961 and retail traders declined from 123 in 1951 to 77 in 1961. At the same time strong migratory flows developed. From the end of the 1950's emigration became a mass-based phenomenon in every social stratum; from a cyclical phenomenon it became structural; from a "correction" mechanism of market disequilibria it became the very origin of such disequilibria.

labor markets (due to the breakup of the latifundia and the crisis of small-scale commodity production, which decreased demand and simultaneously increased supply) was inducing the would-be permanent migrants of the lower social strata and the seasonal migrants of the intermediate strata to seek employment outside the region.

In the first postwar decade, therefore, the propensity to engage in extraregional migration was increasing in all three territories. This greater propensity materialized in three successive waves of migration, each representing a different stage of development of "mass migration."⁴⁵ During the first wave (i.e., from the late 1940's to the late 1950's), extraregional migration remained predominantly long distance. The costs and risks of this type of migration—although considerably lower than half a century before—were still high and generally beyond the reach of the lower social strata. Moreover, the restrictions introduced by key recipient states, such as the United States, and the peripheralization of other recipient states, such as Argentina and Brazil, added new obstacles to the involvement of the lower social strata in long-distance migration.⁴⁶ As a consequence, the enhanced propensity to engage in extraregional migration of the intermediate social strata (subsistence producers under the pressure of customary rules and commodity producers under the pressure of intensifying market competition) found an outlet, but the enhanced propensity of the lower social strata generally did not. The growing disequilibrium between supply and demand in the regional labor market thus materialized in unemployment rather than emigration (see Appendix II).

The second wave began in the late 1950's and lasted until the middle 1960's. It was characterized by the almost complete

45. The quantitative aspects of the three waves are shown in Appendix II.

46. Some of the recipient states that had ceased to import labor (particularly Brazil) were also states that at the beginning of the century had offered special assistance to immigrants from southern Italy as a way to compete with wealthier and more attractive lands of immigration, such as North America. This assistance was often essential for lower social strata to engage in long-distance emigration. The ability of lower strata to engage in long-distance migration was further curtailed by the importance attributed to wealth and family connections by the immigration laws of the United States.

displacement of the earlier pattern of either short-distance (intraregional) or long-distance (extra-European) migration by a pattern of principally medium-distance (extraregional, intra-European) migration. Moreover, intrastate migration (that is, migration from Calabria to other Italian regions) came to account for a large and growing share of intra-European migration. This change in the spatial and temporal pattern of migration was accompanied by a change in the social actors involved in migration: For the first time, extra regional migration became a mass phenomenon dominated by the lower social strata.

These changes were prompted by the boom of industrial activities in northwestern Europe and northern Italy associated with the formation of the E.E.C. in 1958 and the spread of processes of mass production and capitalist rationalization ("Fordism" and "Taylorism") pioneered in the United States in the first half of the century. These processes had already made a breakthrough in Europe during the Second World War, and above all in the years of postwar reconstruction, but only with the formation of the E.E.C. was there created an economic space large enough for their cumulative expansion.

The industrial boom markedly increased the demand for labor in European core regions. It also changed the composition of the demand for labor because the new lines and techniques of production were based on a systematic and ever-widening substitution of high-level manpower (in fact, functionaries of capital) and semiskilled operatives for skilled craftsmen and unskilled laborers. As a consequence, the sharp and sustained increase in the demand for labor was principally for the first two kinds, managerial and semiskilled. The most acute shortages, however, were not felt in the kinds of jobs that were expanding more rapidly. There was no major shortage, for example, of high-level manpower since the growing demand for this kind of labor could be and was easily met by recycling (mainly through on-the-job training of the younger generations) the surplus of intellectual workers that had traditionally characterized Europe, and or by easing the access of lower social strata to higher education.

It was not so easy to meet the growing demand for semiskilled operatives. To some extent it was possible to do so by mobilizing and recycling the surplus of labor that stagnated in low-status/low-pay jobs within the core regions themselves. This was a real possibility as long as the new semiskilled jobs were perceived as providing higher status and rewards than unskilled and lower status jobs, and as long as there were large reserves of labor employed in these unskilled and low-status jobs.⁴⁷ This solution to the shortage of semiskilled operatives was widely resorted to, but, by diverting supplies from low-status/low-pay jobs, it transferred the shortage to the latter occupations. As a matter of fact, in the early stages of development of the new lines and techniques of production, it was quite normal for labor shortages in core regions to be more acute in the slowly expanding unskilled job sector than in quickly expanding semiskilled job sectors.

In the late 1950's and early 1960's the shortage was nonetheless felt in semiskilled occupations as well because of the high overall rate of expansion of industrial activities in

47. When they were first introduced, semiskilled jobs were often perceived as providing higher status and rewards, not only than unskilled jobs, but even than skilled jobs (see, for example, Vallini, 1957). One of the main reasons was that as long as the new methods were not generalized and were not operating at full capacity, the burden of higher speed fell mainly not on those who worked with the new methods but on those who worked with the old ones. In the 1950's the piecemeal introduction of the new lines and techniques of production, both within and between enterprises, combined with the weak bargaining power of the skilled and unskilled workers still operating under the craft system, meant that these latter workers had to bear most of the burden of the intensification of work. A similar point had already been made by Marx (1959) with reference to nineteenth-century transformations of the labor process.

The situation changed radically at the end of the 1950's and even more in the early 1960's. As the new methods became more generalized, the burden of the intensification of work shifted onto workers in semiskilled jobs. In addition, by the late 1950's, the most competitive and easily mobilizable northern reserves of part-lifetime proletarian labor had been exhausted. The labor force in domestic service had been drastically reduced, and, thanks to the competitive pressure from factory work, it was enjoying far better conditions of pay and work than in the early 1950's. Similar considerations apply to the labor force in semiskilled jobs in textiles and other older sectors. More generally, much of the disguised unemployment in northern agriculture had been absorbed, unskilled industrial work had ceased to be the main reference when considering semiskilled occupations, and new forms of apprenticeship, particularly through formal education, were becoming real alternatives for the new generations of peasant and working-class households with multiple incomes.

western Europe. What's more, as soon as the new lines and techniques of production became generalized, the status of semiskilled jobs declined, and their effort-price tended to increase drastically. As a consequence, shortages in semiskilled jobs became progressively more acute than in unskilled jobs. These two kinds of shortages (of semiskilled operatives and unskilled laborers) prompted and shaped the demand of core European regions for the labor power of peripheral regions. The regional surplus of labor that had grown and stagnated in Calabria during most of the 1950's thus found an outlet that was within the reach of the lower social strata, and that could even be exploited on a seasonal basis.⁴⁸

The second wave of migration thus began to reduce unemployment and underemployment in Calabria. Initially, however, the impact of mass migration on the social structures of Calabria was limited by the fact that, up to about 1962, the predominant experience of the migrants in northern Italy and abroad was employment in the low-status/low-paying jobs that had been deserted by the indigenous workers. These jobs were a welcome alternative to open or disguised unemployment but not an inducement strong enough to give up self- or wage employment within Calabria if the potential migrants were so employed. Migration thus absorbed the regional surplus of labor without undermining the viability of existing social structures.

In contrast to this situation, between 1962 and 1966, the predominant experience of the migrants from Calabria became employment in the semiskilled positions of technologically advanced core industries.⁴⁹ These jobs offered the migrants a

48. The meeting of demand and supply was greatly facilitated by the drastic reductions in the costs and times of transport between southern and northern Italy that took place in the late 1950's and early 1960's. A further factor was the widespread mobilization of kinship and patronage networks by core employers either directly through southern employees or indirectly through various kinds of intermediaries.

49. The generalization of the new lines and techniques of mass production increased competitive pressures on employers to reduce unit labor costs. As employers attempted to step up the intensity and pace of work in semiskilled positions (where most of the directly productive work had come to be concentrated), they began to experience labor resistance on the part of the indigenous workers who had come to occupy those positions or labor shortages. The mass substitution of migrant workers

higher status and a higher pay than previous occupations, both in the places of immigration and in the places of emigration. To be sure, they also required a far more sustained effort than these other occupations—effort that could hardly be sustained over a full lifetime. However, as long as the migrants perceived the semiskilled jobs as a stepping stone toward an improved social and economic position, the high effort-price of such jobs was only a minor drawback. Since tenure in semiskilled jobs was thought to be temporary, the higher the pay per unit of time the better—almost irrespective of the energies expended in their performance.

As we shall see, in the longer run these attitudes and expectations were self-defeating. For a while, however, they endowed migrants from Calabria and other peripheral regions with a strong competitive advantage vis-à-vis indigenous workers, resulting in the almost complete substitution of the former for the latter in semiskilled jobs. This substitution had “revolutionary” repercussions on social relations in Calabria. Migration ceased to be a factor of continuity and expansion of subsistence production, as it had been in the Cosentino, or a reflection of labor-market disequilibria connected with peripheralization, as it had been in the Plain of Gioia. Instead, migration became a factor of discontinuity in the evolution of subsistence production, and a primary factor in the peripheralization of commodity production.

As we know, the structures of subsistence production of the Cosentino had survived the breakdown of the capitalist latifundia of the Crotonese, and the crisis of small-scale commodity production in the Plain of Gioia. Both events had negative repercussions on the ability of the independent peasantry of the Cosentino to market its seasonal surplus of labor in nearby areas. Nevertheless, these negative repercussions were more than compensated for, first, by the reopening of channels of long-distance migration in the late 1940's and early 1950's, and, secondly, by the subsequent

for indigenous workers in semiskilled jobs performed the double function of breaking this resistance and overcoming these shortages.

emergence in northern Italy and other European core regions of employment opportunities that could be exploited on a seasonal basis. The social structures of the Cosentino thus entered the 1960's as well preserved as ever.

The first "cracks" in these structures appeared at the beginning of the 1960's, when the higher rate of migration to northern Italian and other core European regions began to exhaust the internal reserves of subordinate domestic labor, mainly unmarried relatives and *proietti*. Yet, as long as the predominant experience of the migrants in core regions was employment in low-status/low-pay jobs, the cracks were limited and could be patched up with marginal changes in the technical and institutional arrangements of subsistence production—e.g., with some mechanization of agricultural work and a more intense exploitation of the members of the nuclear family. After all, a plot of land continued to be a better and more reliable source of status and full-lifetime subsistence than any of the jobs migrants were getting in core regions. But when the predominant experience of the migrants became the semiskilled jobs of technically advanced industry, the cracks widened and deepened until they could no longer be patched up.

The two changes that more than anything else have precipitated the disintegration of subsistence production were a change in what Aglietta (1979) has called the "consumption norm" on one side and a change in the economic relationship between age groups on the other. Both changes were the product of the same technological transformations that had opened up core labor markets to migrants from Calabria. The main products of the new lines and techniques of mass production (the smaller automobiles, television sets, electrical household appliances, mass produced food and clothing, and so on) required a mass market dependent on the spread of semiskilled occupations. As these products entered the new consumption norm, the very meaning of "subsistence" changed, not only in core regions, but also in those peripheral regions like Calabria that had been heavily involved in migration. The old concept of subsistence became obsolete, and lost much of

its value as a source of status and full-lifetime subsistence, and customary rules and obligations began to break down.⁵⁰

The main agents of the transformation were the younger generations. Apart from being more easily influenced by the change in the consumption norm, the younger generations saw in the new structure of demand for labor in core regions a unique opportunity to switch to the new pattern of consumption and, simultaneously, to liberate themselves from the oppressive patriarchy that pervaded the structures of subsistence production (see section I. 1). Two strategies could be and were pursued. One was to move directly into the core work force and exploit the competitive advantage of younger over older generations in the new semiskilled occupations. The other was to enter the workforce via higher education so as to be able to compete for bureaucratic employment either as a functionary of capital or as a functionary of the state.⁵¹

As the younger generations went north or went into higher education, the structures of subsistence production experienced acute labor shortages which could no longer be countered with marginal changes in technical and institutional arrangements. Those peasant households that controlled the best land (in terms of fertility and closeness to the rapidly growing urban markets) and were more entrepreneurially inclined, switched to skill- and capital-intensive techniques of production and transformed their subsistence into market- and profit-oriented activities. The majority, however, either stopped cultivating the land altogether or continued to do so as a side activity from

50. Neighbors began asking to be paid for labor services, and the goods received from neighbors and relatives became subject to a precise accounting. The social aspects of transactions—dominant until now—were suffocated by pecuniary calculations.

51. The first strategy could be pursued individually, and therefore gave considerable leverage to the younger generations in intrahousehold bargaining, regardless of whether it was actually pursued or not. The second strategy generally required the mobilization of the household's resources and of the social networks in which it was embedded, and therefore required the cooperation and intermediation of the older generations. The cooperation and intermediation of the older generations, however, were generally forthcoming either because of the increased leverage of younger generations in intrahousehold bargaining or because the older generations themselves expected to benefit from the social and economic advancement of their younger kin.

which they did not expect anything more than a subsidy to a subsistence earned elsewhere.⁵²

In the Crotonese and in the Plain of Gioia the competition of core regions for peripheral labor supplies subverted existing social structures in a more direct and immediate way than in the Cosentino. In both areas, but particularly in the Plain of Gioia, production for the market was already the rule so that the new consumption norm spread swiftly via shifts in consumer preferences and worsening terms of trade. More important, unlike the Cosentino, both areas were characterized by relatively well-developed labor markets in which changes in what labor could earn elsewhere were promptly translated into competitive pressures on workers or employers according to circumstances.⁵³

52. For example, in neighborhoods A and B of Altopiano (located in two agricultural districts) almost half of the peasant families have left the farm and moved to live in the town or emigrated. But even among the remaining families the land is no longer their main productive base. Instead, they derive their income principally from emigration and wage work. All the men work as wage workers in the district or emigrate periodically to northern Italy or abroad. Their wives remain at home, near the parents or the in-laws, dedicated to domestic activities and to raising children. Occasional or part-time agricultural work allows both men and women to register as agricultural laborers and to collect unemployment and medical insurance. The children study at least until they complete junior high school, many until they complete high school, and some go on to a university. None works the land. Between the ages of 16 and 18 many emigrate temporarily to Germany, Switzerland, or northern Italy.

53. As we have seen, the crisis of commercial agriculture in areas like the Plain of Gioia had already begun in the 1950's. In the first years of the second wave of migration (1959-62), however, the crisis had given way to a short period of prosperity. The economic boom enjoyed by European core regions in general, and northern Italy in particular, trickled down to peripheral regions like Calabria in the form of improved prices and more secure outlets for their agricultural produce. At the same time, the economic boom did not initially eliminate the favorable labor-market conditions enjoyed by employers in Calabria. Even though unemployment began to decline, the "unlimited" labor supplies created by the breakdown of the latifundia and the previous crisis of small-scale commodity production remained large. In addition, as long as migrants from Calabria were only competing for low-status/low-pay jobs in core labor markets, competitive pressures on employers in the Plain of Gioia and the Crotonese to improve wages and working conditions remained weak.

As the boom approached its peak in 1962-63, these conditions changed radically. The opening up of semiskilled jobs in core regions to migrants from peripheral regions drastically reduced unemployment in Calabria and intensified pressures on employers to improve wages and working conditions to match the conditions offered in core labor markets. Also in these cases, the younger generations were the main agents of the

Squeezed between strong competitive pressures in the labor *and* the product markets, small-scale commodity production was plunged into its final crisis. As in the Cosentino, only those households (and enterprises) that controlled the best land and that either had already switched or were quick to switch to skill- and capital-intensive operations were able to survive. All the others either discontinued agricultural activities or were able to pursue them only as side activities.

The recession of 1963-66 marked the end of the second wave of migration. When migration picked up again in 1966 after two years of decline, a third and last wave of migration began. The expectations of the migrants of this third wave were quite different from those of the earlier wave, and in addition they were quite different from what the migrants actually found in the regions of immigration. The main difference was that the migrants of the late 1950's and early 1960's did not expect employment in core regions to provide them with full-lifetime status and subsistence, which in fact they often got, whereas this was precisely what the bulk of the migrants of the late 1960's expected and did not get.

The change was owing to the fact that the experience and activities of the migrants of the earlier wave raised the expectations of the migrants of the later wave and, at the same time, undermined the conditions necessary for their fulfillment. As argued earlier, the strength of the migrants of the second wave in competing with indigenous workers of core regions for semiskilled jobs was that they did not expect to spend the rest of their lives in those jobs and, therefore, were prepared to expend energies at a rate that could not be sustained over a full

transformation. However, the greater stratification of the social structures of the Crotonese and of the Plain of Gioia relative to those of the Cosentino was reflected in a split between the lower social strata (fully or semiproletarianized households), whose younger generations tended to go into the semiskilled jobs of core regions, and the middle and upper strata, whose younger generations tended to go into higher education. The end of the boom and the subsequent recession of 1963-66 greatly intensified competitive pressures in the product markets but did not reduce competitive pressures in the labor market because the substitution of migrant for indigenous workers in the semiskilled jobs of core regions became even more widespread than in the final years of the boom.

lifetime. This strong competitive position facilitated the advancement of the early migrants from the low-status/low-pay jobs into the higher-status/higher-pay semiskilled jobs. This “unexpected” success shaped the expectations of the migrants of the third wave who went north in search of social and economic advancement. Yet, the more semiskilled jobs came to be “monopolized” by migrants, the more they lost status and the more they involved a consumption of energies that could not be sustained for more than a few years.

Thus, the expectations of the migrants of the third wave were bound to be and actually were frustrated. In part, this frustration induced individualized responses such as a lesser propensity to migrate or a shift of preferences in favor of entry into the labor market via higher education. These responses, however, were not open to everybody. The former response was limited by the disintegration of the structures of subsistence and commodity production that the very development of mass migration had precipitated or accentuated. And the latter response required resources that many did not have and, in any event, concerned the younger generations (which had not yet undertaken migration) rather than the migrants themselves. In view of these limitations of individualized responses, it is not surprising that the main effect of the unfulfilled expectations was the outbreak of redistributive struggles of an unprecedented nature.

3. Redistributive Struggles

The migrants of Calabria did not accept passively the verdict of the market that decreed, one, the liquidation of their income-earning opportunities in the areas of emigration, and, two, their confinement in the areas of immigration to dead-end jobs that gave them only temporary access to the means of subsistence of the new consumption norm. Rather, they exploited the social networks in which they were enmeshed to struggle for an improvement in their income-earning opportunities in both areas. In core regions the struggles took the form of industrial conflict aimed principally, although not exclusively,

at a reduction in the intensity of work. In Calabria, it took the form of urban rioting aimed principally at a territorial redistribution of state financial resources in general and bureaucratic employment in particular.

With respect to individual conflict, the semiskilled jobs that migrant workers had come to monopolize in the late 1960's did not provide them with the status and full-lifetime subsistence they expected. But they did provide them with a power they never had before—the power to disrupt production at a low cost to themselves and at a high cost to their employers. Slowing down production or going *often* on *short* strikes cost the migrant worker little or nothing. Their main problem was not that they earned too little per unit of time but that they consumed too much energy per unit of time. Slowing down production or going often on short strikes were ways, not only of protesting against the pace and the intensity of work, but of recovering one's energies as well. Slowdowns and strikes naturally had costs and risks: Strikes implied losses of income, and both slowdowns and strikes involved risks of reprisals on the part of the employer. But the immediate costs were largely if not wholly compensated by the recovery of energies, and the longer-term costs and risks were largely irrelevant, since at the current rate of consumption of their energies the workers did not expect to last very long in the jobs.

The costs of slowdowns and of short and frequent strikes to the employers, in contrast, were extremely high. Semiskilled jobs occupied a strategic position in highly integrated and capital-intensive labor processes. Any slowdown or interruption of production on the part of workers in semiskilled positions was disruptive of the entire complex labor process, and, therefore, had serious repercussions on profitability. From this point of view, longer but less frequent and more predictable strikes were less of a threat to profitability than the slowdowns and frequent strikes migrant workers were spontaneously engaging in.

Taking advantage of this asymmetry of bargaining power in the workplace, southern migrants initiated in 1968-69 a wave

of labor unrest of unprecedented spread, intensity, and length.⁵⁴ The main reason why this wave of industrial conflict lasted so long and was so difficult to bring under control, in comparison to previous waves, was that previous means of undermining workers' bargaining power had been used up, or could no longer be mobilized as effectively as in the past. Thus, the wave of industrial conflict of 1943-50 was centered around the interests of skilled craftworkers whose main objective was control over the conditions of supply of and demand for their skills. The protagonists of that wave, after having been defeated politically, were in the course of the 1950's deprived of their bargaining power through the introduction of the technological innovations mentioned earlier.

Through these innovations, the craftworkers were displaced from directly productive roles by semiskilled workers who were initially recruited among the semiproletarianized and lower social strata of the core regions themselves. When in 1959-62 the latter gave rise to a new wave of industrial conflict, aimed primarily at obtaining higher wages, they were largely successful in their endeavor, but were quickly displaced from semiskilled jobs by southern migrants who were willing to expend more energies for the same amount of money. The strong bargaining power of the southern migrants in the late 1960's and early 1970's was rooted in the very processes that had undermined the bargaining power of the protagonists of the earlier waves of conflict, namely, the transformations of the labor process that had transferred the power to disrupt production from skilled to semiskilled jobs, and the monopolization of semiskilled jobs by the migrants themselves. If the power of the migrants had to be undermined, new ways and means had to be found.

Two obvious ways (widely pursued in other states) were to find regions with competitive supplies of labor from which to "import" labor or to which to relocate production. However, in

54. With ups and downs, and changes in form and substance, the wave of labor unrest lasted for a decade or so. The literature on the subject is vast. Regalia et al. (1978), Lange & Vannicelli (1982), and Barkan (1984) are among the best overviews.

the political atmosphere created in Italy by the wave of industrial conflict (as well as by the other movements of protest to be discussed presently) neither solution to the problem of labor control in mass production could be pursued with the necessary determination. As a consequence, mass-production industries were plunged into a long, drawn-out crisis.⁵⁵

As the outbreak of industrial conflict and its successes in winning higher wages and improved working conditions brought into the open the loss of competitiveness of migrant labor, the expansion of mass production leveled off, and the demand for migrant labor declined. The downturn of migration from Calabria, which began in 1970-71 and accelerated after 1973, was partly the result of this reduction in demand. In part, however, it must be traced to the decline in the propensity to emigrate jointly produced by the changed conditions of migration (see Section III.2) and by the process of growing interpenetration of Calabria's social structures with national political institutions (Section III.1).

The recession of 1963-66 had marked a turning point also in this latter process. As we know, the deepening crisis of commodity production and the sudden obsolescence of subsistence production reoriented migrants toward the pursuit of full-lifetime proletarian status in core regions (Section III.2).

55. It took many years (at least ten and possibly fifteen years after the initial outbreak of industrial unrest in 1968) before some freedom of hiring and firing was reestablished for large employers. In the meantime, the peripheral status of southern Italy was used by workers' organizations and southern pressure groups within the ruling parties to constrain the ability of core employers to relocate production to, and to import competitive labor supplies from, foreign peripheral areas. Immigration of foreign workers increased in the 1970's but remained a relatively insignificant phenomenon (accounting for approximately 500,000 workers). Since it never brought foreign and national labor supplies into direct competition, it did not become an issue in employer-worker relations. Relocation of production, in contrast did become an issue. Considerable pressures were brought to bear on employers to relocate to southern Italy or not to relocate at all. The loss of competitiveness of southern labor supplies meant that core employers often chose not to relocate at all. As a consequence, Italian corporate capital, which in the early 1960's was far ahead of German and Japanese capital in foreign direct investment, fell behind both of them in the 1970's (see Onida, 1978). The crisis was eventually solved, among other things, by switching to automated techniques that did away with (or reduced the dependence on) the use of migrant labor. FIAT, which had been the epicenter of labor unrest in the late 1960's and early 1970's, subsequently became one of the major world innovators in the field of robotization.

In addition, it pushed all social strata to seek status, profits, and subsistence in a closer relation with the state in Calabria itself. Pensions, subsidies for agricultural products, contracts for public works, jobs in bureaucratic employment from the lowest to the highest levels—these and other benefits became the object of struggles among individuals and groups of kin and clients whose typical arenas were state institutions rather than the market.

For the most part these struggles were hidden and scattered in the abodes of everyday life. However, the growing frustration over the actual capacity of core labor markets in the north and of state institutions in Calabria to meet, jointly or separately, the expectations of full-lifetime employment and income that were increasingly entertained at a mass level, made collective action likely. And in 1970, a highly visible and dramatic movement of protest broke out in Reggio Calabria and was only held in check by the sustained presence of the police and army for more than a year.⁵⁶ Just as the struggles of the migrant workers in the industrial plants of the north were reproducing on a much larger scale the class struggles that had torn apart the capitalist latifundia, so the extensive urban riots in the streets of Reggio Calabria reproduced on an enlarged scale the feuds that had divided and held together the social structures of small-scale commodity production.

The feud-like nature of the conflict was evinced by the objectives, forms, and ideological representations of the struggle. The riots broke out as a reaction to the decision of the central government to make Catanzaro rather than Reggio the capital city of Calabria which, like all other Italian regions, was about to acquire significant legislative and administrative autonomy from the central state. The decision was perceived by the inhabitants of Reggio as an insult to the “honor” of their city, which had always been regarded (and not only by them) as the *de facto* capital of Calabria. At a more material level, the decision seemed to sanction, and thereby further enhance, the peripheralization of the province of Reggio in relation not only

56. For an early evaluation of the Revolt of Reggio, see Ferraris (1971) and D'Agostini (1972).

to core regions but also to the other two provinces of Calabria (Cosenza and Catanzaro).

The province of Reggio included most of the once prosperous areas of commercial agriculture for export, such as the Plain of Gioia. The relative prosperity of these areas had made Reggio a peripheral but important trading and administrative center and, for that reason, the habitat of a relatively large and forward-looking bourgeoisie. Up to the Second World War, neither of the other two provinces could compete with the province of Reggio in terms of modern facilities of production, exchange, and consumption.

After the Second World War, social and economic decay proceeded apace. The crisis of commercial agriculture, which we have outlined with reference to the Plain of Gioia, involved in one form or another the whole province. The recession of 1963-66 was the straw that broke the camel's back. While the lower social strata went north to see their expectations of income and status frustrated, the local bourgeoisie and the middle strata—"crowded out" from an overcompetitive market—found themselves seeking refuge in an overcrowded state apparatus.

It soon became evident that the province of Reggio had lost ground not only to core regions but to the other provinces of Calabria as well. In the province of Catanzaro, which included most of the former areas of the capitalist latifundium such as the Crotonese, the land reform and the activities of the OVS had created an agriculture more oriented toward the national than the world-market and therefore less exposed to competitive pressures than the agriculture of the province of Reggio. Moreover, the investments and modernizing activities of the OVS had created in the province a more balanced and, as far as the vast majority of the population was concerned, a more prosperous economy than had ever existed before.

In the province of Cosenza, long-distance migration had slowly but steadily transformed what appeared to be the most backward kind of economic system into a highly resilient system of production capable of prompt adaptations to the

most diverse conjunctures of the world-economy and of the nation-state. As already mentioned, the solid and extensive networks of kin and neighbors typical of this province provided a springboard not only for long-distance migration but also, when the occasion arose, for the infiltration of the state apparatus (see III.1).

The revolt of 1970-71 was a reaction of the people of Reggio to the sense and reality of being left behind. The reaction cemented the highly stratified and segmented social structure of Reggio and its province into a solid bloc impervious to divisive external influences. Feuds among local patronage groups were temporarily set aside in a common struggle aimed at forcing the central government to reverse its decision on the regional capital. As a means to this end the state's legitimacy was challenged through extensive and protracted disruptions of law and order. The significance of the revolt of Reggio was further heightened by its tendency to become a model for urban unrest in other southern cities.⁵⁷

Threatened by a general loss of legitimacy, the central government eventually resorted to the compromise of dividing the role of regional capital between Reggio and Catanzaro. The most important effect of the revolt, however, was not this compromise. Far more important was the attempt of the central state to regain legitimacy through a further increase in the economic resources directly and indirectly channeled toward the Mezzogiorno in general and to Calabria in particular. These redistributive measures gave indirect support to the struggles waged by southern migrants in northern industries because they constrained the tendency of northern industries to rationalize production and cut down the employment of migrant-labor, while they provided migrants or

57. Within Calabria urban unrest spread to Catanzaro. Interestingly enough, this unrest was far less directed against Reggio's claim to become regional capital instead of Catanzaro than it was directed against the central government's policies toward the region as a whole. The Revolt of Reggio itself had been preceded by several urban riots in southern towns and cities (Battipaglia, Caserta, Pescara, etc.). After the Revolt of Reggio, however, urban rioting in the south began to proliferate (Salerno, L'Aquila, S. Benedetto del Tronto, and so on).

potential migrants with alternative sources of income in their regions of origin.⁵⁸

Industrial conflict in the north and urban unrest in the south were thus complementary responses to the contradictions of mass migration, which relied upon and simultaneously undermined the viability of commodity and subsistence production in the areas of emigration. This contradiction was most directly experienced by the migrant-workers who, at the end of the 1960's, could not find a viable source of full-lifetime employee status and subsistence either in the places of immigration or in the places of emigration. Spurred by this contradiction, the migrants initiated or joined movements of protest that in many ways improved the prospects of full-lifetime status and subsistence in core regions or in Calabria.⁵⁹

58. The redistributive measures that most directly constrained the tendency of northern industries to rationalize production were the pressures that unions and government brought to bear on northern employers to relocate production to southern Italy or not to relocate at all (see note 55 above). However, redistributive measures in general indirectly reduced the resources that could be mobilized for the rationalization of northern industries.

59. As we have seen, the success of the struggles of migrant workers in core industries brought about a contraction in the demand for the migrants' labor power. However, many did not lose their jobs and were at last able to enjoy the full-lifetime status and subsistence attached to employment in core industries. Many others attained the same result by appropriating in Calabria the benefits of the redistributive measures induced by urban unrest in the south.

This success was all the more remarkable in that it was attained in spite of the ideological and political contradictions of the movements of protest in which actual or potential migrants had been involved. The most glaring contradiction was between the politics and ideology embraced by the migrants in the factories of the north and the politics and ideology embraced in the streets of Reggio and other southern cities. This opposition can be explained by the different social composition of the movements in the two situations. In the industrial environment of the north, the allies of the migrant worker were other factory workers and "revolutionary" students—an alliance that was generally cemented by extreme left-wing ideologies. In the streets of Reggio Calabria and other southern cities, the allies of the migrant-workers and of the heterogeneous mass of potential migrants (unemployed, self-employed, salaried and wage workers of various kinds) included capitalist entrepreneurs, state and other bureaucrats, *mafiosi* and their clients—an alliance that was generally cemented by extreme right-wing ideologies.

This opposition weakened politically both movements since the political establishment could and did play these *opposti estremismi* one against the other. In the last resort, however, the two movements could be brought under control only by eliminating their common structural roots: a system of labor migration that fed industrial conflict in the north and urban unrest in the south.

These relatively successful redistributive struggles brought to an end the process of transformation of the Calabrian peasantry into a waged and salaried labor force. As mass migration came to an end, no peasantry to speak of was left in Calabria. There still were farmers and agricultural workers, to be sure. But there was no numerically or socially significant group of low-status cultivators that attached importance to land as a source of full-lifetime status and subsistence.

Our story may therefore end here. In order to draw some general conclusion, however, the story must be qualified in one important respect. The qualification refers to the fact that Calabria has been part (and its peoples have been citizens) of a state (Italy) that has included within its national boundaries sizable and important core regions. This fact did not prevent, and might even have favored, the peripheralization of Calabria (see Section II.2). Nor has it prevented northern Italians from treating Calabrians, and southern Italians in general, as second-class citizens. Nevertheless, the status of Italian citizens has given the people of Calabria at least three important advantages over the peoples of most other peripheralized regions of the world-economy.

A first advantage has been a privileged access to core labor markets. The mass migration of the 1960's, which completed the transformation of the Calabrian peasantry into a wage labor force, is unthinkable without such a privileged access. When peasants and proletarians migrate from peripheral regions to core regions, they generally cross political boundaries. As foreigners, their political and civil rights in core regions are subjected to various limitations, and, in any event, the migrants must compete with migrants of other nationalities. Up to the middle 1950's, migrants from Calabria normally faced a situation of this kind because they went predominantly abroad. Moreover, up to the late 1950's, the *Leggi contro l'Urbanesimo* narrowly restricted their rights of residence within Italy itself.⁶⁰ In contrast to this situation, the mass migration of the 1960's was predominantly internal to the

60. See note 32.

Italian state; it was not constrained by the *Leggi contro l'Urbanesimo* (which ceased to be enforced in the late 1950's and were repealed in 1961); and, above all, it never exposed migrants from southern Italy to the competition of foreign migrants.

The second advantage was closely related to the first. Southern Italian migrants in northern Italy were much freer to engage in collective struggles against the verdicts of the market than migrants in foreign countries normally are. There are of course many instances of migrant workers who have resorted to industrial conflict in foreign countries. But in most of these instances (i.e., excepting instances of industrial conflict in lands of new settlement with liberal immigration policies), migrants were restrained by formal and informal inhibitions against resorting to collective action. Southern migrants in northern Italy were not altogether exempt from such inhibitions. But the fact that they were migrants in their own country meant that, in the ripeness of time, these inhibitions could be and were set aside.

Finally, a third advantage has been the access to the economic resources of core regions. The division of the world into state jurisdictions separates most peripheralized regions from most core regions and so has protected the latter from the movements of protest that occur in the former. As long as these movements of protest take place outside the jurisdiction of core states, the legitimacy of these states is not threatened and may even be strengthened by them. As a consequence, movements of protest in peripheral regions have great difficulties in laying claims to the economic resources controlled by core regions. Since no such separation existed between Calabria and the core regions of northern Italy, the protest movements of its peoples were able to induce redistributive measures that are rather exceptional by the standards of most peripheral or even semiperipheral states. Although these measures have not eliminated peripherality, they have at least helped Calabria to live with it.⁶¹

61. The redistribution of resources from a core to a peripheral territory carried out by a political center does not necessarily alter the structural relationship through which

Conclusions

The concept of “economic development” is often used to refer to two related but distinct processes. One is the process of *social change*, through which the organization of economic life of a given territory is transformed. The other is the process of *economic progress*, through which the absolute and relative command of the residents of that territory over economic resources (that is, their “wealth”) is increased. It is hardly conceivable that in the world-economy as a whole command over resources can increase over time without some change in the overall organization of economic life. If our unit of analysis is the world-economy as a whole, therefore, it may not be necessary to distinguish between social change and economic progress.

What is true for the whole, however, is not necessarily true for the parts. Particularly over short periods of historical time, the distribution of wealth among territories is not determined primarily by the organization of economic life within each territory. It is determined first and foremost by the way in which the parts are combined spatially and temporally and by the random processes that always influence these combinations (II.2). It follows that, if the unit of analysis is a region of the world-economy, or a state, or (as in our case) a region of a state, social change and economic progress must be treated as separate processes. That is to say, their interrelations must be subjected to empirical investigation rather than assumed away by definition.

This is what we have tried to do in analyzing developmental processes in Calabria. We hope to have shown that different ways of organizing economic life (such as subsistence produc-

one territory systematically appropriates a disproportionate share of the benefits of the division of labor while the other obtains only marginal benefits. It does, however, counter the effects of this unequal distribution of benefits on the welfare of the residents of the two territories. In the case of Calabria this seems to have been the only effect that redistributive measures have had so far. Thus, while the per capita income of Calabria relative to the national average was in the 1980's more or less what it was in the 1950's (i.e., approximately 50% of the national average), its consumption per capita increased from approximately 50% to approximately 75% of the national average.

tion, small-scale commodity production, and large-scale commodity production) have no necessary relation to economic progress. They are neither stages leading to greater economic command nor attributes of lesser/greater command. Rather, they are alternative forms of social life and social change within an evolving world-economy. Even though elsewhere these forms, or paths, have all been associated with economic progress, in Calabria they have all been associated with economic regress, comparatively at least.

The path of social change followed by a territory does not therefore determine the command of that territory over economic resources. It does, however, determine the distribution of such command *within* the territory, and therefore the welfare of its population. Thus, in Calabria, economic regress for the bulk of the population was least along the path of subsistence production entered by the Cosentino, and was greatest along the path of large-scale commodity production entered by the Crotonese.

The experience of Calabria also seems to suggest that social conflict is the key intervening variable, to use that language, in the process of social change. It intervened in the determination of the initial differentiation of Calabria along three divergent paths of social change. It intervened in disrupting the viability of the Junker road at the end of the Second World War, and therefore in initiating the convergence of the three paths toward a new single pattern. And it intervened at the very end of our story in bringing to a halt mass migration. These "interventions" underscore the fact that the peasants of Calabria, and their semiproletarian and proletarian successors, have not at all been passive pawns in the hands of state and capital. Their history is in fact a history of resistance against all kinds of exploitative tendencies. Sometimes they lost and sometimes they won, and the outcome determined the path of social change for generations to come.

By and large, however, the form, intensity, and outcome of social conflict were shaped by developmental processes that were only in small part, if at all, determined by the present or even past actions of the peoples of Calabria. For example, the

conflicts that led to the differentiation of Calabria were sparked by a particular world-economic conjuncture (the mid-nineteenth century boom of agricultural world prices and the formation of the Italian state), and their outcome was largely determined by the social ecology of the terrain on which they were fought. The explosion of class struggle of the late 1940's, which led to the dismemberment of the capitalist latifundia, was an integral part of the Junker road to social change—itsself the product of a previous defeat of the peasantry. But the spread and intensity of the explosion were largely determined by the fact that in the Crotonese large-scale commodity production had been associated with peripheralization rather than ascent to core position—a fact that was largely independent of what local actors did or could do. Moreover, the acute hegemonic struggles that were being fought at the national and world levels when class conflict erupted in the Crotonese, were as essential to the introduction of the land reform that liquidated the latifundia as the rural revolt itself.

Generally speaking, we may therefore say that social conflict is an integral part of developmental processes, and that its role lies not so much in determining the economic regress (progress) of the locale in which it occurs as in determining the distribution of the costs (benefits) of economic regress (progress) among the residents of that locale. Social conflict, however, is not the only weapon available to peasants and proletarians in their struggles against exploitation and peripheralization. The historical experience of Calabria is instructive also because it shows the importance of migration as a substitute for and a complement of social conflict in shaping developmental processes.

In the phase of regional differentiation, short- and long-distance migration played a key role in promoting social change, but along directions largely determined by the outcome of social conflict. In the Cosentino migration consolidated the informal victory of the peasants over the landlords, while in the Crotonese it consolidated the informal victory of the landlords over the peasants. In the Plain of Gioia, where neither the peasants nor the landlords won, migration facilitated the

reproduction of a balanced relationship of forces in the face of destabilizing market influences.

The role of migration was not limited to a consolidation of outcomes already determined by social conflict. After the Second World War, the deepening peripheralization of Calabria on the one hand and the evolution of the labor process in core regions on the other hand created a large supply of would-be migrants in Calabria and a large demand for migrant labor in northern Italian core regions (III.2). The mass migration that ensued was a mass response to peripheralization. By going north, the migrants were seeking individually the economic progress that no individual or collective action in Calabria could have brought within their reach. Migration thus began to go beyond the realm of possibilities determined by the outcomes of social conflict.


Many of the migrants actually got what they sought, but their success induced new rounds of migration that undermined the foundations of the initial success. Competitive pressures on migrants in core regions became more intense, while productive structures in Calabria were further disrupted. The two explosions of social conflict of the late 1960's and early 1970's were complementary responses to this simultaneous increase in the exploitation of migrants on the one side and in the peripheralization of Calabria on the other. Mass migration thus played a double role. It provided the individuals who were clever enough or lucky enough or generationally fortunate to migrate at the right time with a way out of peripheralization. In addition, it changed the scale and the terrain of social conflict, thereby creating the conditions for successful redistributive struggles.

This success was possible because of the peculiar jurisdictional position of Calabria that we emphasized at the end of our story (III.3). Notwithstanding this peculiarity, the story of Calabria may still be read as a metaphor for the periphery of the world-economy. This is a question, however, that for now we are quite willing to leave open.

**APPENDIX I:
Patterns of Population Growth
and Long-distance Emigration**

In Figure A-1 we have plotted the rates of population growth and of gross emigration abroad of the Cosentino, Crotonese, and Plain of Gioia Tauro taken together over the period 1886-1980. The municipalities included in the three areas for statistical purposes are listed in Piselli & Arrighi (1985: 371-74) with the only difference that here the Cosentino includes also the municipality of Acri. The rates of population growth have been calculated by dividing the increase in population in each subperiod by the population at the beginning of the subperiod. The rates of emigration have been calculated by dividing gross emigration abroad in each subperiod (i.e., emigration with no adjustment for returning migrants and other immigrants from abroad) by the population at the beginning of the subperiod. All rates have been converted into percentage rates, and the rates for 1886-1900 (a 15-year period) and for 1932-40 (a 9-year period) have been adjusted to make them comparable with the rates for the 10-year periods.

The rates of population growth are derived from census data and are comparable throughout the entire time span examined. The rates of gross emigration for the pre-1921 periods and for the post-1932 periods (no data are available for 1921-31) are based on data that are not strictly comparable. For the former periods, rates have been calculated from data on emigration proper provided in ISTAT (1900 and subsequent years); for the latter periods, rates have been calculated from data on cancellations of residence in municipal registries. These data have been published since 1958 (ISTAT, various years). For earlier years they were taken from unpublished records kept by ISTAT (the Central Statistical Office). Data on cancellations of residence grossly underestimate actual emigration abroad because they do not include all those persons who emigrated without cancelling their residence in the municipality of origin. However, since long-distance emigrants are more likely to



SOURCE: See text.

Figure A-1: Overall Rates of Population Growth and of Gross Emigration Abroad (Cosentino, Crotonese, Plain of Gioia Tauro)

officially transfer their residence, and since in the years 1886-1920 most migration abroad was long distance, Figure A-1 may in fact give us a rough, but for our purposes adequate, idea of the secular trend of long-distance migration from the three zones taken together.

All we can confidently say on the basis of this chart is that the explosion of long-distance emigration of the early twentieth century was brought to a sudden halt by developments in interstate relations in the interwar years and during the Second World War. Long-distance migration revived after the Second World War, but it remained well below the levels attained at the turn of the century. As emphasized in part III, after the Second World War and particularly in the period 1959-73, long-distance migration was progressively displaced by internal migration to Italian core regions.


This displacement will be documented in Appendix II. Our main concern here is not with the overall temporal pattern of

migration but with a comparison of the patterns of emigration and population growth of the three zones analyzed in the article. To this end, we have calculated, and reproduced in Figure A-2, the differential rates of population growth and of gross emigration for each of the three zones. The differential rates have been obtained by subtracting the average rates for the three zones taken together from the corresponding rates of each zone. Thus, if the rate of growth of population (or of gross emigration) in a given period for a given zone is 15% and the overall rate is 18%, the differential rate for that period and for that zone is -3%. In particular, it should be noted that a negative (positive) differential rate does not imply a low (high) absolute rate. For example, the negative differential rate of emigration of the Crotonese of 1901-10 (-2.5%) was associated with a very high rate of gross emigration (+24.6%).

Figure A-2 shows that the three zones have been characterized by quite different patterns. If we focus on the differential rates of gross emigration, the sharpest contrast is between the Cosentino and Crotonese: while the latter has been characterized throughout the period by negative differential rates (i.e., by rates lower than the average), the former has been characterized by rates higher than the average in all the periods except 1941-50 and 1971-80, when the rates were slightly below the average. In contrast to this clear-cut opposition, the Plain of Gioia shows a mixed pattern: high negative differential rates in the earlier periods, and positive differential rates since the Second World War.

If we focus on the differential rates of population growth, we get a different picture. The sharpest contrast is now between the Cosentino and the Crotonese on the one side, and the Plain of Gioia on the other. The Cosentino and the Crotonese show negative differential rates (i.e., losses in their shares of the total population of the three zones taken together) in the earlier periods, and relative gains in the interwar and postwar periods. The Plain of Gioia, in contrast, shows large relative gains in the earlier periods and large relative losses since the 1930's.

These different patterns can be traced to the characteristics of the three zones discussed in the article:



SOURCE: See text.

Figure A-2: Differential Rates of Population Growth and of Gross Emigration Abroad

(1) The systematically higher-than-average rates of gross emigration from the Cosentino and the systematically lower-than-average rates of gross emigration from the Crotonese can be traced to the fact that the self-sufficient peasantry of the Cosentino had better opportunities than the rural proletariat of the Crotonese to organize long-distance migration. The persistence of the difference after the Second World War (notwithstanding the convergence of the land-tenure systems of the two zones) can in turn be traced to the fact that long-distance migration from the Cosentino had all along been predominantly *long-term*, whereas that from the Crotonese had been *permanent*. The former kind of emigration establishes (and the latter does not establish) networks of recruitment for, and assistance to, future long-distance emigration. In this way the initial advantage of the Cosentino was reproduced and enhanced over time.

(2) The mixed pattern of the Plain of Gioia can be traced to the radically different economic conditions that this area faced in the earlier and in the later periods. In the earlier periods, the Plain of Gioia was at the apogee of its phase of prosperity so that the small farmers, traders, and artisans who had the means to engage in long-distance emigration had a lesser incentive to do so than the peasants of the Cosentino. But as the crisis of the Plain's small-scale commodity production developed and (after the Second World War) intensified, the rates of gross emigration of the zone rose above the average to match those of the Cosentino.


(3) The radical change in the economic conditions faced by the Plain of Gioia also explains why its rates of population growth were well above average up to 1920 and well below average from the 1930's onward. The prosperity of the earlier periods not only dampened the incentive to emigrate but increased the incentive to immigrate and settle in the Plain. Thus, what the zone lost through emigration abroad (in absolute terms) was more than compensated for (in relative terms) by immigration from outside Calabria and from other areas within Calabria. When the crisis of small-scale commodity production set in, this tendency was reversed: popula-

tion losses (in absolute and relative terms) due to emigration abroad were aggravated (in absolute and relative terms) by losses due to emigration to other areas of Calabria and to other Italian regions.

(4) The lower-than-average rates of population growth in the Cosentino and Crotonese in the earlier periods, and their higher-than-average rates in the later periods, were largely a reflection of the relative gains and losses of the Plain of Gioia. The only data that call for additional explanation are the large relative gains of the Crotonese from 1932 to 1960. These gains had different, indeed, opposite causes according to whether they occurred before or after the Second World War. In the 1930's and in the early years of the war, the relative gains in population were due to the fact that the capitalist latifundia of the Crotonese had reached their highest point of development and, thanks to the protection in the product and labor markets provided by the fascist regime, experienced considerable prosperity—at least in relative terms. Proletarians and semi-proletarians from the rest of Calabria and other southern Italian regions were thus attracted to the Crotonese and, over time, inflated its rate of population growth. In the last years of the war and in the 1950's, it was not the prosperity but the crisis of the capitalist latifundia that accounted for the relative population gains of the Crotonese: Proletarians and semi-proletarians were now attracted to the area by the prospect of acquiring land or by the actual redistribution of land carried out by the OVS.

APPENDIX II: The Three Waves of Postwar Emigration

In Figure A-3 we have plotted the rates of net emigration from Calabria as a whole. As a measure of net emigration we have taken the difference between cancellations and registrations of residence in municipal registries given in Malfatti (1976). The upper line refers to total net emigration and the lower line to intrastate net emigration. The shaded area



SOURCE: Derived from Malfatti (1976).

Figure A-3: Rates of Net Emigration from Calabria

between the two lines refers to net emigration abroad. The rates have been calculated by dividing net emigration by the natural increase of the population (also given in Malfatti, 1976), and by multiplying by 100 the ratio so obtained. A rate of 100 thus means that net emigration is equal to the natural increase in population.


The three waves of emigration have been defined by taking the troughs of 1959 and 1965 as dividing lines. The main tendency shown by the chart is the progressive displacement of interstate migration by intrastate migration. Interstate migration is predominant in the upturn of the first wave, but the downturn brings about a balance between interstate and intrastate migration. This balance is upset in favor of intrastate migration in the upturn of the second wave and then temporarily restored in the downturn. Finally, in the course of the third wave, intrastate migration becomes predominant and interstate migration fades into insignificance.

These changes in the destination of migration are matched by changes in the relationship between migration and labor market conditions in Calabria. Some key aspects of these conditions are shown in Figures A-4, A-5, and A-6. In all these figures the solid vertical lines correspond to the troughs, and the dotted vertical lines to the peaks, of the waves of migration shown in Figure A-3.

In Figure A-4 we have plotted the rate of unemployment in Calabria and the difference between the rate of unemployment in Calabria and the rate of unemployment in Lombardy (the most important core region of Italy and a major recipient of migratory flows from Calabria). In Figure A-5 we have plotted the rates of change of money and real wages in Calabria. The data refer to *de facto* wages in manufacturing and construction industries—these being the only reliable data on *de facto* (as opposed to contractual) wages available for the whole of Calabria and for the entire period considered. The difference between the two lines represents the rate of increase in the cost of living. Finally, in Figure A-6, we have plotted the percentage difference between *de facto* wages in manufacturing and construction industries in Lombardy and *de facto* wages in manufacturing and construction industries in Calabria.


On the basis of these data and of the analysis of part III, we may broadly characterize the three waves of postwar migration as follows:

(1) The first wave is directed predominantly abroad, and as such it involves primarily the middle strata of local societies. This is one of the main reasons why unemployment does not decrease but in fact increases, both absolutely and in relation to core regions. Growing unemployment, in turn, restrains the growth of both money and real wages. The wage differential between Calabria and Lombardy at first rises and then decreases, but in 1959 is still in the order of 60%, i.e., only a few percentage points less than what it was in 1951. The overall picture that emerges is one in which the integration of Calabria with the labor market of core regions is limited, and migration does little to increase such integration.




SOURCE: Derived from Ministero del Lavoro (various years).

Figure A-4: Rates of Unemployment



SOURCE: Derived from INAIL (various years).

Figure A-5: Rates of Change of Money and Real Wages



SOURCE: Derived from INAIL (various years).

Figure A-6: Wage Differential Between Lombardy and Calabria

(2) Integration, in contrast, is the main tendency of the second wave. The rate of internal migration increases sharply, and the migrants now come primarily from the lower social strata (including the unemployed). The rate of unemployment decreases, and money and real wages experience what by previous standards is a truly spectacular increase. The closer integration of Calabria with core labor markets is also reflected in a drop in the unemployment differential and, above all, in the wage differential. The latter, which had lost only a few percentage points between 1951 and 1959, loses 30 percentage points between 1959 and 1965—most of the loss being concentrated in the years when migrant workers entered en masse in the semiskilled jobs of northern core industries.

(3) If the main feature of the second wave is a rapid integration of Calabria with core labor markets, the main feature of the third wave is the attainment of the limits of this integration. Labor-market integration did not alter the peripheral position of Calabria vis-à-vis core regions. Higher wages simply made Calabria less competitive as a locale of production. Moreover, to the extent that higher wages raised the expectations of the would-be migrants, the latter's competitiveness in core labor markets was also undermined. These contradictions of the second wave of emigration began to surface in the upturn of the third wave. The steady decline of migration abroad can be interpreted as a symptom of the loss of competitiveness of Calabrian migrants in core labor markets. And the slow decline of unemployment, notwithstanding high rates of intrastate emigration from Calabria, can be interpreted as a symptom of the loss of competitiveness of Calabria as a locale of production. However, as long as rates of intrastate migration were rising, these contradictions remained latent, and the further integration with core labor markets produced a new wage explosion and a further decline in the wage differential. This explosion and the subsequent decline in rates of migration brought the contradictions into the open: the rate of unemployment began rising both absolutely and in relation to core regions, and the decline in the wage differential itself was brought to a halt.

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