EAST ASIAN STUDIES FORUM & REVIEW
Fall 2022 Edition
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Opening Letter

The *East Asian Studies Forum and Review* is a biannual publication of interdisciplinary undergraduate research with a regional focus on East Asia. The journal is supported by the Johns Hopkins University’s East Asian Studies Program and is produced entirely by undergraduate students. It aims to showcase research, while promoting awareness and scholarly discussion of a vibrant, diverse, and increasingly prominent region of the world.

The Fall 2022 East Asian Studies Forum and Review features a total of ten papers from eight Johns Hopkins University students. Submissions consist of course papers as well as independent research. The journal is divided into three categories: East Asian History and Historiography, Contemporary Geopolitical and Security Issues, and Film and Literature of East Asia.

The first section, “East Asian History and Historiography,” features papers that inspect the history of East Asia and East Asian diaspora from the foundation of the Koguryo kingdom to Indonesia’s *Reformasi*. The following section, “Contemporary Geopolitical and Security Issues” discusses current geopolitical and security issues in East Asia impacting Asia and the rest of the international community, with a heavy focus on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Lastly, the third section, “Film and Literature of East Asia,” examines historical and contemporary East Asian film and literature. This is done through both conducting literary analyses as well as exploring film and literature as a reflection of society.

We would like to thank not only all of the student writers, but also our committee members, editors, and distinguished faculty members for making this publication possible.

**Chief Editors:**
Dylan Tran
Tess Yu

**Editorial Staff:**
Amrita Mukunda
Calista Huang
Grace Ma
Leyra Espino-Nardi

**Cover Design:**
Iheoma Anaemeribe
Section I
East Asian History and Historiography
The Gwanggaeto Stele: Reviving the Past

Amrita Mukunda

Monuments and Memory in Asian History

Professor Tobie Meyer-Fong
Along the northeastern border of China and North Korea lies the remains of an ancient kingdom which became the center of an international race to own the past. Burial mounds decorated with intricate wall paintings, stone tombs of great emperors, and a seven-meter-tall stele inscribed with the history of the Goguryeo Kingdom have inhabited the border region for centuries long after its people disappeared.¹

In the early 2000s, the rediscovery of the Gwanggaeto Stele in Ji’an, China caused tensions to spike between China, South Korea, and even Japan, affecting diplomacy. According to the Gwanggaeto Stele’s official UNESCO entry, the Gwanggaeto Stele, which is located near China’s northeast border, was constructed in 414 CE and is inscribed with Chinese characters which tell “the story of the founding of the Koguryo kingdom” and detail the accomplishments of King Gwanggaeto.² The stele was built in Guonei City, an ancient capital of the Goguryeo Kingdom, presently known as Ji’an, China.³ Goguryeo was one of the three main kingdoms located across the Korean Peninsula during the Three Kingdoms Period which flourished from the first century

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³ Ibid.
BCE to the seventh century CE along with the kingdoms of Baekje and Silla. Goguryeo’s territory is split between modern-day North Korea and China, and monuments and remains of the kingdom have been found in both countries. While the Gwanggaeto Stele details the triumphs of King Gwanggaeto and the strength of the kingdom during the stele’s time of construction, Silla defeated and united the three kingdoms in the seventh century CE. Nonetheless, Koreans still proudly believe they are ancestors of the Goguryeo people.

Although the stele was discovered in the 1800s, it was largely forgotten until China began funding the Northeast Project (NEP) in 2002. China’s government funded the NEP in order to adopt the histories of different ethnicities found in China and expand the scope of Chinese history “based on the logic of ‘China being a multiethnic state not only in the contemporary era but traditionally as well.’” A popular belief amongst “Korean nationalist scholars is that the Northeast Project is part of an aggressive Chinese move to claim territory…in the event of a North Korean collapse.” Since the common understanding internationally is that North Korea would be reunified with South Korea in the case of a collapse, these nationalist scholars believe that China is preemptively trying to lay claim to the history of Goguryeo to justify demanding North Korean territory. On the other hand, Chinese nationalist scholars believe South Korea is attempting to encroach on Chinese land by claiming ownership of Goguryeo’s territory.

8 Ibid.
China’s main points of contention concerning the history of Goguryeo are that the kingdom was founded by a Han commandery located in the region and that Goguryeo adopted many practices from the Chinese including the Chinese writing system. The NEP cited the discovery of the stele and other remains of Goguryeo in Northeast China as evidence that Goguryeo was a vassal state of China. Critics, however, believe China’s politicization of history is dangerous and could result in a “diplomatic dispute between” China and South Korea.

The Korean public has responded to Chinese claims on Goguryeo asserting that Goguryeo “should be returned to Korea since it was the old territory of our ancestors,” which highlights the Korean belief that they are descendants of Goguryeo. The public took particular offense to Chinese claims of ownership of Goguryeo’s history as this directly opposes their own claims of the history. People flooded the streets carrying signs criticizing both China and other South Koreans for not fighting harder to defend their history. Additional action taken by the Korean public included public awareness campaigns and fiery debates on television and radio programs.

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9 Ibid.
11 Ahn, "Competing Nationalisms."
12 Jang, Song, and Hwang, "China and Contemporary," 133.
13 Sung-Ho You, Northeast Project Protest, photograph.
14 Ahn, "Competing Nationalisms."
Polling conducted by the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) on the Korean public with regards to which of four major powers they felt most favorably towards found citizens were increasingly skeptical towards China following publication of results from the NEP in 2004.\textsuperscript{15} When polling was conducted earlier in 2004, 61\% of respondents favored China while 26\% favored the United States.\textsuperscript{16} However, after the news was released and polling was conducted again in 2005, only 29\% favored China, and the United States’ favor increased to 55\%.\textsuperscript{17} This 32\% decrease in favor towards China indicates public distrust and anger towards China’s claims on Goguryeo’s history through the NEP which helps us understand why so many public campaigns and rallies were taking place during this time.

While the citizens’ response emphasized taking action and was directly critical, the South Korean government’s response was less aggressive. An official statement made by the government declared that it was “hard to consider the NEP as a project propelled by the Chinese government.”\textsuperscript{18} This official response led to 52 members of the Korean National Assembly urging the government to take a more active role in protecting Korean identity and nationalism.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Jae-Ho Chung, "China's 'Soft' Clash with South Korea: The History War and Beyond," Asian Survey 49, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 473.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 473.
\textsuperscript{17} Chung, "China's 'Soft,'" 473.
\textsuperscript{18} Jang, Song, and Hwang, "China and Contemporary," 135.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 135.
An article published in an August 2004 issue of the International Herald Tribune even indicated that the percentage of “South Korean parliamentarians [who] said China was South Korea’s most important economic partner” dropped from 80% to 6% while the two countries were still projected to have a record amount of bilateral trade. Even though tensions were high, no action was taken against China.

Even though there were internal disputes regarding the response by the government, the government as a whole aimed to calm tensions in order to prevent a larger scale political issue and to prevent issues with trade. In response to the Korean government’s concerns, the Chinese government assured that they would “[understand] Korean concerns and” agreed to “take corrective measures,” but their collective measures were immeasurable. Official trade dependency data from the years prior to and during the NEP show that trade dependence on South Korea in China and on China in South Korea continued to increase despite the controversial NEP. The South Korean government’s response to the NEP was less than the response to issues involving Japan, like the disagreements over the Dokdo Islands and Yasukuni Shrine. Some scholars suspect that while Goguryeo is important to Korean shared identity, the

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>China Trade in South Korea’s Total Trade (%)</th>
<th>South Korea Trade in China’s Total Trade (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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*Data showing trade dependence between China and South Korea continued to increase despite the Northeast Project’s published results.*

*Jung, Song, and Hwang, “China and Contemporary,” 471.*

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21 Ibid.
22 Brooke, "1,300-Year-Old Dispute," 2.
23 Chung, "China’s ‘Soft,’” 471.
The government’s response was less confrontational since the “stimulus involves a distant historical memory” as opposed to more recent events that triggered tensions between Japan and South Korea.25

Interestingly, while South Korean citizens were enraged by the NEP and the government issued responses, North Korea, on the other hand, “remained silent on the dispute with China, a key ally” even though China’s claims on Goguryeo had more potential to affect North Korea since it is home to other major Goguryeo remains.26

Another major source of tension between South Korea and China was the UNESCO registration of the Gwanggaeto Stele by China. Following the discovery of the Gwanggaeto Stele and Goguryeo tombs in China and North Korea, the two countries raced to register the monuments they discovered.27 The synthesis provided by UNESCO states that “the stele and inscriptions show the impact of Chinese culture on the Koguryo” and highlights that Goguryeo shared the Chinese written language.28 The entry refers to the monument by its Chinese name, the Stele of King Haotaiwang, and does not mention the Koreas or how the monument is related to the two countries. This omission of the Koreas and the assertion that the stele shows the Chinese impact on the kingdom is problematic to Koreans as it does not include the other influences on Goguryeo that can be inferred from the inscriptions on the stele itself nor does it mention any context provided from the inscriptions generally. This context is important since Goguryeo was impacted by other entities in addition to Han China like Wa (Japan), Baekje, and Silla.

25 Ibid., 335.
26 Brooke, "1,300-Year-Old Dispute," 2.
27 Ahn, "Competing Nationalisms."
In response to China’s success in registering the Gwanggaeto Stele and other Goguryeo sites as World Heritage Sites, the People’s Daily Online, the online version of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) official newspaper, published an article celebrating the accomplishment. The article claims that "Koguryo was a regime established by ethnic groups in northern China some 2,000 years ago, representing an important part of Chinese culture." This sentence shows the CCP’s belief that Goguryeo is part of Chinese heritage and was created by Chinese ethnic groups. The article furthers this stance by directly mentioning the Gwanggaeto Stele and how it displays the effect of Chinese culture on the kingdom.

While the Chinese were celebrating the registration of the stele and taking measures to protect it, additional public campaigns began in South Korea, targeting the infrastructure constructed near the stele by China, with the most important issue being the sign outside the stele enclosure. The Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK) promoted a new campaign using an image which shows two signs outside of the Gwanggaeto Stele enclosure. The sign on the left which reads “The Gwanggaeto Stele is a genuine work of Chinese stele art that has long been famous” is the sign that is currently present at the site; VANK proposed that the sign should instead be changed to promote their media campaign petitioning for China to change the sign outside of the Gwanggaeto Stele.

VANK, a South Korean organization, created this image to promote their media campaign petitioning for China to change the sign outside of the Gwanggaeto Stele.


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30 Ibid.
31 J. S. Shin, "VANK Launches Campaign to Correct Misconceptions About the Gwanggaeto Stele," The Korea Bizwire, last modified 2020.
read “The Gwanggaeto Stele is a genuine work of Goguryeo-era stele art that shows the splendid glory of Korean history,” which is the sign on the right side of the image.\textsuperscript{32} The author of this VANK article argues that the sign proposed by VANK is more accurate.\textsuperscript{33} Although the second sign is correct in describing the stele as an example of Goguryeo-era stele art as opposed to Chinese stele art, the campaign and author’s intent of claiming that the stele is solely a part of Korean history is also incorrect. Nonetheless, this media campaign is an important example of the protests promoted by the Korean people and shows their strong disagreement with Chinese claims.

An additional point of controversy affecting the Gwanggaeto Stele is the feature most integral to the stele itself: the 1,775 Chinese characters that cover its four sides.\textsuperscript{34} Parts of the stele have eroded or crumbled over time, making some of the characters illegible, shrouding influential moments of history in doubt. The most important information presented by the stele was affected by the erosion, with a key word being lost to time.

This section of the stele reads:

Since Baekjan (百殘) and Silla (新羅) are originally subservient states (of Goguryeo), they paid tributes (to Goguryeo). And since the Sinmyo year (辛卯年; CE 391), the Wa (倭; Japan) came across the sea, defeated Baekjan, [(\textit{then xxx-ed} Sil)]la and made them subjects.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{rubbing_part_of_gwanggaeto_stele_inscription_with_evidence_of_missing_characters.png}
\caption{Rubbing of part of the Gwanggaeto Stele inscription with evidence of missing characters.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ahn, "The Contested."
In this sentence found on the first side of the stele, a critical word describing the fate of Silla at the hands of the Wa (Japanese) eroded completely. Korean scholars argue that the missing word would provide evidence that Silla was not defeated by the Wa to support their belief of an independent Korean identity, but Japanese scholars argue otherwise. Since there is no way to determine what the missing character is, it is important to consider the broader knowledge of Korean history and the context provided by the other characters in this inscription. It seems probable that Silla was temporarily defeated by the Wa before eventually being aided by Goguryeo and unifying the Three Kingdoms two-hundred years later.

Since perspectives on the Gwanggaeto Stele inscriptions greatly differ, seeing how the material is handled in a school setting provides us with the common interpretation of the stele’s text pertaining to Korean identity. The following translated text can be found in high school history textbooks in Korea:

As soon as the Koguryo military force made contact, the [Wa] immediately broke into retreat. The Koguryo force chased after them until they reached Chongbal Fortress in Imnagara. Chongbal Fortress fell under Koguryo’s control and the latter left behind a defensive force (sullabyong). The [Wa] force was completely destroyed when a Koguryo force attacked Silla’s _nong Fortress.

The Korean history textbook only mentions a passage found on side two of the stele which shows Goguryeo’s defeat of the Wa forces in a specific battle. The carefully selected information found in this textbook contributes to a nationalistic agenda by highlighting a victory...

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36 Ibid.
37 Iwaya, "Inscription on the Gwanggaeto," Teikoku Denmo.
of Goguryeo without providing information on the rest of the invasion. The actual stele translation does not mention complete annihilation of the Wa forces at the fortress, and only mentions the original retreat since many characters in this inscription have been eroded making a final conclusion impossible.\textsuperscript{39} The Korean interpretation attempts to fill in the missing characters with a history that supports Korean nationalism.

Despite the Gwanggaeto Stele being located in China, Koreans have found a way to celebrate it through the installment of a replica at The Independence Hall of Korea. Located in the outdoor section of the Independence Hall museum complex known as the Plaza of the Nation, the replica is 6.4 meters tall and contains the full inscription of the original stele.\textsuperscript{40} The Independence Hall’s website reveals that the stele was recreated because it “establish[es] Korean history and symbolize[s] the [spirit] of the people of Goguryeo,” demonstrating that the stele and the history it shares have been adopted by Koreans regardless of the actual stele’s physical location.\textsuperscript{41}

The issue of the Gwanggaeto Stele requires an exploration of an ancient kingdom, international political tensions, and public outcries and celebrations. Although this international conflict from the early 2000s embodied by the discovery of a simple stone monument in the borderlands of China may seem irrelevant today, the Gwanggaeto stele teaches us that it is

\textsuperscript{39} Iwaya, "Inscription on the Gwanggaeto," Teikoku Denmo.
\textsuperscript{40} Independence Hall of Korea, "Main Facilities," The Independence Hall of Korea.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
critical we remember history cannot be changed regardless of modern-day borders. Even though nationalists in both South Korea and China assert complete ownership of Goguryeo’s history, the truth is Goguryeo leaves its legacy to both countries. In the years since the Northeast Project and following controversies surrounding the stele, “China, South Korea, and Japan have together written a history textbook on East Asian history” which is a hopeful sign of future non-political academic endeavors regarding the exploration of the countries’ shared past. It’s impossible to consider the history of a kingdom that existed 1400 years ago as belonging to a singular entity, and through the means of collective interpretation and joint efforts, China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and others can better piece together Goguryeo’s history from an academic standpoint which would be more meaningful than a politically charged and incorrect record. Scholars on both sides have come to the consensus that “diverse nations can share the same history.” From the management of these controversies, we can learn how to better handle the pursuit of history while remaining critical of information presented to us and the motives involved.

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43 Jang, Song, and Hwang, "China and Contemporary," 142.
Bibliography:


Tracking the Roots of Korean Ginseng through Japanese Colonization

Amrita Mukunda

Biology and Society in Asia

Professor Lijing Jiang
Korean Red Ginseng, “one of the most popular herbs in the United States” and Korea, has gained national and international acclaim for its properties that supposedly aid multiple conditions including the cold and flu, heart health, diabetes, mental and physical fatigue, stress, fertility issues, and even cancer.¹ This cure-all root is primarily cultivated by Cheong Kwan Jang, a major corporation whose history is intermingled with the Japanese Colonial Period and now supports “200 researchers and 20 million dollars to the science of ginseng” yearly.² Cheong Kwan Jang’s large Research and Development budget along with the heavy promotion of red ginseng has created a global impression of red ginseng as always having been inherently Korean despite the previous acclaim for the unprocessed white ginseng root in Korea. Japanese colonization of Korea led to the privatization of Korea’s Ginseng industry, increasing its production, usages, and exportations, while creating lasting effects on the modern globalization of Korean ginseng.

Korea underwent a series of ruling changes in the late 1800s and throughout the 1900s. In 1897, the Korean Empire was founded and had heavy Russian influences “until Russia was defeated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War.”³ Two months following the defeat of Russia, Korea became a protectorate of Japan which lasted until 1910 when “Japan effectively annexed Korea by the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty.”⁴ The beginning of the Japanese Colonial period was marked with the repression of Korean culture and tradition along with the transfer of “arable land [to] Japanese control.”⁵ This transfer of land was also paired with the imposition of taxes on

¹ “Asian Ginseng,” Mount Sinai (Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, n.d.).
² Korea Ginseng Corp, “CheongKwanJang's Story,” Korea Ginseng Corp (Korea Ginseng Corporation, n.d.).
⁴ “The Koreas.”
⁵ Ibid.
Korean crop farmers which forced many Koreans to become tenant farmers.\textsuperscript{6} Japanese rule over Korea came to an end in 1945 following Japanese surrender during World War II. The Colonization Period of Korea spurred the “rapid growth of the Korean economy…which… continues to be the subject of controversy between the two Koreas and Japan” as the Koreas argue that this rapid growth also came with many negative repercussions and the exploitation of Koreans, tainting the successes accomplished during colonization.\textsuperscript{7}

Production of ginseng in Korea predates the Japanese colonial period; however, ginseng cultivation, exports, and uses varied drastically compared to colonial and modern uses. During the times of the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, ginseng is mentioned when “a group of three thousand young men and women [were sent] to the mountains of a remote eastern area… assumed to have been located either in Japan or on Cheju Island in Korea” in search of the root as an aid for longevity and immortality.\textsuperscript{8} The tale of the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty along with various “folktales and legends” regarding the elusiveness and magical nature of ginseng “demonstrate[s] the high respect ginseng has commanded over the centuries.”\textsuperscript{9} From the Song Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty, the borderlands of modern-day China and North Korea were grounds for ginseng gathering for the Han, Jurchen (Manchu), and Korean people.\textsuperscript{10} The precious root which held power in trading and “had been the most important item in Choson tributes to the Ming emperors” caused many conflicts in the border regions regarding territory and increased hostilities in the northern areas of Korea.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{9} Kim, “Ginseng and Borderland”, 24.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{11} Kim, “Ginseng and Borderland”, 44-45.
\end{footnotesize}
Chinese medicine as the collective of root plants characterized as ginseng were known for its quality of “good health and rejuvenation.”\textsuperscript{12} Mentions of the root can be found in Chinese \textit{Materia Medica}s such as the \textit{Bencao Gangmu} and even in French reports from Jesuit missionaries in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{13} Korean ginseng plants were mainly used in tributes to the Chinese courts until the hostilities became overwhelming and other trade connections opened for China.\textsuperscript{14}

Korean ginseng exports continued to rely on wild ginseng harvesting until the end of the 18th century despite the challenges; however, beginning in the 19th century, merchants gained control of the ginseng market and significantly altered it.\textsuperscript{15} When merchants from Kaesong, currently located in the southern part of North Korea, began to steam and dry ginseng prior to selling it, the product of this process was red in color rather than the white color of natural ginseng roots, giving Korean ginseng its characteristic name of “Korean Red Ginseng.”\textsuperscript{16} Production of red ginseng led to a “huge economic success” for Kaesong merchants throughout the 19th century.\textsuperscript{17}

Korean ginseng production took a major turn in 1899 when the Korean Empire established Samjungkwa, also known as the Ginseng Management Division or the Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation, which supported the monopolization of ginseng cultivation and processing for both domestic and export use.\textsuperscript{18,19} The Korean Empire also imposed taxation

\textsuperscript{13} Kim, \textit{Ginseng and Boderland}, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{14} Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 7.
\textsuperscript{16} Yang, \textit{1920-1920 White Ginseng}, 117.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{18} M L Cohen, “KT&G Corporation,” Encyclopedia.com (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.).
on ginseng fields, causing many ginseng farmers to struggle in the industry.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the amount of ginseng fields in 1908 “reduced to less than half that in 1898-99.”\textsuperscript{21} In 1908, during the time Korea was a protectorate of Japan, “the Resident General of Korea passed formal laws to restrict the production of [ginseng]” exclusively to Samjungkwa “and limited the areas of cultivation to the Kaesong region,” severely limiting any new expansion of red ginseng cultivation.\textsuperscript{22}

Nonetheless, cultivation of white ginseng, which spoiled easier than Kaesong red ginseng, in the Geumsan region of Korea was able to continue during the early modern period of Japanese rule “because of lack of interest” in what was considered an inferior product.\textsuperscript{23,24} Although white ginseng exports from Korea still exist today, Samjungkwa’s production of ginseng carried a bigger legacy past the colonial period as it received government interest due to its much higher export value even though white ginseng had local demand.\textsuperscript{25}

The actions of the Resident General of Korea in 1908 carried over into the colonial period as Samjungkwa continued to have control over Korean red ginseng cultivation. However, the official ruling of Korea by Japan brought new challenges to the Korean Ginseng industry. Japanese efforts to sell monopolized ginseng products in China met backlash as the “exorbitantly priced monopoly item” was challenged by “nationalist anti-import campaigns” in China, leading to declines in exports to what was previously the biggest importer of Korean ginseng products.\textsuperscript{26}

At this time, white ginseng exports “gained considerable popularity mostly within Korea, Japan,

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 451.
\textsuperscript{22} Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 8.
\textsuperscript{24} Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 8.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{26} Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 6.
and various parts of Asia” forcing Japan to establish the title of Cheong Kwan Jang which indicated that a ginseng product was of significant quality and originated from government processing and production. Anti-Japanese sentiment continued to increase in China, causing Japan’s alternative method of selling “Koryo Ginseng” through a distributor Mitsui to be boycotted as well. In 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria further “decimated” exports of red ginseng to China, forcing Japan to “restrict production [of red ginseng] in Korea to prevent oversupply” and to maintain red ginseng’s high value. This caused local farmers to turn to white ginseng production once again as its production was not heavily controlled, production taxes were lifted, and demand still existed in Korea and within the Japanese empire despite white ginseng’s inability to “survive well in the humid climates of South China and SE Asia.”

Red ginseng production was not the only monopolized product in Korea during Japanese colonization, but red ginseng uniquely experienced rapid diversification of products. Larger state enterprises included “railroads, postal services, telecommunication, and forestry” along with the monopolized production of salt, opium, and tobacco. Red ginseng, however, was most affected economically due to tumultuous relationships with China, the primary purchaser and consumer of the root. During the times of the Japanese Colonial period where exports of red ginseng were low, the Japanese Monopoly Bureau in Korea encouraged the diversification of products in the ginseng market, creating a ginseng extract in the forms of “liquid, pill, and powder” for use internally and externally through skin application. Despite poor exportation of ginseng during colonization and the plateauing of the global ginseng market at the time, ginseng extract products

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27 Ibid., 6.
28 Ibid., 13.
29 Ibid., 14.
30 Ibid., 15-17.
31 Ibid., 11.
32 Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 19.
today are quite popular, and the pioneering of their development can be attributed to Japanese colonization.

In addition to monopolizing the red ginseng industry in Korea, Japanese authorities imposed restrictions on Korean traditional medicinal practices, yet “traditional Korean medicine… remained the primary and preferred form of treatment for specific conditions for a majority of Koreans” despite the growth of western medicine in Korea.33 In 1912 and 1913, the Japanese Government-General of Korea established bans and regulations regarding Korean traditional doctors, western medicine “pharmacists…, drug sellers…, drug manufacturers…, and patent medicine sellers,” but since these “decrees were based on western medical standards, they could not be applied to the Korean herbal medicine field.”34 Since these previous regulations did not control the Korean herbal medicine merchants, further regulations were passed in 1916, but sales outside of prescriptions still retained full freedom. Korean herbal medicine merchants retaining their rights to sell products with little regulation from the colonial government was essential to the expansion of ginseng uses during the colonial period. Korean medicines remained a way to express national pride, as other aspects of Korean culture such as the native language were stripped from the people.

Traditional and ginseng-exclusive medicinal shops and merchants expanded during the colonial period, dealing only with white ginseng due to government control of red ginseng.35 Ginseng chambers of commerce in Kaesong opened medical stores to help sell ginseng products, deal with patent manufacturing, and trading.36 Korean medicinal stores expanded to Japan during

34 Huang, “Medicine of the Grassroots”, 220.
35 Ibid., 239.
this time as well since many Koreans emigrated during the colonial period while still relying on
Korean herbal medicines and struggled to visit doctors in a foreign country. These overseas
stores received help in keeping stock available from stores back in Korea as “a show of
coopera tion towards Koreans in Japan.” Thus, during the colonial period, uses of ginseng
domestically were not hindered significantly, but instead were able to grow and shift to
 accommodate a growing Korean diaspora.

The colonial government did not focus on ginseng promotion domestically in Korea or
Japan, so private actors took matters into their own hands, developing, distributing, and
marketing their own products. Japanese settlers in Korea joined the ginseng market, creating
and selling products, including Sudo Hisaemon, the founder of Choson cheyak hapcha hoesa.
Sudo was able to grow his business during the 1910s and 1920s into one that “not only
developed the colonial Korean consumer market, for it also distributed its products throughout
the Japanese empire,” Manchuria, and Taiwan. In addition, his company “pioneered the mail-
order market for ginseng” sending out up to 100,000 pamphlets a month, increasing awareness
and education surrounding the health benefits of ginseng. Educational efforts from private
companies increased their sales while helping to promote ginseng as a cure-all domestically and
internationally. This contrasted government advertising efforts that merely relied on the label of
“government-made” as opposed to including information regarding ginseng’s potential benefits.
Government-made products, therefore, struggled more with sales in comparison to the private

37 Ibid., 243.
38 Ibid., 245.
39 Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 22.
40 Ibid., 22.
41 Ibid., 22.
42 Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 22.
43 Ibid., 21.
market as only very few consumers in China that were targeted by the colonial government were aware of and eager to purchase the red ginseng products. In 1943, towards the end of the colonial period, the government eventually intervened with white ginseng production due to a “growing shortage of ginseng for pharmaceutical and manufactured products,” even going so far as “to place ginseng under its system of wartime controls” to ensure supply was available.\footnote{Kim, “Pitfalls of Monopoly”, 28.} Ginseng had become a staple product in Korea and in Japan, and its importance can be further seen as the Japanese government and companies’ attention turned to the root domestically in Japan.

Private ginseng-related companies expanded in Japan during the colonial period, producing many derivative products including candies, “wines, teas, soaps, and pills” for sale in both Korea and Japan, geared toward “a consumer market that private companies had saturated with scientific information about ginseng’s health benefits.”\footnote{Ibid., 24, 27.} Even though the government’s advertising attempts were lackluster, research and development and “Japan’s scientific achievements in the biomedical field” were utilized to the maximum by private ginseng companies.\footnote{Ibid., 25.} Japan was the first country to spend so much time “focused…[on] research on the plant’s chemical properties” with the first official research paper on ginseng being “published in 1905 by a member of the Kyoto University medical department” and studies on ginseng-derivative products’ effectiveness dating back to 1893.\footnote{Ibid., 25.} Japan focused on the biomedical aspect of ginseng research as a way to contribute to their claims of scientific superiority, helping with the “establishment of biomedical research facilities” for ginseng, essentially creating another monopoly.\footnote{Ibid., 26.} Overall, during Japanese colonial rule of Korea, red ginseng production expanded...
but plateaued while white ginseng production gained uses, and ginseng extract-derivative products were introduced widely for the first time. Even though red ginseng exports struggled because of direct connections to Japan, the industry diversified as a whole, which was essential for the modern success of Korean red ginseng, and information on the health benefits of ginseng were spread internationally and domestically, increasing ginseng’s potential uses.

After the Japanese colonization of Korea ended, expansion of the red ginseng market globally arose, and the marker Cheong Kwan Jang began gaining traction. During the early phases of post-colonial global expansion in the 1950s, Cheong Kwan Jang was used as a means to “differentiate genuine Korean ginseng from fakes produced overseas” to protect the standard and quality associated with Korean red ginseng.49 Cheong Kwan Jang officially launched as a private brand in 2004 with global franchises but is the successor of the Korea Ginseng Corporation and Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation of 1899.50 The biomedical research legacy related to ginseng left behind from the Japanese colonial era is continued by Cheong Kwan Jang today as it is the leading spender in Korean red ginseng research and development and publishes the most papers related to Korean red ginseng.51 As of 2021, Cheong Kwan Jang accounts for 70% of the global red ginseng market and leads Korea in ginseng exports to “the US, China, Japan, and Europe” as it has been recognized by Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety for its health benefits.52

Modern efforts to expand globally have been met with success as new strategies and increased research efforts have allowed Cheong Kwan Jang to tailor their approaches as needed.

49 Park, “Premium Red Ginseng.”
50 Korea Ginseng Corp, “CheongKwanJang's Story.”
51 Ibid.
52 Yongchan Cho, “Red Ginseng of Korea Ginseng Corp. (KGC), the Representative Food of K-Immunity, Occupies about 70% of the Korean Market,” August 17, 2021.
Interestingly, modern marketing approaches for red ginseng in both Korea and internationally include paid promotional appearances in K-dramas, which has caused an “influx of the younger generation” to the ginseng market. This increase is not limited to domestic sales as the Hallyu wave, the recent wave of Korean culture globally, has expanded K-drama viewership internationally, and therefore helped ginseng gain increased recognition in other countries. Given that mail pamphlets have decreased in popularity as both an advertising and sales mechanism, e-commerce and new products have also helped Cheong Kwan Jang increase sales. New products from Cheong Kwan Jang are made specifically for the global market, and they are being sold using targeted advertising in countries such as the United States, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore, and others. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has also greatly benefited ginseng sales, leading to an increase in sales by 4.8% annually, with one quarter increasing 20%, as red ginseng has been promoted as a natural immunity and stamina booster with the capability of increasing “healthy brain function and blood circulation.” These modern and malleable uses of red ginseng have given it the title of the ‘original Korean food’ internationally, and without the diversification of ginseng derivative products during colonial rule, this global expansion would have been stunted in the long term as each market is distinctive with different needs. Although the effects of Japanese colonization on Korea’s economy and progression have been hotly debated, the effects of colonization overall benefitted Korea’s ginseng production despite a plateau of red ginseng sales to China at the time. The lasting effects of colonization

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Tae-gyu Kim, “Whats Special about Cheong-Kwan-Jang?,” The Korea Times (The Korea Times, November 11, 2010).
57 Cho, “Red Ginseng of Korea.”
include a diversification of ginseng products, increased focus on research and development modeled off the Japanese biomedical research model, and the eventual privatization of the industry during the post-colonial era. During the current times of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Korean Hallyu Wave, the global ginseng market has had the opportunity to expand further. Cheong Kwan Jang has continued to work to educate people globally on the benefits of ginseng along with its various forms through new projects like the Ginseng Museum Cafe in New York City’s Koreatown and product placement in popular K-dramas. As ginseng’s usages have grown from tributary purposes to a cure-all and now a potential supporter in preventing COVID-19 infections, it is important to continue research efforts to back up these many uses and analyze how ginseng can be utilized in the future.
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Lost Shadows: A Historiography of the Chinese Community in Cuba

Jean Zhou

Modern Latin America

Professor Casey Lurtz
I stumbled upon the cobblestone streets in Havana Chinatown on a misty morning in December. The street was still sleeping—shops and restaurants were closed, little lanterns and signs with characters danced in the wind—calling out the lingering memories of the Chinese community that worked their way two hundred years ago.

Dawn was breaking in the distance. I came across a rusty building with painted rooftops with dragons and two stone lion statues—the location of the old Chinese Civic Association that stood for the Chinese community so long ago. Though closed, the dragon was powerful and graceful, while the lion was calm, steady, and lived through the years. Its mission remained firm and visual, creating a powerful force that guarded the building.¹

Havana Chinatown, present-day²

In this essay, I will analyze the founding document of the Chinese Civic Association from three significant points in time. First, the point where this document came into being, then during the process of archival selection, and lastly, historical research and historiography.

¹ This paragraph is hypothetical. Nonetheless, the details are accurate, and all these points will be discussed in greater depth below.
**Chinese Civic Association: The Founding**

The founding document of the Chinese Civic Association in Cuba was created in 1872, by a group of social elites within the Chinese community after the mass incarnation of Chinese laborers in 1871 in Havana.³ This organization was created out of necessity, to some degree, to unite the Chinese workers in Cuba against suffering and hardships driven by the Spanish government in control. As the document stated, the Chinese Civic Association was birthed into solidarity and unity—“As sojourners in an unfamiliar land, [we] should prepare good strategies to protect ourselves. The reason all that has happened is because our Chinese people lack the heart to unite and furthermore because we lack leadership.”⁴

Cuba once had the largest Chinese population in the Caribbean and Latin America.⁵ There were Chinese communities across the country, from Santiago de Cuba to Havana, and in the cities and towns within.⁶ As in other Chinese communities around the world, the Chinese in Cuba established many regional, fraternal, political, and commercial organizations.⁷ The Chinese Civic Organization is one of these organizations that functioned as a cultural support system within, and a political labor union without.⁸ It centers the elite Chinese businessmen in Cuba, where they possess a vast network of economic and political connections to implement strategic

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⁵ Margaret Mih Tillman, “Laboring between Empires: Coolie Solidarity and the Limits of the Chinese Civic Association in Havana, 1872”, pp. 191
⁷ Ibid.
leadership and planning. The articles supposedly stressed that they should vocalize the average Chinese worker—“The rationale of establishing the Association was originally a plan for long-term peace. No matter one’s age, all people of reason have the right to discuss [these matters] collectively.”

However, many voices remain unheard. The first category is the lower-class Chinese workers, especially the relatively young and illiterate laborers with a rural and poorer economic background. Their immediate concerns with regards to labor conditions, compensation, living environments, and social relations were left unaddressed in this brief document. Since this perspective is from an official standpoint, it is issued to be publicly accessible to the literate working Chinese people in Cuba. The language suggested that it was published in Chinese originally, which shields protection from local Spanish governments. The terminology of “public consensus” and the right to discuss matters collectively is not surprising as it fits into the general political and cultural framework of a centralized nation in Chinese history. However, there is no specific method to confirm that this document would represent the concerns of the general body or the most apparent issues that the higher-end political figures cannot neglect. At the end of the document, there is a long list of signed names of the executive leadership within the organization, which would likely be a reflection of the decision-making process.

The second missing voice is the Chinese people that have already gained manumission after the eight-year working contracts expire. As stated in the Civic Association Founding Document, it was “unnecessary to discuss those Chinese who have already gained manumission

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after fulfilling their contracts of eight years.**12** However, they are still subject to discrimination and potential hardships that would be beneficial if included in the organization. These policies would have hindered a large part of the Chinese community in Cuba in the long term.

Certificate of nationality issued to a Chinese settler by the Chinese consulate in Havana, 1880.**13**

In addition, the economical functionality for maintaining this organization was also vaguely mentioned. Most political or cultural organizations, even non-profit ones, would still need adequate financial resources to sustain themselves in the long term. In this case, the financial sources could either be public-funding through these charges for documentation fee, or donations from benefactors, European and Chinese alike. The functionality and maintenance of

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12 Ibid, 2.
this organization was neglected throughout the document. This is a critical point that would
change the effectiveness of the Chinese Civic Association. The document should include salaries
for workers within the organization, how donations are garnered towards meaningful
investments, or other potential funding sources available. Membership dues were vaguely
mentioned in the document. “Every shop needs to contribute exactly two pesos every month.
Each peddler contributes exactly one peso every month. Those who have already fulfilled their
contracts must donate half a peso every month, but those who have not yet fulfilled their
contracts must only pay 8 centavos.”¹⁴ The amount mentioned in the document does not appear
to be sufficient for the functioning of this organization. This leads to the question of leadership
and executive discrepancy. The terminology used was to settle the problem “properly,” and
“should clearly note the monetary amounts with the association records in order to attain the
public good and self-altruism.”¹⁵ The word choice “properly” leaves several questions. Would
the leadership positions be part-time commitments? Were there rotational executive meetings to
discuss key decisions? How was the executive leadership selected? All of these questions are
silenced, because there would be hardly any documentation in the archives to address them in
such detail.

¹⁵ Ibid, 6.
The Chinese Civic Association Bylaws included a preamble about its collective history and aims, its rules and regulations, and its signatories.16

In the moment of archival selection, this source in particular survived due to several reasons. First, its formality and the degree of impact that the Chinese Civic Association created within the Chinese Community in Cuba are noteworthy.17 With strong leadership and elite membership from the upper class, as well as well-established benefactors on the European side, its survival was granted through layers of protection and safeguards. The second significant factor of its survival would be the written language. The preservation of the document was also elongated partly due to the cultural preservation of the Chinese heritage communities in Cuba.18 These communities’ strong ties with mainland China played a major role, where the majority of the Chinese community in Cuba chose to emigrate to the United States, other nearby Latin

17 Margaret Mih Tillman, “‘Laboring between Empires: Coolie Solidarity and the Limits of the Chinese Civic Association in Havana, 1872’”, 197.
18 Ibid, 198.
American countries, or back to China after World War II, when they acquired the adequate financial capability to return home.¹⁹ Many did not view Havana as a permanent settlement, and the crucial documents and archives in Chinese were brought back to America or Mainland China, which was one of the key reasons why this document was preserved and translated into English.²⁰

Even if this document functions as a relatively comprehensive collection of the Chinese Civic Organization, the archive tends to leave out specific documentation of specific incidents.²¹ such as unnamed people, membership requirements, a false crime release report, or the public’s reaction to this article were missing, let alone the fact that this document might not be fully accessible to the illiterate in the first place.²² Their voices and full narratives were lost forever in the wave of “more prominent, significant” documents, where individual identities and their lived experiences were dismissed in the archives.²³ The archive leaves out traces of self-identity, series witnesses of court hearings, participants, and marginal events that garnered neither positive nor destructive consequences.²⁴

In the present day, these archival silences for the histories led to significant discrepancies within the historiography of Chinese history in Cuba.²⁵ Many narratives remain forgotten, sometimes forever, lost in the history of collectivity and hardships. The historical narrative of Chinese laborers remained a smaller subset within the general history in Latin America, or the

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¹⁹ Ibid, 198.
²⁰ Ibid, 200.
²² Ibid, 49.
²³ Ibid, 53.
²⁴ Ibid, 58.
²⁵ Ibid, 63.
larger framework of a Eurocentric stance on the enslavement of people of African descent. The survival of these documents represented a small segment of Chinese Cuban history, with only the names of the social elite and prominent roles in society, but they were still representations of solidarity and unity as a minority culture in Latin America.
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Mia Venezia

Chinese Diaspora: Networks and Identity

Professor Hue- Ying Kuo
Nostalgia is fatiguing and destructive; it is the vice of the expatriate. You must put down roots as if they were forever. You must have a sense of permanence.

— Isabel Allende

Chinese people have resided in Indonesia for centuries. During the Dutch colonial era, Chinese traders and merchants benefited from the territorial government’s preferential trade policies, which discriminated against indigenous Indonesians and favored Chinese Indonesians as an economically strong “market dominant minority.” After Indonesia’s independence in 1945, because they had been provided more opportunities to develop business experience during Dutch rule, Chinese Indonesians solidified their strong economic position within the Indonesian economy by managing nationalized businesses and attracting investment from mainland China.

At the 1956 National Importer Congress, Asaat Datuk Mudo, the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, opined that the Chinese Indonesian superiority in the economy had become “monopolistic.” To ameliorate the status of indigenous Indonesian merchants, Asaat proposed PP Nomor 10 Tahun 1959. The law required that by January 1, 1960, all foreign nationals were prohibited from doing business in rural areas and required them to transfer their businesses to Indonesian nationals. They were also required to relocate to designated urban centers or return to China. While generally nationalistic on its face, the law, as applied disproportionately, affected Chinese and Indonesian Chinese, who owned about 90% of Indonesian businesses.

The situation became worse for Chinese Indonesians as time went on. Approximately one million communist sympathizers, the majority of whom were ethnic Chinese, were killed in a

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4 PP 10, which sanctioned the economic scapegoating, confiscation of property, and forced ghettoization of Chinese Indonesians was the first instance of similarity between the government’s treatment of Chinese Indonesians and Nazi Germany’s treatment of German Jews.
year-long series of massacres from 1965-1966. In 1966, anti-Chinese legislation urged Chinese Indonesians to adopt Indonesian-sounding last names. The following year, the teaching of the Chinese language was prohibited, and Chinese language and literature (with the exception of one Chinese language newspaper) were removed from the public space. Moreover, Chinese religious observances, including Chinese New Year, were required to be confined to homes. Underpinning all of these laws was the 1958 citizenship law that rendered most of Indonesia’s millions of ethnic Chinese residents essentially stateless. Under the law, only “indigenous” people were granted citizenship, but regardless of their generational history in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese were not “indigenous.” Chinese Indonesians were without rights and powerless against the Indonesian Government, which endeavored to erase their literal identity and culture from Indonesian society.

In 1997, what eventually became known as the Asian Financial Crisis began in Thailand, with the country’s government devaluing its currency against the US dollar. A mix of easy credit from foreign investment and financial speculation based on questionable loans in seemingly stable and growing economies in East and Southeast Asia had created valuation bubbles in all economic sectors, and by 1998, the entire region was affected. Indonesia also devalued its currency and, like other nations, fell into a financial and economic crisis. Mass unemployment coincided with inflation, causing the price of everything, including basic staple goods, to

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7 Id, Suryadinata.
Although the reasons for the crisis were multifactorial and region-wide, Chinese Indonesians, who were still the face of the economy in Indonesia, again became scapegoats.

Between May 4 and May 15, 1998, unrest erupted in several Indonesian cities. Protests in and around Jakarta were particularly violent. President Suharto attempted to deflect the public’s anger from his nearly 30-year authoritarian administration to the Chinese community, accusing them of playing a major role in the collapse of the national economy. Popular perceptions of Chinese Indonesians as greedy and exploitative were manipulated by the government, which not only condoned the violence, but also participated in it. Over the final two days of the rioting, thousands of Chinese businesses were attacked, looted, and burned in targeted attacks. More than 1,000 people were killed, and untold numbers of ethnic Chinese women and girls suffered horrific and violent sexual attacks.

A Turning Point

Violence ended when President Suharto resigned and the extreme nationalist, cultural assimilation-focused New Order era came to an end. The reformation era, or Reformasi, was at hand. Vice President Habibie assumed the presidency and immediately began to undo the restrictions on Chinese Indonesians. The limitation on political party participation in government was lifted, as was the control of the national press. In 1999, forty-eight parties participated in

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11 Id, Himawan.
12 Id, Himawan.
13 In a continuing parallel, the national perception of Chinese Indonesians mirrored those of the German perception of Jews’ collective economic position. The May 1998 riots can be seen as Indonesia’s “Kristallnacht.”
14 Id, Himawan.
Indonesia’s first free election since 1955.\textsuperscript{15} Between 1999 and 2001, under President Wahid, the prohibition on the display of Chinese characters in public ended, Chinese New Year became an optional public holiday, and Chinese publications could again be imported. Most importantly, however, the 2006 modification of Indonesian citizenship law under President Yudhoyono eliminated the requirement of indigeneity and instead granted Indonesian Citizenship by birthright or by formal naturalization.\textsuperscript{16} In recognition of their new status as potential full members of Indonesian society, President Yudhoyono also changed the term Cina (which many Chinese Indonesians considered derogatory) to Tionghoa (more acceptable due to its similarity to the Chinese word for China) for use in public discourse.\textsuperscript{17}

**Political Perspectives**

Chinese Indonesians have long been considered economically strong but politically weak, and their perceived questionable loyalty has perpetuated the idea among indigenous Indonesians that their political disenfranchisement is not entirely bad for the country.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, President Suharto intentionally sought to restrict Chinese Indonesian participation in government while benefiting from their contributions to the economy.\textsuperscript{19} With Reformasi, however, Chinese Indonesians began to reclaim their political voice. Almost immediately, Chinese socio-political organizations began to form.\textsuperscript{20} Though there was unanimity among ethnic Chinese that political participation would protect them from a recurrence of their prior oppression, there seemed to be

\textsuperscript{15} Tempo. (2007, August). *Peraturan yang Menggusur Tionghoa*. Majalah Tempo Online.
\textsuperscript{16} Law No. 12 of 2006, Republic of Indonesia.
\textsuperscript{18} Id, Setijadi.
\textsuperscript{20} Id, Setijadi.
a divergence in their perspective about the benefit or detriment of ethnicity-based voting and the need for support from indigenous Indonesians.

Several ethnicity-focused political parties aiming specifically to support the interest of Chinese Indonesians were formed when diverse political parties were again permitted under Reformasi. KNPI (National Committee of Indonesian Youth) was, as noted, led by young Indonesians, none of whom were of ethnic Chinese descent, which did not engender confidence. PPI (Indonesian Assimilation Party), by contrast, was founded by an ethnic Chinese convert to Islam, but its stated focus on assimilation recalled Suharto’s New Order policies and made the party unpopular from the start. The PBI (Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party) seemed to be a strong blend of established Chinese Indonesian leadership and an equitable platform, but the PBI did not court press coverage and largely failed to get its message out.\(^\text{21}\) Overall, many, if not most, Chinese Indonesian voters were uninterested in ethnicity-specific party affiliations.

As it turned out, the majority of Chinese Indonesians chose political integration. Rather than use their newfound ethnic recognition and freedom as a rallying point, they determined that supporting an established non-ethnic party would be beneficial and would garner the most support from the indigenous Indonesians.\(^\text{22}\) Of the five major national parties formed at the beginning of Reformasi, the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) became the political choice for 70% of the Chinese Indonesian voters in the 1999 election. It presented itself as a nationalist party friendly to ethnic Chinese. Two ethnic Indonesian parties also gained Chinese Indonesian support because of their moderate views on Chinese issues.\(^\text{23}\) In the end, Chinese

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\(^\text{22}\) Id, Suryadinata.

\(^\text{23}\) Id, Suryadinata.
Indonesians hoped that by voting as Indonesians rather than as Chinese, Indonesians would see them as Indonesian instead of Chinese.

Since the beginning of Reformasi, ethnic Chinese candidates have been successful in local and regional elections, as evidenced by the chart below:\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Distribution of Chinese Indonesian (Deputy) Regents, (Deputy) Mayors, and (Deputy) Governors in Various Provinces (2003–2020).}
\begin{tabular}{lcccccccccc}
\hline
\textbf{Position} & \textbf{Province} & Bangka Belitung & Central Java & East Java & East Kalimantan & East Nusa Tenggara & Maluku North & Maluku North Sulawesi & Riau Islands & West Java & West Kalimantan & Total \\
\hline
Deputy Bupati & Bangka Belitung & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 6 \\
Bupati & Jakarta & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 3 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 13 \\
Deputy Mayor & Central Java & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
Mayor & East Java & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 5 \\
Deputy Governor & East Kalimantan & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 4 \\
Governor & East Nusa Tenggara & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total number of positions per province} & & 3 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 1 & 5 & 1 & 3 & 5 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 30 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnote{Note: This table includes Chinese Indonesian candidates who serve in multiple capacities in consecutive term periods, including those of other regions/ provinces (based on Table 1). Candidates who served two-term periods in the same capacity in a similar regency/province are only counted once so as to avoid double-counting.}
\end{table}

The latest election in 2019 saw continued high rates of participation among Chinese Indonesians as well as the formation of two new ethnic Chinese parties. Young non-Chinese Indonesians form the base of these parties, while Chinese Indonesians remain in support of PDI-P. In fact, despite the increasing number of ethnic-focused parties, all of the ethnic Chinese members of parliament have come from the PDI-P and other established national parties.\textsuperscript{25} Indonesia’s 7 million ethnic Chinese account for 3.3% of the total population.\textsuperscript{26} In the 2019 election, Chinese Indonesians were elected to 5% of the 575 parliamentary seats, slightly outpacing their population percentage.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Rakhmat , M. Z. (2022, March 19). Indonesia tries to embrace Chinese language but problems persist. The Conversation.
\textsuperscript{27} Id, Suryadinata.
Chinese Indonesians supported President Jokowi in 2014, largely due to his moderate position on Chinese issues and his support of mainland Chinese investment in infrastructure projects in Indonesia (it should be noted, however, that Jokowi’s opponent was thought to have been siding with radical Muslim organizations specifically against the Chinese, which made him distinctly unpalatable). In 2019, Chinese Indonesians continued to support Jokowi.\footnote{Id, Suryadinata.}

Many Chinese Indonesians prefer to participate in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which address issues in society through issue-based advocacy and influence instead of through representation. This form of soft politics has been particularly beneficial regarding Chinese economic issues. The Indonesian Chinese Chamber of Commerce advocated for Chinese investment in the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail project, which was originally a partnership between Indonesia and Japan. Another project, the Maritime Silk Road Initiative was also supported by the Chamber and, in fact, was announced in a speech by Xi Jinping to the Indonesian Parliament.\footnote{Setijadi, C. (2016). Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia: Changing Identity Politics and the Paradox of Sinification.} None of this advocacy would have been tolerated under Suharto’s nationalist New Order.

**Economic Perspectives**

Citizenship Law 12/2006 has had an array of effects with regard to Chinese Indonesians. One benefit of full citizenship is the ability to leave the country with the confidence of knowing one will be permitted to return. In the ten years following the enactment of the new law, Indonesian citizens have gone abroad to work and have sent nearly $10 billion annually in
remittances. Indonesia’s 2016 national budget was $165.4 billion, making remittances 6.2% of the budget. The revenue-generating effect of birthright citizenship, particularly for Chinese Indonesians, has had a positive financial effect on the country.

Remittances are a new beneficial economic side effect of full citizenship. However, the economic life of many Chinese Indonesians remains the same, which is to say comfortably remunerative. Due to Suharto’s relegation of Chinese Indonesians to the economic sphere, and despite the violent clashes and state-supported racism of 1998, most of the businesses in Indonesia were—and still are—owned by Chinese Indonesians. Many of these businesses have become large conglomerates, and their owners have become quite wealthy. What is different now is that Chinese Indonesians have begun to experience a kind of long-distance nationalism.

On the other hand, the re-Sinification of Chinese Indonesians is also causing unease among some Chinese Indonesians.

Indonesia’s tolerance of Chinese Indonesian customs, language, and political participation has coincided generally with the rise of China as an economic power. This fact has brought a sense of ethnic pride for Chinese Indonesians. Mandarin language learning has become popular, and China has become a destination for higher education for many Indonesians (both ethnically Chinese and not). The goal of this embrace of the Chinese language and educational cultural learning on an individual level is to take advantage of the opportunity to act as an intermediary between China and Indonesia, facilitating investment of the former in the latter.

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34 Id, Setijadi.
PRC government officials have been very supportive of this perspective for some time, urging Chinese Indonesians to learn Mandarin in order to strengthen their identification with the Chinese nation as early as 2012.\textsuperscript{35} Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs are often the first point of contact for Chinese investors in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{36}

President Jokowi has slowly and steadily been solidifying bilateral economic ties between Indonesia and China. In addition to the Jakarta-Bandung rail project, which is seen as Indonesia’s main Belt and Road project, Jokowi has considered several other Chinese-financed infrastructure projects such as railroads and ports.\textsuperscript{37} Recently, Indonesia announced that it will move its capital from Jakarta to Nusantara, a city yet to be built on Borneo.\textsuperscript{38} In support of this effort, China has begun to build a cement plant near the city site to provide building material. While the promise of factory jobs is enticing, Indonesians are concerned that the plan will displace local cement producers and also that the factory jobs will be taken by imported Chinese workers.\textsuperscript{39} China is also the majority funder of a green industrial development and a hydroelectric dam project, neither of which has been subject to an environmental feasibility study, nor have resource development rights been negotiated.\textsuperscript{40}

The Indonesian government’s focus on investment from China is worrying to many Chinese Indonesians. As they become more comfortable with their ethnicity within Indonesia’s diversity, Chinese Indonesians are concerned that being overtly Chinese may draw backlash; perhaps the new focus on Mandarin language learning among Indonesians will blur the lines

\textsuperscript{35} Id, Setijadi.  
\textsuperscript{36} Id, Setijadi.  
\textsuperscript{39} Id, Rakhmat.  
\textsuperscript{40} Id, Rakhmat.
between Chinese Indonesians and the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{41} In spite of their developing political influence, there is growing concern that their bridging intermediary role will be seen as both economically self-serving and politically disloyal.\textsuperscript{42}

COVID-19

With anti-Chinese sentiment still simmering just below the surface of Indonesian society, COVID-19 arrived in the archipelago in March 2020. Immediately, anti-Chinese sentiment became apparent. Demands that Chinese nationals and even Chinese Indonesians leave the country came from the general population, and in one instance, a group of local residents marched to a hotel where Chinese tourists were staying, insisting that they leave immediately.\textsuperscript{43,44}

On the positive side, China provided protective supplies for Indonesian healthcare workers as well as Sinovax, which accounted for nearly 90\% of the vaccine doses administered in Indonesia. In a country woefully behind the curve for virus mitigation due to its “power of prayer” campaign, one would think that Chinese aid would be welcomed.\textsuperscript{45} It was not.

Was COVID a bioweapon sent by China? Was COVID God’s revenge for the mistreatment of Muslim Uigers?\textsuperscript{46} Those questions were asked in the public domain, but more concretely, Chinese Indonesians were accused of “uncleanness” and spreading the virus, thereby

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causing the cancellation of religious observances in Indonesia. Chinese Indonesians feared that racial hatred would result in violence along the lines of the 1998 riots. Though the online vitriol was extreme, actual incidents of violence were few.

Conclusion

The violent May 1998 riots prompted by the Asian Financial Crisis were a turning point in Indonesia’s perception of its ethnically Chinese residents. Under Suharto, Chinese Indonesians were stripped of their ethnic names, their language and culture, and their religious rites, all in the name of national identity. They were left with the double-edged sword of economic freedom, which both sustained them and marked them as targets for the frustrated wrath of the poorer indigenous Indonesians. With Suharto’s resignation and the beginning of the Reformasi era, ethnic Chinese identity returned, and most importantly, full Indonesian citizenship was possible for Chinese Indonesians born in Indonesia or formally naturalized there.

Citizenship made participation in government possible. Chinese Indonesians formed ethnic-focused political parties but found that alliance with national parties would produce the fastest political integration. Chinese Indonesians vote, and Chinese Indonesian candidates have been successful in elections, though primarily in urban areas. NGOs, policy-focused alternatives to direct political involvement, have also helped Chinese Indonesians address issues of social change.

Citizenship has not affected Chinese Indonesians’ economic situation in a similar way. Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia remain the major drivers of national commerce. However, Indonesia’s ongoing bilateral relationship with mainland China has become so entrenched that

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47 Anti-chinese feeling in Southeast Asia revived by pandemic. South China Morning Post. (2020, April 30).
some Chinese Indonesians worry about backlash—if China oversteps economically in Indonesia, they fear that they will be scapegoated because of their cultural ties with China. It is unclear if their political integration will be enough to counteract the ethnic Indonesians’ distrust of Chinese Indonesians and their role as economic intermediaries between Indonesia and China, a potential 21st-century economic colonizer.
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Section II
Contemporary Geopolitical and Security Issues
An Examination of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of International Development Cooperation

Junhan (Katarina) Yang

Study Abroad Dissertation
Introduction

After major “aid fatigue” in the late 1990s, the volume and significance of foreign aid and development cooperation started to rebound in recent decades. This time, an important change lies in the active participation of non-Western donors, especially a rising China. China’s foreign development cooperation strategy is constantly evolving, with an innovative structure—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—being introduced in 2013. Since then, there have always been debates regarding the nature and impact of BRI on the recipient countries and the existing global aid architecture.

This paper engages in this discussion by investigating China’s development cooperation strategy, particularly the BRI, through a comparison with traditional Western framework to reveal key similarities and differences between the two systems. Through case studies and statistical facts, the paper shows how compared to the traditional Western model, China’s proposal is more pragmatic and impartial in the eyes of recipient countries. Though not without deficiencies, it is capable of resolving some lasting problems of North-South development cooperation, such as limited local adaptation, overly optimistic grand strategy, poor post-project operation, and distrust towards local sovereignty. Lastly, the paper suggests major areas of improvements in the development cooperation system.

Background of International Development and Foreign Aid

Historical Review

Although development has become a familiar concept that is widely referred to by policymakers and scholars, its origin is in fact a very modern one.\(^1\) It was not until the end of the

second World War that development as a subject began to receive wide attention and various
development doctrines were invented and policies carried out. As colonial control withered and
many non-Western countries assumed autonomy over themselves, the world development regime
gradually shifted from one marked by a affiliated relationship between the core and the
peripheral states through mercantilism and colonial rulership to one that permitted “inward-
looking growth” and more independent decision-making at individual country level. The exact
meaning of development may vary across time and stakeholders, but fostering better economic
and social development—potentially through economic growth, redistribution policy, or
institutional reform—has since then become a major theme for global interaction and diplomacy.
Foreign aid, therefore, arose as a foreign policy innovation and development instrument within
this context.3

The US introduced a primitive prototype of foreign aid, known as the Marshall Plan. This
aid program helped with post-war reconstruction in Western Europe.4 During the Cold War
period, foreign aid began to be introduced into less developed non-Western states in the form of
financial resources (such as grants, foreign reserves and concessional loans), kinds (such as food,
medicines, and essentials), and other human-led services.5,6 Foreign transfers were and continue
to be used to fund a plethora of projects and activities, such as balance of payment needs,
political and institutional reforms, humanitarian relief, poverty alleviation, and productive sector
investment. As most LDCs have trouble providing sufficient capital by themselves, development

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5 Lancaster, 2008.
finance becomes a critical component of international development. At the same time, it has been shown that the exact format of aid exhibits different patterns over time ranging from poverty and disaster relief to financial support, depending on changes in existing development theory, geopolitical situation, and the overall economic and social condition of the world. Its configurations have become increasingly complicated as aid-giving has been institutionalized and professionalized, and has been practiced by a more diverse set of actors over time.

Figure 1 Proportion of Foreign to Local Sponsors in Low- and Middle-Income Countries with Private Investment Commitments (2021)

Source: World Bank (2021)

Comparison of Different Development Cooperation Models: Complement or Challenge?

This section advances the current understanding of China’s international development cooperation strategy and action by comparing it with the traditional West-led North-South structure. The comparison is made through different angles, including development aid principles, aid-making process, and aid provision and outcome, as well as project finance and debt management. Case studies are provided to add concreteness to the comparative reasoning.

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7 Lancaster, 2008.
In essence, China’s aid and development cooperation exhibit more flexible and demand-driven characteristics during both design and implementation. Although in recent years there has been some convergence between the frameworks proposed by China and the traditional donors, those emerging similarities tend to be nominal whereas clear divergence can still be found in on-the-ground practices.

On Aid Principles: from Supply-Oriented Aid to Demand-Oriented Aid and Greater Ownerships

Until most recently, North-South cooperation (NSC) remains the dominant form of international development and aid. The traditional framework often involves an affluent Western donor trying to pour resources to a poor recipient at its own will. This donor-recipient relationship is argued to be unequal as the proposed cooperation deal is usually supply-oriented, meaning that it is a one-sided decision made by the Western donors without taking the actual demand of Southern recipients into consideration. In fact, the participants of major international forums on aid before 2005 were solely made up of donor countries, and there was no agreed principle on how aid should be designed and carried out between the giver and the recipient. The structural adjustment program and the subsequent debt crisis further undermined the credibility and legitimacy of Western donors in the eyes of countries in the Global South. As such, the South-South cooperation (SSC) framework has become an appealing alternative to international development cooperation.

Since the early 2000s, new developments have emerged and there seems to be greater convergence between the principles proposed by traditional donors and those proposed by

emerging partners. The inclusion of recipient countries in aid-related discussions and the Paris Declaration’s stress on ownership and local alignment are important steps taken by traditional donors to establish a more equal aid partnership. The NSC and SSC reached further agreement during the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which took place in Busan in 2011, when 3000 delegates from both the Global North and South countries signed the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. “This declaration establishes for the first time an agreed framework for development co-operation that embraces traditional donors, South-South co-operators, the BRICS, civil society organizations and private funders.”

The tendency of convergence is two-sided: on one hand, facing the competition of emerging donors, traditional OECD donors endeavored to capture developing countries by adopting principles of national ownership, greater localization, and self-sustaining development. On the other hand, China also makes an effort to obtain greater international recognition by paying closer attention to project sustainability and risk management. And both embrace inclusive development partnerships and multilateral cooperation. However, most of the convergence did not necessarily bring in substantial changes to the practices on the ground, which will be introduced in more detail in later sections.

Additionally, despite increasing similarities, major divergence exists on major principles. One key aspect covered by China but not by the Western donors is the principle of non-interventionism. China stays largely hands-off from recipient states’ domestic affairs and respects local regulatory frameworks when doing businesses and aid projects. In contrast, the major Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and IMF tend to use an internal

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standard of evaluation and have historically required certain economic and political reforms as a premise of getting aid or loan forgiveness.

Another key difference lies in aid accountability and transparency. OECD donors release detailed reports and data regarding aid and development projects, and financial institutions, such as the World Bank, also operate their own online datasets that contain key information regarding different financial and non-financial projects. In contrast, China has not been very transparent regarding the details of its aid, and the lack of the accountability principle also means that China does not consider it essential to disclose aid information.

Lastly, China and traditional donors each follow a different evaluation principle on the aid results. Traditional donors emphasize the aid project’s direct impact on development goals such as poverty reduction and effect durability. On the other hand, China’s principles regarding outcomes concentrate on ensuring a “self-reliant” development and minimizing the burden of recipient countries.

On Aid-Making and Project Design: Where Theorist Meets Practitioner

How aid is made and designed has a lasting impact on the actual implementation and outcome of aid. The difference between China and the traditional donors in their approach to aid-making has mainly two dimensions: (1) the logic and procedure of aid design; (2) the use of tied
and untied aid.\textsuperscript{11,12} Whereas traditional donors tend to prioritize conceptual framework building and the use of a theory-based aid-making procedure, China follows its own development philosophy known as “learning by doing” and takes a more experience-based approach. And while traditional donors show trends of aid specialization and prefer the use of untied, or “pure,” aid, China usually offers a holistic package that obscures the boundary between aid and economic cooperation.

The different preferences towards tie versus untied aid have led to a difference in aid measurement and controversy about the nature of aid. But as Mawdsley argues, “judging emerging foreign aid and development cooperation on mainstream terms often leads to problematic expectations, conclusions, and comparisons with ODA (official development aid). Rather, they should be judged on their own terms—what they claim to do, to promote, and to achieve.”\textsuperscript{13} The holistic package offered by China is able to merge aid with other organic growth mechanisms. In this sense, judging aid’s effectiveness solely on its purity might be misleading. Brautigam thus suggests including the OECD working party on export credits in the conversation on foreign assistance would be conducive to facilitating cooperation between China and the OECD.\textsuperscript{14}

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\textsuperscript{11} A narrow definition offered by OECD (official website) describes “tied aid” as “official grants or loans that limit procurement to companies in the donor country or in a small group of countries.” And untied aid refers to aid with a competitive procurement process. But some scholars (Mawdsley 2012, Brautigam 2009) extend the meaning of the term and describe aid that involves only official grants or concessional loans as “untied” whereas those coming with other forms of cooperations such as trade credits as “tied aid.” In the context of this paper, this latter, more general definition is used to distinguish between the two approaches of aid design.


\textsuperscript{13} Mawdsley. 2012: 81.

On Aid Delivery and Outcome: Investigating the Local Interaction Paradigms

Three key differences can be found in the aid delivery process and are summarized in the table below: (1) the relationship between each donors’ overseas agencies and the recipient countries’ local authorities; (2) the participation of the private sector; (3) the role of the social sector.

Most project aid involves inter-organizational interactions in the recipient country with management and working teams that are a mixture of local people and foreigners. Traditional donors tend to set temporary project management units to bypass weak local agencies as a way to achieve quicker project completion (USAID). Aid staff, workers, and experts are given the right to rest in city hotels and commute to the manufacturing sites during the project. This has made aid not only expensive, but also unsustainable, as the local institutions often found themselves incapable of operating post-project completion. China on the other hand managed to create an image of “brotherhood,” and it has been reported that Chinese staff and workers live side by side with local employees. Further, there is generally more in-depth technical and operational training offered during the implementation period to improve local capacity.

Secondly, the composition of corporate players also has distinct characteristics. It is common for private firms to serve as subcontractors and bid for public development projects overseas, especially in the infrastructure, manufacturing, energy, and water and sanitation sectors. Unlike in the West, where private firms from all member states can bid for the projects,

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16 Calderisi. 2006.
in China-led projects, oftentimes the bidding rights are restricted to Chinese firms, with the state-owned multinational enterprises (SO MNEs) dominating the space.\textsuperscript{17}

Lastly, non-state actors in general play a much more limited role in China-led development cooperation compared to in the West. Under the traditional framework, there has been a general shift since the 1980s from government-to-government transfers to non-state agency participations, as different private foundations were set up and non-governmental organizations became professionalized.\textsuperscript{18} This multilevel network of cooperation is also frequently incorporated into the aid strategy design. From an institutional perspective, this multiplicity of stakeholders decentralizes and complicates the decision-making process, because no single state donor has complete decision power in this giant bureaucracy. This super-sovereign “flat” governance structure is one key feature of the traditional aid architecture. Nonetheless, despite a wide membership and cooperation network, China’s development cooperation governance seems to be more exclusive and centralized. One explanation for this is that China lacks a robust domestic social sector, and the involvement of non-state agencies stays largely peripheral compared to the Western model. Relative to the West, there are less large-scale grassroots efforts to offer aid. Instead, most social, and private actors react to policy guidance designed by different levels of government in China.


**Table 1 West-led and China’s Aid Delivery and Local Interaction Paradigm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West-led Approach</th>
<th>China’s Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor’s overseas agency and local authority</strong></td>
<td>Exclusive partnership: (1) administered through special project management units (2) superior treatment for overseas personnel(^{19})</td>
<td>Inclusive partnership: (1) cooperate with local agencies (2) no differentiated treatment for overseas staffs(^{20})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate sector participation</strong></td>
<td>(1) diverse private firms are competent in bidding for aid-funded projects (2) risk-averse capital very sensitive to external risks (3) legitimacy concerns</td>
<td>(1) greater involvement of SOEs (2) patient state capital more tolerant to return volatility (3) legitimacy concerns due to government affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state agencies</strong></td>
<td>(1) robust participation of non-profit organizations (2) consultancy from aid professionals and academics</td>
<td>(1) limited participation of the social sector (2) consultancy relies on government officials</td>
</tr>
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</table>
On Development Finance: IFIs and Debt Management

Since financial aid and project finance together make up another central pillar of international development cooperation, a picture of the aid architecture would not be complete without studying the major financing approach and consequences. In this domain, China in recent years has set up a paralleled structure that both competes with and complements the existing international financial institutions (IFIs). For instance, major project finance players are the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), which is responsible for BRI-related project financing with China being the major fund contributor and shareholder, and the Silk Road Fund, a government-led private equity fund that invests in projects and in the private sector in the developing world.

How do the multilateral development banks led by China differ from the ones led by the West? And what is their relationship with the rest of the players? Based on first-hand interviews and open resources, Ella compares the institutional design of the AIIB and the WB from three perspectives: (1) loan conditionality, (2) membership structure, and (3) control and governance. According to her, AIIB pursues a balance of interest by attracting both regional and Western investors and lending to as many potential borrowers as possible, and, at the same time, establishing its status as a legitimate and differentiated non-Western creditor through softer conditionality and a more inclusive negotiation framework. For instance, the AIIB discards the traditional “harsh” conditionality policy that permits external interventions by powerful creditors to enforce implementation and push for certain “good governance” practices. According to the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement (AoA), during loan negotiations, the conditions on loans need to

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be decided by all parties, including the borrowers, and can be modified in the future. It also adopts China’s non-intervention policy and legislates it in the Operational Policy on Financing, which states that “the Bank, its President, Officers, and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member [and] only economic considerations [are relevant to related decisions].”

Secondly, instead of using a two-layer categorization to differentiate borrowing countries (in terms of income and development level), the AIIB only categorizes countries into regional or non-regional groups but does not discriminate based on their economic status. This could arguably avoid status contestation and make credit design more flexible. Lastly in terms of internal control, both the AIIB and the WB follow weighted voting rules. But in the AIIB China as the biggest fund contributor holds veto right (26.6% voting power, larger than the 25% line) over any super majority decisions at the board of governor level, whereas in the WB no single state has such power in this regard (the largest two members, the US and Japan, each holds 12.75% voting power). When it comes to executive board elections, in the AIIB, the entire Board of Governors picks the president, whereas in the WB, the 5 major shareholders are given the special right to appoint one director to the executive board.

Conclusion

This paper reveals major areas of divergence and convergence between the traditional West-led and the emerging China-led aid approach. In general, China manages to utilize its domestic development lessons and overcome long-lasting deficiencies of the old system by putting emphasis on ownership, intergovernmental partnership, and local demand. Those

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22 Ibid.
23 AIIB. Operational policy on finance. 2020b.
innovations in turn incentivize traditional donors to modify and improve their own ways of aid-giving.

However, due to space and data access limitations, certain key aspects regarding foreign aid are left unexamined by the paper and are worth further research consideration. One is the need to better understand the recipient country’s profile under different aid and cooperation systems. For instance, to what extent does the destination of aid delivered by China and by OECD countries differ or overlap, and is there a correlation between aid-giving and other economic, political, or ideological factors.

Now, with an ever more uncertain post-pandemic global economy, there needs to be a greater level of innovation and mutual learning between traditional and emerging donors to ensure a sustainable debt management strategy, improve aid efficiency, and catalyze economic growth in the Global South. The foreign aid system must find the proper balance between procedural justice and yield efficiency, between short-term benefit and long-term influence, and between applying alien theories and respecting local intuitions. At the same time, recipient countries should also better take advantage of their own agency to clarify demands, leverage partnerships, and pursue self-sufficient growth strategies using original know-how and comparative strengths.
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Enabling Skilled Migration to China from BRI Countries through Chinese Policy Development

Feiyang Huang, Shanthi Ramakrishna, Tess Yu

Migrating to Opportunity? Economic Evidence from East Asia, the U.S. and the EU

Professor Giovanna Maria Dora Dore
Abstract

Despite the economic growth China has experienced over the past few decades, it is still a country of emigration. The resultant decline in skilled labor and foreign talent has contributed to changes in the country’s immigration policies. Notably, China is leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by implementing attractive migration policies specifically targeted towards generating greater migration from BRI countries. However, especially in light of China’s border policies following the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen to what extent these policies will be effective in facilitating greater rates of migration and retaining skilled migrants from BRI countries to China.

Background

China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 with the aim of building trade routes over land and sea through Asia and Africa. The BRI centers around infrastructure projects along the proposed route, which has been heavily funded and built by China through national banks and state-owned conglomerates. The scope of BRI is massive; independent research revealed over 13,000 projects in 165 countries and more than $800 billion spent, although the complex and diverse funding mechanisms for each project mean this is certainly an underestimate.¹ From 2013 to 2018, trade between China and BRI countries totaled over $6 trillion and accounted for 27.4 percent of China’s total trade in goods.²

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Domestically, China faces a myriad of population trends, including an aging population, a low fertility rate, and a large shortfall in pension funds. Meanwhile, China has been a country of emigration since economic liberalization in the 1980s. Net emigration peaked in the period of 2005-2010 at 0.28% per 1,000 population, or 1.88 million people, and the outflow of people is projected to continue over the next 30 years. These factors materialize in a decline of the working age population (WAP), which is expected to fall by 10.5 million from 2015-2020. The largest fall of WAP is estimated to be 41.9 million from 2035-2040. China had reversed course on its “one-child policy” and engaged in other forms of social engineering to boost birth rates but met limited success. Therefore, there is a strong incentive for China to encourage immigration in order to increase its labor force and sustain its economic growth.

From the perspective of migration and labor, the BRI is a conduit for the movement of people and workers. Strengthening people-to-people ties is one of the “five connectivity” goals articulated by China. Additionally, the BRI connects countries facing divergent demographic and labor trends. Middle- and high-income BRI countries such as China, Singapore, Thailand, and Russia face a decrease in the working age population and thus a shortage of labor; low-income countries such as India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Egypt will face a labor surplus. The BRI presents China with an opportunity to recruit talent and labor, given that it is the main policy driver.

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4 UNICEF. “China Migration Profiles.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA).
Given these trends, we are motivated to understand how China intends to encourage, and how it is already facilitating, greater skilled immigration from BRI countries in particular. Thus, this paper seeks to answer the question of how developments in Chinese immigration policy and legislation are enabling increased migration from BRI countries to China and the retention of skilled migrants for its workforce.

**China’s Migration Initiatives**

A priority of the Chinese government, as embodied within the Belt and Road Initiative, is the transformation of the country into a leader in global high-tech manufacturing, going from an economy based on exports and a low-skilled labor force to an economy based on services, science, technology, and innovation.\(^7\) This, in addition to the aforementioned adverse demographic trends, has made China aware of the critical need for it to introduce plans and policies to attract and retain foreign talent and skilled international migrants. A strategy China has started to employ in attempting to obtain more foreign talent for its labor force includes implementing simpler application procedures for visas, work permits, and similar documentation, as this enhances China’s overall attractiveness to foreign talents by increasing the ease with which one can migrate to China and remain there for studies or work.\(^8\) In this section, several developments in Chinese migration regulation and policy will be discussed with regards to how they complement and advance China’s pursuit towards transforming its economy

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and labor force into one that is more open and attractive to high-skilled foreign talents and, in turn, relies on such a skill and talent base for furthering its economic and industrial agenda.

In general, the approach employed by the Chinese government for generating greater skilled migration is to increase circular migration of academics and researchers through foreign talent introduction plans. Until recently, all foreign students were forced to return to their home countries upon completion of their studies in China, leading to a forced higher skilled return migration. Recent regulations developments, however, indicate a desire for the permanent attraction of foreign skilled workers and a “diversification of such attraction channels through talent plans, policies and permanent residency reforms.”

An example of such a policy development occurred in January 2017, when the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, and Human Resources and Social Security dropped the requirement for foreign postgraduates from Chinese universities to have two years of overseas work experience and now permits them to be employed within a year after graduation. In April of the same year, a revised and simplified work permit standard was enacted, by which foreign workers were selected into categories A, B, or C depending on their professional expertise. Group A is reserved for highly skilled foreign workers, such as those who are highly distinguished in their field or hold a senior position in a leading institution or company; Group B is reserved for skilled foreign workers, such as those who work in Sino-foreign relations or teach a foreign language; while Group C is for everyone else. Ease and accessibility to the Chinese

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labor market, the duration of work permits, and the availability of work-related resident permits and other rights foreign workers could enjoy partly depend on the category they are selected into.\textsuperscript{12} Such changes to immigration policy have had a demonstrated impact on the number of foreign workers working in China: in 2018, the number was around 950,000—the highest since the country began implementing more open immigration policies.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2019, China implemented new exit and entry rules for foreigners. The new immigration policy, designed to expand the ability of foreign workers and top students to stay in China for residence or for longer periods, includes increasing the number of permanent residence permits available for qualified overseas workers and long-term visas available to top talents, which encompasses students, workers, and people looking to start businesses in China.\textsuperscript{14} Through this initiative, China is hoping to attract and retain more highly skilled foreigners. Recent changes such as this have expanded China’s openness towards skilled foreign workers and students and have underscored the country’s intent on facilitating their ability to stay and work within the country more easily. These shifts are demonstrative of China taking actionable steps towards achieving its aim of attracting and retaining more top international students and foreign experts to bolster its domestic labor force and economic development.

The relaxation of immigration channels is also occurring through changes in visa-free transit policies and visa exemptions. Although the decision to migrate for employment tends to be highly personal, facilitating greater mobility through visa regulations is a crucial enabling factor in incentivizing and promoting migration to and longer-term stay in China. This area of policy change in particular also reveals how being a BRI national can bring an additional layer of

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} “China implements new immigration policy.” 2019. CGTN America.
ease and mobility to the immigration process compared to being a non-BRI national. This comparative advantage will be expanded upon further in the following section.

In terms of visa policy that is conducive to facilitating greater skilled migration, unilateral and mutual visa exemption agreements for Chinese tourists visiting BRI countries and vice versa for 30 days for business, tourism, and exchanges have been introduced for 55 countries along the BRI.\(^{15}\) Visa-free transit mandates—which allow for short-term business visits and attendance of trade fairs and job interviews without having to undergo the lengthy process of applying for a visa—have been implemented by over 27 border ports and 20 major cities across China and extend to nationals of 53 countries, 31 of which are BRI countries, presenting an advantage for BRI nationals.\(^{16}\)

Finally, in April 2019, visa facilitation measures, mainly benefitting nationals of BRI countries, were implemented in 12 airports and 6 land border ports, all of which are located at major migration and transportation channels between China and its BRI neighbors.\(^{17}\) These policies were being tested at these ports on eligible individuals invited by Chinese authorities for BRI projects or events, and they enjoyed extended benefits such as expedited exit and entry, greater visa convenience for spouses and children, and expedited residence permit processing.\(^{18}\) This measure is not only an example of how Chinese immigration policy is broadly becoming more intent on attracting and retaining skilled foreign workers and talent, but it also is an example of how such policy often offers BRI nationals an advantage compared to nationals of other countries.

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\(^{16}\) Ibid, 22.

\(^{17}\) Ibid, 23.

\(^{18}\) Ibid, 24.
Advantageous Position of BRI Students and Academics in Immigration Programs

Furthermore, China’s government has launched a number of initiatives that aim to attract immigrants from BRI countries in particular. These initiatives often target students studying at universities, from the undergraduate to doctorate levels. For instance, the Cirrus Project was launched by the Zhongguancun Belt and Road Industry Promotion Association (ZBRA) in 2017. Since its inception, it has attracted over 10,000 students from over 80 BRI countries and has helped over 1,200 students access internship opportunities. Since 2013, Zhongguancun has also held an entrepreneurship competition that brings in investors from around the world to judge participants, and within this competition, those from BRI countries have their own division, offering BRI nationals with their own competitive pool and comparative advantage. The “Belt and Road” Talent Development Program is another example of a BRI-centered talent attraction program. Hosted by the International Cooperation Center of the National Development and Reform Commission and Tanoto Foundation, this initiative has established training programs at the master’s level throughout top universities in China and intends to increase the scope of cooperation and exchange between BRI countries through training promising talents in subject matter specific to BRI. The Chinese Government’s Silk Road Scholarship Program that was launched this year was established by China’s Ministry of Education to support Chinese universities in their efforts to attract exceptional students from Belt and Road countries to study

20 China One Belt One Road Network. 2022. “藤蔓计划”服务“一带一路”科技人文交流和经贸投资合作取得积极成效.”
22 “Belt and Road Initiative - Talent Programs.” n.d. Tanoto Foundation.
in China.\textsuperscript{23} This adds yet another program that provides BRI nationals with an advantageous position when migrating to China for studies or work. The Belt and Road Education, Culture, Health, and Talent Introduction Program is another instance of a program offered specifically to individuals from BRI countries outside of the ones generally available to all foreign scientists looking to conduct research in China.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, such examples of programs and initiatives demonstrate how in addition to the measures China is taking to increase skilled migration broadly, it is also focused on recruiting talent from BRI countries in particular. This caters to China’s aim of facilitating the growth of a more skilled workforce and pursuing economic development rooted in the desire to become the global leader in high-tech manufacturing, services, and innovation.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In response to structural falls in the working age population, China has implemented policy reforms to attract foreign students and retain highly skilled graduates. These measures include reducing overseas work requirements for international students and streamlining work visa categories by skills. The BRI has presented China with a unique opportunity to augment its labor force since China is a major funder and policy driver within BRI countries. Indeed, China sees BRI countries as important partners and sources of skilled labor, as shown by the preferential short-term work visa policies extended to BRI countries. Additional efforts target students from BRI countries seeking higher education. Using scholarships, training programs,

\textsuperscript{23} “CUG 2022 Chinese Government Scholarship- Silk Road Scholarship Program - 国际教育学院英文版.\textsuperscript{24}” 2021. International Education College, China University of Geosciences.

and academic or entrepreneurial competitions, China seeks to attract these international students to its universities, which increases their likelihood of staying in China to work.

Overall, BRI nationals have a comparative advantage when immigrating to China and therefore may increasingly see China as a viable destination country in addition to traditional destinations such as Europe, North America, and Australia. This has been reflected in part through the steady rise in international students and foreign workers in China prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the pandemic, China has maintained stringent border control measures which have not made provisions for international students and foreign workers. Thus, it remains to be seen if China can position itself as an attractive destination for BRI students and immigrant workers in the post-pandemic world.
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North Korea: Past, Present, and Future of their Cyber Force

Greta Cortez

Cyber Attack Predictive Index (CAPI) Research
North Korea is constantly mentioned in the news regarding their association with nuclear weapons and cyber attacks. From its establishment by Kim Il-sung, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has sought to build the country via the Juche ideology which promotes a nation “dependent solely on their own strength and the guidance of a near-godlike leader.”\(^1\) To compensate for their lack of traditional military weapons and operations, the country has developed a cyber force that threatens the United States and their southern neighbor.

Notwithstanding their lack of public electrical and internet infrastructure, North Korea’s cyber force has attacked South Korean government agencies, American companies, and financial institutions effectively. How has this young nation been able to develop the powerful cyber force we know today? The following report will present North Korea cyber capabilities, the history of operation, and showcase examples of where their offensive capabilities are deployed.

In 1948, after the United States and the Soviet Union established the divide of the Korean Peninsula using the 38th parallel, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea was established. The authoritative communist country has uplifted the Juche ideology of self-reliance and North Korean nationalism. From Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-un, Juche became the grounds for establishing and developing a military capable of deadly attacks to their greatest enemies: South Korea and the United States. By the 1980s, the country acknowledged their military inferiority against their adversaries due to their fragile economy and began focusing on cost-efficient cyber capabilities. Starting in 1984, Pyongyang established three institutions that “significantly contributed to advancing the country’s offensive cyber program: Mirim College, the Pyongyang Informatics/Information Center, and the Korea Computer Center.”\(^2\) Under a bilateral cooperation

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\(^1\) Zach Beauchamp, *Juche, the State Ideology That Makes North Koreans Revere Kim Jong Un, Explained* (Vox, 2018)

agreement with the Soviet Union, Soviet computer science professors traveled to teach at Mirim College, and trained about 1,300 hackers that got placed into intelligence and military operations, making a total of 6,000 state sponsored hackers.³

By learning how to exploit vulnerabilities in operating systems, North Korea began to weaponize this knowledge to create dangerous codes that would threaten foreign agencies and companies. With the financial aid from sympathizers in Japan, the United Nations Development Program, and the collaboration with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea has been able to create a cyber force capable of hacking into any government agency with little trace.⁴

North Korea has three strategic goals that sustain their deployment of cyber attacks: “counter balancing the growing gap in traditional military operations between North Korea and the US-ROK alliance, causing social disruption in adversaries with little immediate risk of retaliation, and financing the impoverished Pyongyang regime.”⁵ Their asymmetric cyber capabilities stress national survival through offensive measures. As mentioned by Kim Jong-un, “cyber warfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an all-purpose sword that guarantees our military’s capability to strike relentlessly.”⁶

The former students of Kim Il-sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology are now the cyber warriors of North Korea committing cyber espionage, attacking critical infrastructure, and committing financial crimes with little retaliation in part of their isolated intranet, Kwangmyong, that shields the entire nation from the World Wide Web.⁷ In 2016, North Korea was able to hack into South Korea’s Defense Integrated Data Center and stole 235

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³ Bartlett, Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program
⁴ Bartlett, Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program
⁵ Min-hyung Kim, North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and Their Implications for International Security (Sustainability, 2022)
⁶ Kim, North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and their Implications for International Security
⁷ Kim, North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and their Implications for International Security
gigabytes of classified military intelligence due to a maintenance worker’s mistake of not removing the connector jack that linked the military intranet to the public internet.\textsuperscript{8} This allowed for North Korean hackers to enter the secure military intranet and access data that explained military drills in partnership with the United States along with classified information relating to South Korean special forces and power plants. Other military documents included the \textit{Decapitation plan}, written in partnership with the U.S., which laid out procedures for the assassination of Kim Jong-un in the case of war with North Korea.\textsuperscript{9} That same year, North Korean hackers attacked the Bangladesh Central Bank hoping to steal $1 billion but only securing $81 million.\textsuperscript{10} These illicit money transfers were possible with their creation of fake bank accounts and charities along with past experiences in hacking the SWIFT international transaction system by the Federal Reserve of New York. The most notable cyber attack was the 2014 Sony hacks led by the Guardians of Peace, also known as the Lazarus Group, entailing the release of private information of Sony employees and terrorist threats towards theaters that would premiere and showcase the movie \textit{The Interview}.\textsuperscript{11}

These cyber attacks illustrate that the cyber capability of North Korea has improved in the last decades, representing a serious threat that is only growing more destructive. The attack on the Bangladesh Central Bank was their first attack aimed at a financial institution and the FBI describes this attack as, “the culmination of years of methodical preparation.”\textsuperscript{12} This opens the possibility to similar attacks in the future for the purpose of funding the Pyongyang regime. The incident in ROK’s Defense Integrated Data Center sent the grim message to both South Korea

\textsuperscript{8} Kim, \textit{North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and their Implications for International Security}
\textsuperscript{9} Kim, \textit{North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and their Implications for International Security}
\textsuperscript{10} Geoff White & Jean H Lee, \textit{The Lazarus Heist: How North Korea Almost Pulled off a Billion-Dollar Hack} (KYC360, 2021)
\textsuperscript{11} Emily St. James & Timothy B. Lee, \textit{The 2014 Sony Hacks, Explained} (Vox, 2015)
\textsuperscript{12} White & Lee, \textit{The Lazarus Heist: How North Korea Almost Pulled off a Billion-Dollar Hack}
and the United States of the ability in which the cyber warriors can leverage their asymmetric weapon to instill fear and attack their adversaries regardless of their disadvantage in traditional military weapons. Lastly, the attack upon Sony Pictures led to sanctions upon the North Korean government intelligence agency and a North Korean arms dealer. Former President Obama warned that “if somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary they don’t like, or news report they don’t like.”

To prepare for future attacks, nations such as the ROK and the United States must understand their current cyber capabilities in order to create offensive and defensive strategies against North Korea.

With the rise in cryptocurrency, North Korea has heavily invested in cybercrime targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and banks worldwide, successfully stealing over $1.2 billion. These financial crimes are then used to funnel the money to Pyongyang, their cyber force, and talented person college. Besides funding their cyber programs, at least one third of this money goes into their missile program. With information on specific cyber groups within North Korea being scarce, one group is known for their disastrous outcome on their prey. The Lazarus Group is a cybercrime group of an unknown number of North Korean hackers that are responsible for the Sony and Bangladesh Central Bank attacks. They have committed cyber espionage, crypto crime, and used certain software flaws to exploit, extort, and threaten actors for money and information that will benefit North Korea. Though little is known of the state-sponsored group’s relative size, their threat globally is undisputed.

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13 James & Lee, The 2014 Sony Hacks, Explained
14 Kim, North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities and their Implications for International Security
15 Bartlett, Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program
With the North Korean cyber force only becoming more complex and increasingly destructive, it is vital for nations to understand the risks of an attack from their hackers. Regardless of the numerous sanctions inflicted upon the country that contribute to their already hermit state, and with substantial education preparation with the assistance of neighboring communist nations, North Korea has successfully shown the world that it can compete against world powers in cyberspace. North Korea continues to be an impoverished and isolated nation with poor critical infrastructure, a weak economy, and hungry citizens. Nevertheless, as a way to further waning trust in the Pyongyang regime and compete against South Korean and American military capabilities, the North Korean cyber force is an intricate and powerful force to be reckoned with.
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Section III
Film and Literature of East Asia
Deconstruction Grand Narrative: Transwar Japanese Literature as Foundation of Reality

Langyi Ren

Transwar Japanese and Japanophone Literature

Professor Satoru Hashimoto
Literary history is a part of the history of the history civilization... It has recorded, in its long and rich development, all the gradual evolution of ideas and sentiments which has been projected in political and social events and which has become established in institutions, but more especially all that inner and hidden life or suffering or of aspiration which has not found expression in action.

— Gustave Lanson, The Method of Literature History

Jacques Derrida famously defined, “the movements of deconstruction” as a form of criticism that “do[es] not destroy structures from the outside” and “[is] not possible and effective, nor can [it] take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures.”¹ This paper turns this nondestructive deconstruction into the lens for probing transwar Japanese literature. By proposing that the core function of literature is to tell petits récits, or little stories, I argue that transwar literature is an essential and effective tool against the grand narrative of post-war Japanese history. The concept of grand narrative, otherwise known as metanarrative, is developed by Jean François Lyotard in his 1976 landmark treatise, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.² For the purpose of this paper, I will define grand narrative as a theory that attempts to give a totalizing, comprehensive account of Japanese transwar history based on the appeal to general schemas such as invasion versus resistance. The reductionist and teleological notion embedded in grand narratives presuppose a rationale in historical progress and directs to an objective story that focuses solely on collective and empirical events,

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overlooking the subjective experience of individuals. *Petits récits*, on the other hand, acts as a more modest and localized narrative which shows that history is actually neither rational nor objective.

Specifically, I analyze the plot of *Floating Clouds* to demonstrate that literature employs features that often uphold individual subjectivity, and only encourages the reader to embrace reality as not only a totality of empirical events but also as the subjective experience of individuals. I will then analyze the nested structure of *Fires on the Plain*, concluding that literature serves the function to blur the lines between reality and fictionality. Thus, literature undermines the superficial approach of grand narratives. Lastly, I will argue that the countermovement against grand narrative is a movement of deconstruction. By deploying a tactic that inhabits the very structure of realistic history, we could create a destabilization of empirical and objective records.

1. *Floating Clouds*: away from the battlefield

World War II is often depicted with images of bloody conflicts and life in the trenches. This is an instance of a grand narrative that often overlooks the everyday life of Japanese people. Literature such as Hayashi Fumiko’s *Floating Clouds* preserves the stories of life away from the battlefield and reveals the indirect influence of war on individuals. The story starts by showing how war can easily disrupt the normality of a person’s life. Yukiko, a woman with extremely mediocre looks, education, and manner, was never outstanding in the eyes of men. However, as she was the only young woman in the Japanese forestry agency in the deep mountains, Yukiko became sought after. She eventually had an affair with Tomioka, a minor official with the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, whose toxic relationship creates a
dramatic center for the novel.

Although none of the characters have confronted the war directly, the abnormality that the war imposes on the world greatly influences their understanding of love and life. At their first meeting, Yukiko's nostalgia drew her attention to Tomioka. “Depending on the wind direction, a Japanese song, ‘You were strong, Father - Chichi’yo anata’wa tsuyokatta,’ was subtly flowing into the dining room from far away…Yukiko was inadvertently attracted by this music. Nothing in particular, but adventurous feelings came up to her, and felt like talking with the man drinking there.”

3 If it was not the war that separated her from her hometown and placed her into the unfamiliar and exotic forest of Japanese-occupied French Indochina, she might never have noticed Tomioka, let alone be attracted to him. In addition, Hayashi writes, “she [Yukiko] was on the journey, therefore, nothing would hinder her from speaking to the man without anyone's introduction.”

4 The isolated environment that cut them off from the original world and from the traditional morality catalyzed their affection for each other. These unusual turning points drastically changed Yukiko's life forever, and made up a crucial part of her reality. In a grand narrative, these important individual experiences are hidden because they are just brush fires, too inconspicuous to be noted on the pages of history.

Moreover, Floating Clouds shows that the reality people experience is not as logical as the grand narrative suggests. Instead, reality is often incoherent and irrational, which is another reason why the grand narrative excludes them. In a dichotomous structure, the novel follows Yukiko as she moves from the physically lush and beautiful surroundings of Indochina to the

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4 Ibid.
desolation and chaos of Tokyo. If life in Tokyo is normal and rational, Indochina symbolizes a Utopian fantasy, and the two consist of an independent and discontinuous period of Yukiko’s life. Through Yukiko's reflection after returning to Tokyo, the time in Indochina was distant and disconnected for both her and Tomioka. Yukiko keeps questioning why she fell in love with the man in the first place, and Tomioka remains emotionally inscrutable to Yukiko, refusing to break off with his wife as he promised back in Indochina. Tomioka reminds himself when he first reunites with Yukiko in Tokyo: “their eruption had already extinguished. They both were estimating wrongly. Substantially, two people were sinking to the bottom of the defeat of the war and lost their fire for eruption. They simply had forgotten the reality.”\(^5\) The empty dream is over, and the incompatibilities between them are evident. Looking back, they both see flaws in each other, but they find themselves trapped in their own drifting, unable to break out of the morass of indecisiveness. As Yukiko and Tomioka spend a night in a shabby hotel in Tokyo, “they did not talk about their future, forgetting any expressions, but were striving solely to ignite their passion of the past days again.”\(^6\) They no longer love each other, but they refuse to let the memory go. Even with the help of the reminiscence of their time in Indochina, their passion can hardly last longer than a night. It shows that time in Indochina is an unnatural, irrational, and discontinuous life experience caused by the war that can hardly fit into the rational reality for both Yukiko and Tomioka.

*Floating Clouds* shows that war shapes people’s subjective experiences and causes irrational and inconsistent actions. These scattered stories are never a significant part of history, but they amalgamate into an unignorable and crucial portion of reality. When historians take a

\(^5\) Ibid, p.209.  
\(^6\) Ibid, p.208.
grand narrative, they try to rationalize, organize, and interpret all the events that happened as a coherent system. However, events based on individual experience in a unique environment like war cannot be direct and rational. In turn, subjective experiences are often ignored and eventually forgotten. The role of literature is precisely to record these irrational personal experiences and reveal them to the world, as they are an integral part of the reality we are living in.

2. *Fires on the Plain*: blur between reality and fictionality

Ōoka's novel *Fires on the Plain* conducts a more fundamental attack on the grand narratives by blurring the line between reality and fictionality, which reveals that the grand narratives’ ambition of justifying their stories as “the truth” is unrealistic.

Through the eyes of a soldier of the routed Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines, *Fires on the Plain* describes the tragic battlefield in rich detail, making readers feel as if they were right on the scene. It is worth noting, however, that some of these descriptions are overly surrealistic and bizarre. This hints at the fictionality of the protagonist's narration. For example, the narrator writes that “flies came down. They filled the whole sky, as the flowers had done before, and zoomed straight for my face, buzzing loudly.”7 Here, the narrator adopts a metaphor on a pair of aesthetically opposite images—flies represent ugliness, and flowers stand for beauty. It suggests that the narrator’s perception has been completely blurred, and his rational appreciation has given way to a chaotic and animal subjective perception. Later on, the protagonist’s description of a dead

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man’s body is even more bizarre: “His eyes protruded like a bird’s; his hair and beard had
grown at random and had taken on a brownish tint.” These vivid but morbid metaphors
appear more and more frequently as the story progresses, implying that the protagonist is
descending into delirium. The epilogue of the novel further blurs the line between fiction
and reality. In the last few chapters, the narrator reveals that the story was based on his
recolletion after he was taken in as a mental patient. The story’s transition from a record to
a report, especially by a man with mental problems, directs the reader to doubt the veracity
of all the experiences previously read. In the last chapter, the protagonist confesses his self-
doubt by saying, “Maybe this too, is nothing but an illusion,” pushing the tension between
reality and fiction to a climax.

The nested structure of the novel by the method of second-hand text undermines the
reality of the whole story. It portrays all direct experiences of war as fictional, but at the same
time suggests that the more fundamental truth of the world lies in the fictionality of the story.
Lu Xun adopts a similar structure in his novel Diary of a Madman, in which Lu Xun points out
the corrupt roots of traditional Chinese society through a madman’s maddened remarks. The
fictional nature of his work reveals a more profound truth hidden by the so-called “normal
society.” Whether it is a coincidence or not, in Fires on the Plain, Ōoka adopts the same
metaphor of cannibalism as Lu Xun does in Diary of a Madman. Moreover, Chapter 37 is titled
A Madman’s Diary, making a more direct reference. It is reasonable to speculate that his final
plot design also borrows from Lu Xun—through the use of fiction to expose the reality beyond
the surface.

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8 Ibid, p.203.
At the end of the novel, Ōoka guides readers to reflect on the value of subjective experience. “Recollection is itself a type of experience—and who can say that I am not alive? Even though I can believe no one else, I still have faith in myself…” The so-called truth is not an objective description of what happened. Rather, the emotional fluctuations experienced by the protagonist and the projection of will in the real world also formulate part of the experience. The irrational experiences lures the readers to ponder on the normality that has been taken for granted and eventually see the irrational nature of reality.

In general, if we read the lack of rationality in the story as analogous to the incomprehensible cruelty in reality, then *Fire on the Plain* provokes reflections both at and beyond a representative level. *Fires on the Plain* is an example to show that literature is the proper medium for revealing irrational, subjective realities, precisely through the very means of fictionalization. These realities are not taken into account by historians because the grand narrative is concerned only with rationalizing all events that can be rationalized. Thus, the truth of war, and indeed of the world as a whole, must be derived from the countermovement of decoding the reality behind the fictionality of the subjective experience of individuals, which are absent in the grand narrative of history.

3. Destruction vs. Deconstruction

The destabilization of the grand narrative remains effective as a movement of deconstruction instead of destruction. Literature can inhabit the very structure of telling a true story while also “pressing them to the point of cracking.” The *presented* reality is the core of

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9 Ibid, p.204.
literature, but *represented* reality must be its outer packaging for it to be effective. An excellent literary work should accurately restore the details of life, which can immerse readers. The detailed scenery of the battlefield in *Fires on the Plain* and the exquisite inner activities of Yukiko gives a sense of reality. This pursuit of realism is reflected in a literary genre called *I novel*, which occupies a significant role in Japanese literature. *I novels* tell stories based upon a vital framework of “jijitsu (reality)” or “makoto (sincerity).” It emphasizes the “inner reality” of the story and presents the story as a mingling of fiction and reality, completing the missing parts of the story told by grand narratives. By giving specific details and constant inner activities of the narrators, Japanese literature camouflages as realistic record of history. However, the overtone of its fictionality persistently rings, although slightly, mocking the naïveté of grand narratives.

Encountering fictionality is not synonymous with experiencing a complete loss of reality. As my analyses of *Floating Clouds* and *Fires on the Plain* demonstrate, fictionality accompanies reality as a disturbance, not as its negative. It is precisely through this disturbance that culture products’ rebellion against the grand narrative. Using the explanation of the doctor in a mental hospital in *Fires on the Plain*, Ōoka proposes that people make up the details of things and convince themselves that they are true. He explains this process as the brain’s self protection mechanism in the face of things beyond common sense. This process fits precisely the description of the attempt of grand narrative explaining various events in history, giving the past meaning by connecting dispersed events and phenomena by appealing to a logical schema. It turns out that writing fiction and writing history in the grand narrative are essentially the same. Therefore, since there is no absolute fictionality, history is not and cannot be made up of objective historical events. Moreover, an accurate picture of reality must be painted with the
subjective experience of individuals. This is the only method that can produce a true and sincere story. Once the one-sided understanding of reality is discarded, the fictional nature of the grand narrative becomes apparent. As Hayden White argued, historical writing was influenced by literary writing in many ways, sharing the firm reliance on narrative for meaning.¹¹

Consequently, fictionality must not be misunderstood as the negative reality of literature that foregrounds a real subjective experience instead of complete artistic fantasy. It is a structural borrowing of the features of a realistic record of history that emphasize consistency, rationality, and details suggest that the criticism of grand narrative could resemble an instance of deconstruction. To borrow from Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of Derrida, the aim of deconstruction is neither destruction nor correction but rather, “to struggle, internally disrupt, assault [a traditional system] with its own techniques, presumptions, and aims.”¹² This difference between destruction and deconstruction, I propose, might be a key for literature to reveal the absurd nature of the grand narrative itself.

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Insights from *Parasite* on Labor Precarity and Lower Class Families

Connie Chang-Chien

Precarity in South Korea through TV and Film

Professor Clara Han
In the 2019 award-winning South Korean film, *Parasite*, director Bong Joon-ho executes thoughtful, powerful filmmaking techniques and creates a satire about labor precarity and lower-class families in South Korea. The movie centers on how the financially struggling Kim family slowly infiltrates the household staff of the affluent Park family. While enjoying the luxuries of being employed by the Park family, the Kim family inadvertently discovers the secret of the exiled previous housekeeper in the form of her husband Oh Geun-se, who has been hiding from loan sharks in the Parks’ bunker for over four years. The themes introduced through *Parasite* add onto the narratives seen in several other research papers and South Korean television shows regarding topics of labor and societal class. In particular, Bong’s aesthetic choices focusing on self-reinforcing social class structure and the disillusionment of lower class warrants greater examination, as will be done here. First, the paper will look into the numerous references to jobs and qualifications in regard to the modern instability of jobs in South Korea. The focus will then shift to symbols in the film that create a divide between the affluent and poor, emphasizing the message that upward class mobility is all but a hopeless dream.

The driving force of *Parasite* is the lower-class families’ need for economic stability, or in other words, a job that can provide sufficient financial support. Bong masterfully utilizes small, seemingly irrelevant dialogue to include several cues in the film implying that the Kim family and the Oh family have been faced with job insecurity in the past. It seems that the family has already had a myriad of working experiences as they debate their father’s last part-time valet job questioning whether he worked there. “…after the chicken place went bust, before the Taiwan cake shop, in that 6-month window?... No, it was after the cake shop went bust.”¹ Coincidentally, the Park family housekeeper’s husband, Oh Geun-se, notes that Taiwanese

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¹ *Parasite*, directed by Bong Joon-ho (2019; South Korea; Barunson E&A), 30:44-31:02
castella shop, referred to by the Kim family, was his shop that went bust, and even after 4 years, the loan sharks are still pursuing him due to his overwhelming debt.\(^2\) Although the characters may not realize it, their past and current struggles in job security are mirrored, linking the lower-class families in their struggle financially and in their efforts to find labor. The mention of failing small businesses and unemployment for periods of time is reflective of the modern-day situation. In South Korea, the IMF Crisis of 1997 resulted in the restructuring of the then-economy and the dissolution of long-term jobs. This event could have affected all of the characters in the modern-day *Parasite* but especially the parents of the Kim family and the Ohs. The IMF Crisis consequently forced many lower-class adults to turn to self-employment as characterized by Myunji Yang in *The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997-2015* as the “fried chicken hypothesis.” Self-employment, such as forming a business, seemed favorable since they did “…not seem to require highly skilled labor, in-depth knowledge, or business know-how…” [Self-employed people] usually invest all or nearly all of their money in self-employment ventures.”\(^3\) Despite these actions, the accumulated debts by starting one’s own business typically further aggravates financial instability, as Yang notes that with the saturation of businesses, 40% of small businesses fail in the first year and fall into deeper debt.\(^4\) The IMF Crisis adds a layer of context to the stories of the Kims and the Ohs, demonstrating how realistic the desperate plights of the two families could be in modern-day South Korea.

The mention of attempts at self-employment without requiring specialized knowledge or experience acknowledges how education plays a major role in the self-reinforcing class structure.

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\(^2\) *Parasite*, 01:09:44- 01:10:11


\(^4\) Yang, “The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997–2015: Status Anxiety and the Collapse of Middle-Class Myths.” 106
As can also be seen in the 2014 office-centric television series, *Misaeng*, upper level education is necessary to be considered as qualified for a job—it is presumed that one should have earned a college degree or be in the process of earning one. These are the standards for the lower and middle class, at least. For wealthy families, such as the Parks, future generations can still inherit wealth and family businesses, and hence, bypass the work qualifications imposed on the lower class. The Kim siblings’ tutoring positions for the Park children allows for the Kim family to “spy” on the affluent, leading to the realization that the rich bask in their lives by taking advantage of the most disadvantaged. In the 2007 data provided from Yang’s paper, The typical Korean family spent close to 242,000 won (approximately 220 USD), a quarter of monthly expenditures, to send their children to extra tutoring to help them do well in school, in the hope that a college degree will allow for their children to maintain their position in the middle or upper class. Those who are unable to pay for such tutoring services have a decreased likelihood of finding jobs in the already competitive job market. Consequently, they fall into a situation similar to that of the Kims and the Ohs: either forced into short-term jobs or self-employment, with risk for further debts. The children of such people continue to be stuck in a position where they have little to no advantage nor future prospects. As Yang states, “In the new economy, the prospects for becoming middle class for those not from privileged backgrounds are dim.”

Even when the lower class receives employment opportunities, it is likely that these opportunities are provided by those in the upper class. The events of *Parasite* are kicked off with

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5 *Misaeng: Incomplete Life*, Directed by Won-suk Kim and Yoon-jung Jung, aired December 13, 2014, on tvN
6 Yang, “The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997–2015: Status Anxiety and the Collapse of Middle-Class Myths,” 121
7 Yang, “The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997–2015: Status Anxiety and the Collapse of Middle-Class Myths,” 119
8 Yang, “The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997–2015: Status Anxiety and the Collapse of Middle-Class Myths,” 118
a visit from Kim Ki-woo’s rich and well-connected acquaintance, Min, who arrives at the Kims’
semi-basement with one of his grandfather’s scholar stones. After a few drinks, Min casually
offers Ki-woo a tutoring job for the daughter of the Park family. The conversation following the
job offer holds the implication that Min trusts Ki-woo more than his own classmates because he
is aware of Ki-woo’s financial situation and desperation to make money. The fact that it is Min
who reaches out to the struggling Ki-woo is an indirect acknowledgement of how the rich do not
expect the poor to be able to climb the social ladder. As such, the rich sometimes feel that they
can manipulate the poor to do their bidding; here Min trusts that Ki-woo will not make advances
on his tutee so that he will have the chance to ask her out in the future. Social class standing is
maintained by relying on a rigged system from modern imperialism and the associated capitalism
with it, so education is an expensive resource that is not available to everyone. While the rich can
constantly fuel a system based on advantageous meritocracy through the wealth that funds
advantageous study abroad experiences and tutoring, the job prospects for the lower class shrink
and the class mobility becomes less possible.

In *Parasite*, there are two lower class families hired by the Parks—the Kim family and
the Oh family. In the eyes of the Parks, the workers in their household are not considered to be
lower class, since none of them disclose their true backgrounds. The Kim family and the
housekeeper’s family are in a constant, conscious struggle to escape from their position in the
lower class, which is visually demonstrated in the cinematographic technique of vertical
movement through the movie. Bong includes several shots panning up and down in the film
featured in the scenes where the Kim family travels to and from their semi-basement apartment
and the Park mansion such as in the major flooding scene. The most important shots in the

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9 *Parasite*, 01:32:01-01:35:14
movie are the movements up and down the stairs to the bunker where Geun-se has been hiding, which is appropriate given how the bunker holds the poor characters’ secret lower-class status and only consists of a small, underground space. The rest of the Park residence represents a possibility of living an affluent and prosperous life like the Parks, with the expensive food, alcohol, and notably windows to look out from as they sit from a higher social class, while they are all totally unaware of anything that occurs in the lower-class, symbolized by the hidden bunker. The discovery of Geun-se living in the bunker is followed by the Kim family all accidentally tumbling down the stairs, revealing that like the Oh family, they are all frauds.\textsuperscript{10} The in-fighting between these two families is captured with a constant up and down camera movement, similar to how all of them have tried to climb to a better social position but are constantly reminded of their reality. Most importantly, only the Oh and Kim families are fighting up and down the stairs, rather than the Parks, against their home invaders. While it is the Park family’s wealth that allows imperialist capitalism to continually exist, the lower-class families do not exhibit any class solidarity to rebel against the upper class. Even as the Kim family tries to plead Moon-gwang, the ex-housekeeper, to not send the incriminating video revealing the familial connections between the household staff to the Parks, the patriarch of the Kim family, Ki-taek, rhetorically asks “What did those nice people ever do wrong?”\textsuperscript{11} defending the social system that has been continuing their impoverished situations. As defined by Dr. Clara Han in the journal article, “Precarity, Precariousness, and Vulnerability,” these two families represent the “proletariat” and are united by the precarity of their jobs while lacking a collective mindset to protest for the betterment of their class.\textsuperscript{12} In the eyes of the public, the Kims and Ohs are

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Parasite}, 01:07:08-01:11:39
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Parasite} 01:11:34-01:11:59
\textsuperscript{12} Clara Han, “Precarity, Precariousness, and Vulnerability.” \textit{Annual Review of Anthropology} 47, no. 1 (2018): 336
identical, interchangeable families since they have yet to develop class consciousness and identity beyond their own selfishness. They have the same type of aspiration, as symbolized by Min’s scholar stone: the dream to climb to a higher social class. Despite sharing the same hope, they literally destroy each other using the scholar stone, with Geun-se nearly bludgeoning Ki-woo to death. Until the families and members of this proletariat become aware of how to come together with a definite voice, class mobility is little to impossible to achieve.

*Parasite* is a film that resonates well with many people in its depiction of the rich and poor dichotomy because viewers witness these aspects in real life. Bong utilizes dialogue, the premise of education, and filming in specific locations with meaningful techniques to render precarity at several levels. All together, these elements merge to depict how class mobility is close to inconceivable. As Jin-kyung Lee describes in *Gender and Class in Contemporary South Korea: Intersectionality and Transnationality* how South Korean television dramas have shifted with the changes in the Korean economy and its people, *Parasite* demonstrates that the “self-made man” narrative is no longer applicable in a social structure as society favors those already in the upper echelons. Even more so, it shows the stark reality that there is no fantastical popular cultural narrative such as a “changeling” or “Cinderella” plot that can moralize the social division seen in modern society.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Jikyung Lee, “Changelings and Cinderellas: Class In/Equality, Gendered Social Im/Mobility, and Post-Developmentalism in Contemporary South Korean Television Dramas,” *Gender and Class in Contemporary South Korea: Intersectionality and Transnationality*, (Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2019), 24
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The Precarity of Womanhood: A Narrative of Criminality

Connie Chang-Chien

Precarity in South Korea through TV and Film

Professor Clara Han
In the 2016 film *Missing*, the director Lee Eon Hee guides the audience through a commentary on gender relations and expectations. As a “feminist film,” themes about the current state of between genders and within the female cohort in South Korea are raised. One of the most pronounced themes addresses the narrative of criminality formed around women, which can be broken down in several aspects. First, we will compare how the backgrounds of these female characters affect their narratives of criminality. Second, we will examine the views on the active working positions women pursue. Finally, we will focus on the solidarity of women as a means to safeguard from precarity. Research papers about the housing situation in South Korea and aspects of the 2012 South Korean drama *Misaeng: Incomplete Life* will be used to supplement these themes.

The two female characters in *Missing* have different criminal narratives placed on them with regards to their positions as mothers, which reveal different aspects of gender relations. In the first situation, we have Ji-sun’s situation as a single mother who is struggling to raise her child and maintain her work. While she is criticized at work, Ji-sun is simultaneously at the forefront of her mother-in-law’s opinions. On the other hand, Han-mae, the Chinese nanny for Ji-sun’s daughter, comes from a migrant background. As we discover through Ji-sun’s search for her daughter, Han-mae spoke little to no Korean, married a Korean husband, and had a child but with little ability to financially support her family. Instead of examining the types of criminal narratives placed on Ji-sun and Han-mae, we can reflect on how the criminal narratives placed on these characters reflect gender relations and precarity. From early on, there are hints of patriarchy influencing how society views these female characters. When Ji-sun is interviewed by the police and her mother-in-law, the mother-in-law embodies the voice of the male patriarch, supporting the opinions of the male police officers of “feel[ing] sorry for the baby for having a
The acknowledgement of an issue lends itself to a pre-existing dissatisfaction with the mother who cannot take care of her child. This image of a mother straying away from the expected realm of domestic care leads to the point where society, dominated by the ideals of a patriarchal household, questions whether she is mentally stable. This criminal narrative placement highlights the expectation for women to still only reside in the domestic, and how failure to do her maternal tasks perfectly will be considered criminal. In Han-mae’s situation, as well as a secondary migrant character, the character of the migrant bride and mother is subjected to numerous claims of infidelity towards her husband, even if there may not be any evidence to substantiate these ideas. Han-mae’s mother-in-law takes a similar role in expressing the male voice, pointing out that since she is a foreigner, she cannot claim to have any right to be in Korea. She furthers her claims about a lack of ties to Korea, yelling later, “She’ll need to have a kid to live here! Giving me a grandson will be the only way! No need to give her reasons to flee!” The patriarchal system is supported by the idea that there is a household that exists to be maintained, and also by the demonstrated desperation to establish a family with a child, even if it is with a migrant. Yet, like the numerous narratives that migrant wives have provided from Hae Yeon Choo’s text, there is an eventual conflict when these migrant mothers are unable to claim the legal rights, or in some situations, are only able to attain these rights if her husband is present. As a result, these wives feel the need to prove their belonging to their child and husband’s country, whether it be by taking literacy classes, participating in migrant wife sessions, or giving up on returning to their home countries. Through both the paper on migrant wives and depiction of the film, the central focus on the male head of household serves as the

1 Missing, directed by Eon-Hee Lee (Dice Film, 2016), 00:28:35
2 Missing, 00:51:06 - 00:51:20
root of the strained gender relations and subsequent criminalized narratives. In *Missing*, this is how the movie places the criminal narrative on Han-mae, who is forced by this inability to take legal care of her child to partake in criminal activity, illegal organ trade, in order to pay for her child’s medical treatment. The two mothers’ actions in this movie are continuously viewed as criminal, even if it is a narrative forced upon them.

Another important aspect is how characters from media are depicted as women with active jobs outside of the singular domestic sphere, which contrasts the male counterpart and gender relations. At one point, Ji-Sun’s boss says, “I heard you were late because of your kid. This is why I hate working with moms. I pay for them and look out for the kids too.”\(^4\) The single mother role is difficult, as Ji-Sun has stepped outside the domestic domain to work but is still expected to bear the burden of work to an extreme degree to keep in favor with her male boss. Even Ji-sun’s mother-in-law accuses Ji-sun of faking the disappearance of Da-eun, reasoning that she must be looking for ransom to support her precarious situation as a single mother.\(^5\) A similar situation holds for a working woman with a family, as seen in the situation of Mrs. Sun in episode 5 of *Misaeng*. Even though she and her husband both hold jobs at a company and hence supposedly equally care for their daughter, she seems to carry more blame for the lack of parental interaction even compared to other male co-workers. These two plots demonstrate that by breaking out of the expected domestic domain, women become more actively involved in the workplace. However, at the same time, this situation places false criminal narrative on working women, one that labels them as incapable of their jobs as a caretaker and a worker. Even in the depiction of an unmarried female worker like Young-yi in *Misaeng: Incomplete Life*, there is an underlying accusation that being female makes her working life precarious from the onset to

\(^4\) *Missing*, 00:16:43
\(^5\) *Missing*, 00:34:30 – 00:34:50
meet the double standard of being a woman in a male pre-dominated workplace and society. While Young-yi was previously shunned by her father for being born a daughter, he now begs for financial assistance. Young-yi demonstrates resistance towards this double standard when she decides to take on the task of moving the fertilizer by truck despite her male senior comments that she is unsuitable.

_Missing_ showcases the female characters without criminal narratives through the detective work of Ji-sun and retrospective insight, forming a solidarity between women. The audience walks in the shoes of Han-mae by following the perspective of Ji-sun, tracing back Han-mae’s details to unexpected areas such as the massage parlor and countryside. Director Lee hints at this understanding between women by framing the story in Ji-sun’s steps rather than the police’s. Even though the male detectives also begin to understand, Ji-sun is almost always one step ahead of the police, such that the audience experiences Ji-sun’s search contrasted to the trailing investigation. Notably, Ji-sun’s shared experiences of motherhood are what allow her to pick up more insights into Han-mae’s character, as demonstrated by her discovery of Han-mae’s sewn quilt. Using the shared female experiences in storytelling prevents a hard criminal narrative from being pushed onto the female characters. The situation for the middle-class women is truly precarious, and is not misdirected by a societal assumption of these characters. Rather than a portrayal of Ji-sun's inability to care for her child, the audience sees that the strain and precarity of her life are in part due to the patriarchal society. While these characters may have been precariously holding their social position under the force of social and gender expectations, there are hints that reveal a mutual understanding between the women. However, the moment where

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7 _Misaeng_, “Episode 10”
Ji-sun dives after Han-mae shows that despite an understanding of the gendered situations, there cannot be a complete reconciliation of resulting grief and pain. This holds true for *Misaeng,* where the female characters can empathize with each other facing the male-dominated workplace. However, even when empathy between female characters exist, the characters cannot completely console Mrs. Sun in her decision to retire and her later discovery of how her future retirement is viewed as a stepping stone by her employees.8

*Missing* is a film that showcases the precarity of South Korean women through the director’s focus on a female character’s steps in understanding the actions and people’s misconceptions of another female character. The director opens a perspective on these characters in terms of their criminal narratives, motherhood, and work life. Although the characters are not able to fully reconcile over the movie, there are hints of solidarity between the female characters who are subject to similar gender expectations, specifically pertaining to their domestic roles. While the full berth of precarity is not discussed with this film, the contrast between the characters demonstrates the extent of precarity in the lives of women amongst different socioeconomic and citizenship backgrounds. These women, Ji-sun and Han-mae, are coming from very distinct backgrounds, and despite the movie initially focusing on Ji-sun’s initial prejudice against Han-mae, the film also reveals how society also “criminalizes” Ji-sun for being a working single mother. There is a prevailing sense of solidarity as these two women look past the forced criminal narratives to see that they are mirrors of one another—fighting to be independent despite the societal pressures to be a traditional woman.

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8 *Misaeng,* “Episode 17”, 47:16 – 48:49
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