

Curriculum Vitae.

Michael J. Williams
 Birthdate: July 6, 1947
 Citizenship: British. Permanent Resident, U.S.A.

Permanent address:
 3908 N. Charles St., Apt. 302
 Baltimore, MD 21218
 USA

Education

Ph. D., Princeton University 1973.
 B.A., Oxford University, Brasenose College, first class honours, Henry Wilde Prize in Philosophy, 1968.

Career

Krieger-Eisenhower Professor, The Johns Hopkins University, 2003-
 Professor, The Johns Hopkins University (2000--).
 Charles and Emma Morrison Professor of Humanities, Northwestern University, 1995-2000.
 Professor, Northwestern University, 1990-2000.
 Associate Professor, Northwestern University, 1985-90.
 Associate Professor, University of Maryland, 1981-4.
 Associate Professor, Yale University, 1979-81.
 Assistant Professor, Yale University, 1973-9.

Visiting Appointments

S. T. Lee Visiting Professorial Fellow, School of Advanced Study, University of London, January-June 2010.
 Distinguished Visiting Professor, American University in Cairo, March 2009.
 Cowling Visiting Philosopher, Carleton College, Fall 2001.
 Adjunct Professor, University of Chicago, Winter 1999.
 Visiting Fellow, Brasenose College, Oxford 1988-9.
 Visiting Scholar, University of St. Andrews, Spring 1987.
 Adjunct Professor, University of Illinois, Chicago, Fall 1985.
 M.I.T., 1984-5.
 Adjunct Professor, Wesleyan University, Fall 1984.
 University of Pennsylvania, 1983-4.
 University of Michigan, Spring 1983.
 M.I.T., Spring 1980.
 University of Chicago, 1969-70.

Grants and Awards

Fellow of American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007.
 Director (with Saul Morson), N.E.H. Seminar for College Teachers, “Views from Nowhere--Utopian Literature in Interdisciplinary Perspective,” 1996.
 Director, N.E.H. Seminar for College Teachers, “Realism and Scepticism,” 1992.
 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, 1988-9
 Morse Fellowship, Yale University 1976-7
 Charlotte Proctor Fellowship, Princeton University 1972-3
 University Fellowship, Princeton University 1970-2
 Senior Hulme Scholarship, Brasenose College 1968-9
 Open Scholarship, Brasenose College 1967-8
 Open Exhibition, Brasenose College 1966-7

Areas of Specialisation

Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy of Language, History of Modern Philosophy.

Books:

Problems of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology. With a New Afterword (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press 1999).

Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Blackwell, Oxford: Blackwell 1992; paperback edition, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press 1996). Selections reprinted in Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, *Epistemology: an Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell 2000).

Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology (Oxford/New Haven: Blackwell/ Yale University Press 1977). Selections reprinted in Cahn, Kitcher and Sher, *Reason at Work* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 1984).

Edited volume: *Scepticism*, International Research Library of Philosophy (London: Dartmouth Press 1993).

Articles and Chapters:

73. “Kaplan’s Way with Skepticism”. *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, vol. 12,3 (2022).

72. “No Shadow of a Doubt: Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty”. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 45 (1921). [Print publication Jan, 2022].

71. “Skeptical Arguments and Pyrrhonian Practice”, *Skepsis* 21 (Online, December 2020).
70. Knowledge without ‘Experience’” *International Journal of Skeptical Studies* (2020).
69. “The Indispensability of Knowledge”, *Philosophia* (Online: Dec. 30, 2019; Vol. 48, Issue 5, November 2020).
68. “Beyond *Unnatural Doubts*: Lessons from Wittgenstein” in *Context, Truth and Objectivity: Essays on Radical Contextualism*, edited by E. Marchesan and D. Zaperro (London: Routledge 2019).
67. “Perception as a Rational Capacity”, review article, *European Journal of Philosophy* (2018), 1-8.
66. “Illusions of Doubt: Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty” in *Skepticism: from Antiquity to the Present* edited by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).
65. ‘O Neopirronismo de Fogelin”, *Skepsis* 16 (2017). Translation of 18.
64. “Internalism, Reliabilism and Deontology,” in Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, eds., *Goldman and His Critics* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2016).
63. “Pragmatism, Sellars and Truth”, in *Wilfrid Sellars and his Legacy*, edited by James O’ Shea (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016).
62. “The Agrippan Problem, Then and Now”, *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, v. 5, n. 4 (2015).
61. “What’s So Special About Human Knowledge?” *Episteme* (2015).
60. “Knowledge in Practice,” in David Henderson and Terence Horgan, eds., *Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology* (Oxford University Press, 2015).
59. “Avoiding the Regress,” in Peter Klein and John Turri, eds. *Ad Infinitum* (Oxford University Press, 2014).
58. “Knowledge, Acriptionism and Defeasible Concepts,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* (2013).
57. “How Pragmatists Can be Local Expressivists,” in Huw Price, *Themes From Pragmatism* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
56. “Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two kinds of Knowledge, *International Journal of Skeptical Studies* (2012).

55. “External World Scepticism and the Structure of Epistemic Entitlement” in *The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding*, edited by Wai-hung Wong (Oxford University press 2012).
54. “Wright Against the Sceptics,” in *Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright*, edited by Anna Maria Coliva (Oxford University Press, 2012).
53. “Skeptizismus und Metaphysik: Wie Radikal ist der Pyrrhonismus?” in Markus Gabriel, ed., *Skeptizismus und Metaphysik* (Akademie Verlag 2012).
52. “Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (2011).
51. “Verantwortlichkeit und Verlässlichkeit,” in Stefan Tolksdorff, ed., *Conceptions of Knowledge* (De Gruyter 2011). [Translation of 42. 1 of 2 out of 23 English language papers selected for translation.]
50. “Skepticism. Evidence and Entitlement,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2011).
49. “Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies (July 2010).
48. “Descartes’s Transformation of the Skeptical Tradition,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Skepticism*, edited by Richard Bett (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
47. “Self-Profile,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*, edited by Matthias Steup (Oxford: Blackwell 2009).
46. “The Tortoise and the Serpent: Sellars on the Structure of Empirical Knowledge,” in *Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Reasons and Normativity*, edited by Willem de Vries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).
45. Introduction to Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton University Press, 2009).
44. “Hume’s Skepticism” in John Greco, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism* (New York: Oxford University Press 2008).
43. “Responsibility and Reliability,” Philosophical Papers, (March 2008).
42. “Naturalism, Realism and Pragmatism,” Philosophic Exchange (2007).
41. “Meaning, Truth and Normativity” in *Truth and Speech Acts*, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart (New York and London: Routledge 2007).

40. "Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Isn't Relativism," *Episteme* 4, n.1 (2007).
39. "Science and Sensibility: Sellars and McDowell on Perceptual Experience," *European Journal of Philosophy* 14 (2006).
38. "Realism: What's Left?" in *Truth and Realism*, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch (Oxford University Press, 2006).
37. "Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume (2003); also in *Sosa and his Critics*, ed. John Greco (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).
36. "Why Wittgenstein Isn't a Foundationalist" in *Understanding Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty'*, edited by Danielle Moyal-Sharrock and William Brenner (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
35. "There Is No Immediate Justification", *Epistemology: Central Issues*, edited by Matthias Steup (Blackwell, 2005).
34. "Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon?" in *The Externalist Challenge*, Richard Schantz ed., (Amsterdam: De Gruyter, 2005).
33. "The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project", *Hume Studies* 30, 2 (2004).
32. "Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses", *Erkenntnis* 61, n. 2-3 (November 2004).
31. "Wittgenstein on Truth and Certainty" in Bernhard Weiss, ed., *The Permanent Significance of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
30. "The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Scepticism" in *Essays Presented to Robert Fogelin*, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
29. "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Idealism" in Denis McManus ed., *Wittgenstein and Scepticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
- "Meaning, Context and Truth", *Philosophical Studies* (2004).
28. "Skepticism and the Context of Philosophy," *Philosophical Issues* 14 (2004).
German version: "Skeptizismus und der Kontext der Philosophie", *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 51 (2003).
27. "Rorty on Philosophy, Knowledge and Truth," in *Reading Rorty*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).
26. "Knowledge, Reasons and Causes: Sellars and Scepticism" in *Scepticism and Interpretation* . ed. James Conant and Andrea Kern (Amsterdam: Elsevier 2002).

“Fatal Attraction: McDowell’s Defence of Empiricism” in Hungarian translation in a collection of Essays on McDowell’s *Mind and World*, edited by Janos Boros (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002).

25. “Nozick on Knowledge and Scepticism” in David Schmitz, ed. *Reading Nozick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).

24. “On Some Critics of Deflationism,” in *Essays on Truth*, ed. Richard Schantz (De Gruyter, 2002).

23. “Is Wittgenstein a Foundationalist?” *Proceedings of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society* (2001).

22. “Fogelin on Contextualism,” *Nous*, supplementary volume (2001). In Spanish translation as “Es enunciable el contextualismo? Una respuesta a Robert Fogelin,” *Teorema* XIX/3, 2000, pp. 81-6.

21. “Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards,” *Philosophical Studies* (2000); also in German translation in *New Directions in Epistemology*, ed. Thomas Grundmann (Mentis: 2001).

“Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature,” in R. Brandom, ed. *Rorty and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell 2000).

20. “Meaning and Deflationary Truth,” *Journal of Philosophy* 96, no. 11 (November 1999), pp. 545-564. Reprinted in *Deflationary Truth*, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J.C. Beall (Chicago and Lasalle: Open Court 2005).

19. “Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (Sept. 1999).

18. “Fogelin’s Neo-Pyrrhonism,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* (1999).

17. “Scepticism” (lead essay, 15, 000 words) in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., *Blackwell Guide to Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell 1999).

16. “Bilgrami on Belief and Meaning: Is Fregean Externalism Possible?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1998).

“Still Unnatural: a Reply to Rorty and Vogel,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* (1997).

15. “Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* v. 56, n. 2 (1996).

14. “Exorcism and Enchantment,” critical study of John McDowell’s *Mind and World*, *Philosophical Quarterly* (1996).

13. "The Unreality of Knowledge," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, special supplementary volume, ed. Kai Nielsen (1993).
12. "Realism and Scepticism," in *Reality, Representation and Projection*, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1993). Reprinted in Revue Roumaine de Philosophie (Tome 39, nos. 3-4, 1995). Reprinted in German translation as "Realismus und Skeptizismus" in Th. Grundmann and K. Stueber, *Philosophie der Skepsis* (Paderborn, Munchen, Wien, Zurich: UTB fur Wissenschaft 1996).
11. "Wissen als Gegenstand der Theorie" in *Realismus und Antirealismus*, ed. Wolfgang Kohler (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1992).
10. "Scepticism and Charity" Ratio (1988).
9. "Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism," Mind (1988).
8. "Scepticism without Theory," Review of Metaphysics (1988).
7. "The Elimination of Metaphysics" in G. MacDonald and C. Wright, *Fact, Science and Morality* (Blackwell: Oxford 1987).
6. "Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt" in A.O. Rorty ed., *Essays on Descartes' "Meditations"* (University of California Press: Berkeley 1986). Reprinted in *Oxford Readings in Philosophy : Descartes*, John Cottingham, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1998).
5. "Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?" Philosophical Topics (1986).
4. "Hume's Criterion of Significance" Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1985).
3. "Liberalism and Two Conceptions of the State" in D. MacLean and C. Mills, *Liberalism Reconsidered* (Rowman and Littlefield: Totowa 1983).
2. "Coherence, Justification and Truth" Review of Metaphysics (1980).
1. "Inference, Justification and the Analysis of Knowledge" Journal of Philosophy (1978).

Encyclopaedia Entries etc:

Introduction to selections from J.L. Austin, in *Classics of Western Philosophy*, ed. Steven Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett 2003).

"Richard Rorty," in *The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*, ed. David Sosa and Al Martinich (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

"Doubt," *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (1998).

“Paul Feyerabend,” *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (1998).

“Truth: Alternate Theories,” *MacMillan Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (1998).

"Logical Constructions," *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Robert Audi, (Cambridge University Press: 1996).

"Brand Blanshard," "Richard Rorty," Death of Epistemology," *Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Blackwell: Oxford 1993).

Reviews:

Marian David, *Truth*, Mind (1996).

Crispin Wright, *Truth and Objectivity*, Philosophical Review (1995).

Thomas Baldwin, *G.E. Moore*, Philosophical Quarterly (1992).

W. V. Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, Journal of Philosophy (1991).

Anthony Flew, *David Hume, Philosopher of Moral Science*, Philosophical Review (1990).

Peter Urbach, *Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science*, Philosophical Quarterly (1990).

Marie McGinn, *Sense and Certainty*, Philosophical Quarterly (1990).

Michael Levine, *Hume and the Problem of Miracles*, Times Literary Supplement (1989).

Robert Fogelin, *Hume's Skepticism in the "Treatise of Human Nature"*, Philosophical Review (1988).

Barry Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, Teaching Philosophy (1987).

George Romanos, *Quine and Analytic Philosophy*, Philosophical Review (1987).

John Watkins, *Science and Scepticism* Philosophy of Science (1986).

P.F. Strawson, *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties*, Philosophical Quarterly (1986).

Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Journal of Philosophy (1984).

Barry Stroud, *Hume*, Philosophical Review (1978).

Frederick Will, *Induction and Justification*, Philosophical Review (1978).

Nicholas Capaldi, *David Hume: the Newtonian Philosopher*, Philosophical Review (1977).

D.C. Stove, *Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism*, Philosophical Review (1975).

Invited Lectures and Seminars

“Pragmatism”, NYU Mind and Language Seminar (Topic: Metaphilosophy), April 2022.

“Questions About Disjunctivism”, Research Workshop on Disjunctivism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind, University of Porto, July 2022.

“Moore’s Mistake”, Third Conference on “Hinge Epistemology”, UNAM, Lisbon, June 2022.

“How Not to Read *On Certainty*,” NOVA School of Social Science and Humanities, Lisbon, July 2019.

“How Anti-Skepticism Lost Its Way”, University of Porto, December 2018; revised version, Charles McCracken Distinguished Lecture, Michigan State University, February 2019.

“Avoiding Metaphysical Dissatisfaction”, Conference on Barry Stroud’s Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, University of Leipzig, December 2017.

“Hinges as Knowledge”, Conference on Hinge Epistemology, UC Irvine, September 2017; revised version, Epistemology Conference, College de France, September 2017.
 “Illusions of Doubt, Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty”, Paris (Sorbonne), June 2017.

“Pragmatism, Naturalism and the Task of Philosophy”, University of Bonn, June 2017.

“Austin’s Way with Epistemology: Comments on Mark Kaplan’s ‘Austin’s Way with Skepticism’”, APA (Pacific) April 2017.

Comments on *Ideas, Evidence and Method: Hume’s Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge & Causation* by Graciela de Pierris, APA (Central), March 2017.

“Illusions of Doubt, Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty”, Conference-Workshop on Skepticism as Philosophical Experience, Franke Institute for the Humanities, University of Chicago, January 2017; revised version, Keynote Lecture, Graduate Student Conference, University College Dublin, May 21-017.

“Nothing to Worry About: Wittgensteinian Reflections on Cartesian Skepticism”, workshop on Duncan Pritchard’s *Epistemic Angst*, Sorbonne (Paris), January 2017.

“Davidson’s Pragmatism”, Keynote Address: Conference “Is There Such a Thing as Language?” University of South Florida, December 2016.

“Laws and Rules”, Conference-Workshop on Jaroslav Peregrin’s *Why Rules Matter*, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, November 2016.

“Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Skepticism: How Not to Read On Certainty”, University of Vienna, November 2016 and Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), December 2016.

Invited Participant, Closed Workshop on Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in B, (Jointly organized by the Philosophy Departments, University of Chicago and the University of Berlin-Potsdam; Berlin, June 2015.

“The Skeptic’s Way”, Conference on ataraxia in Ancient Philosophy, Assos (Turkey), June 2015.

“Knowledge in Practice”, NYU Mind and Language Seminar, March 2015.

“Relativism, Skepticism and the Limits of Argument,” invited address, British Wittgenstein Society meeting, University of Edinburgh, June 2014.

“Relativism, Skepticism and the Limits of Argument: Lessons from Wittgenstein,” Conference on Wittgenstein’s Contemporary Relevance, American University, Beirut, May 2014.

“Pragmatism, Sellars and Truth,” Kant-Sellars Workshop, University of Chicago, April 2014.

“What’s So Special About Human Knowledge?” Episteme 10th Anniversary Conference, San Juan, Costa Rica, January 2014.

Seminar: “The Originality of Descartes,” CNRS-Lyon, December 2013

“Austin and the Illusions of Epistemology,” Conference on Skepticism and Ordinary Language, Sorbonne, Paris December 2013.

Seminar: “What’s the Use of Knowledge?” Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, December 2013.

“Relativism, Skepticism and the Limits of Argument,” Conference on Doubt and Ignorance, Paris Arts et Lettres, December 2013.

“Knowledge for Inferentialists” Conference on Inferentialism in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, November 2013.

“Questions about Infitism,” Workshop on Infitism and the Regress Problem, Vanderbilt University, October 2013.

“What’s the Use of ‘Knowledge’?” Invited Paper for Symposium, World Congress of Philosophy, Athens July 2013.

“What’s the Use of ‘Knowledge’?” Northern Institute of Philosophy (university of Aberdeen), July 2013.

“What’s the Use of ‘Knowledge’?” Workshop on recent work by Michael Williams and Mini-Conference on Pragmatism and Epistemology, University of Edinburgh, June 2013.

“A Tincture of Pyrrhonism,” Conference on Neo-Pyrrhonism, Curitiba, Brazil, May 2013.

“Rorty’s Skeptical Turn,” Simposio Rorty, Buenos Aires, May 2013.

“Knowledge in Practice,” University of Chicago, April 2013.

“How Pragmatists Can Be Local Expressivists,” Workshop-Conference. “Kantian Readings of Sellars/Sellarsian Readings of Kant,” Berlin-Potsdam, November 2012.

“Meaning, Truth and Representation,” Sellars Centenary Conference, University College, Dublin, June 2012.

“Knowledge in Practice,” Cambridge Pragmatism Workshop, June 2012; Conference on Contemporary Pragmatism, University of Zurich, June 2012; 8; First European Pragmatism Conference, Rome, September 2012; Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge, Cambridge, November 2012

“Knowledge as a Deontic Concept,” Workshop on Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Ancient and Contemporary Philosophy, Notre Dame, May 2012.

“A Pragmatic Approach to Knowledge,” SADAF, Buenos Aires, December 2011.

Pragmatic Background.”

Lecture 1: “The

Reliabilism and the Pyrrhonian Problematic.”

Lecture 2: “Internalism,

Structure of the Space of Reasons.”

Lecture 3: “The Deontic

“Responsibility, Reliability and the Ethics of Belief,” Northwestern, November 2011.

“The Social Structure of the Space of Reasons,” Conference on Social Epistemology, Technische Universitaat, Berlin, September 2011.

“Hume and Sellars on Causal Modality,” Conference: Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism 3, University of Sydney, Australia, June 2011.

“Skepticism and the Space of Reasons,” Conference: “Scepticisme en Pratique, Sorbonne, Paris May 2011.

“A Pragmatic Approach to Knowledge,” two lectures at the University of Warsaw, May 2011.

“Meaning, Use and Normativity,” Conference on Meaning and Normativity, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, May 2011.

“The Deontic Structure of the Space of Reasons”; “Meaning Use and Normativity,” University of Bonn, May 2011.

“Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” University of Frankfurt May 2011.

“Looking Back on *The Claim of Reason*” Conference on Stanley Cavell, Johns Hopkins, April 2011.

“A Pragmatic Approach to Knowledge,” Keynote Address, George Washington University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April 2011.

“Skepticism and the Deontic Structure of the Space of Reasons,” Keynote Address, Northern Illinois University Graduate Student Conference, December 2010.

“Skepticism and the Deontic Structure of the Space of Reasons,” Chambers Epistemology Conference, University of Nebraska, October 2010.

“Skepticism and the Deontic Structure of the Space of Reasons,” Conference on Defesibility in Epistemology, Ethics and Law, University of Frankfurt, September 2010.

“Skepticism Ancient and Modern,” S. T. Lee Lecture, School of Advanced Study (London), June 2010.

“The Expressive Function of Truth,” Conference on Pragmatism and Expressivism, Institute for Philosophy (London), May 2010.

“Scepticism and the Space of Reasons,” Dean’s Seminar, School of Advanced Study (London), April 2010.

“Rorty, Davidson, Pragmatism,” invited paper, Conference on Pragmatism, University of Zurich, April 2010.

“Some Remarks on Horwich on Truth and Meaning,” invited paper, Workshop on Paul Horwich’s Theory of Meaning, University of Zurich, March 2010

“Pragmatism, Minimalism, Expressivism” and “Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” two lectures at the University of Szczecin, Poland, November 2009.

“An Uncertain Skeptic: Richard Rorty and Philosophy as Epistemology,” Conference on Richard Rorty and the Mirror of Nature, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, November 2009.

“What is Philosophical Skepticism?,” “Austin and the Illusions of Epistemology” and “Reconciling Responsibility with Reliability”: three seminars at UAM, Mexico City, September 2009.

“Inferentialism and Ontology,” Conference on Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism, University of Sydney, Australia, July 2009.

“Richard Rorty,” Blackheath Symposium, Blackheath NSW, Australia, July 2009.

“Dreamers, Drunkards and Doppelgangers: the Originality of Descartes’s Skepticism,” Australian Association for Philosophy, Melbourne, July 2009.

“Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” invited address College de France, Paris, June 2009.

“Inferentialism and Ontology,” Conference on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, Paris may 2009.

“Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” (invited main speaker) Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 2009.

“Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” American University in Cairo, March 2009.

“Demons, Drunkards and Doppelgangers: Descartes and Ancient Skepticism,” American University in Cairo, March 2009.

“Looking Back on *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*,” Memorial Symposium on the Philosophy of Richard Rorty, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, December 2008.

“Demons, Drunkards and Doppelgangers: Descartes and Ancient Skepticism,” University of Basel, October 2009.

“Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism,” Conference, Towards the Centre of Pragmatism, University of Zurich, October 2008.

“Descartes’s Transformation of the Skeptical Tradition,” Conference on Pyrrhonism, Bibiloteca Nacional. Buenos Aires, August 2008

“Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement,” conference on Skepticism, University of Edinburgh, May 2008.

“The Long Goodbye: Rorty on the Rise and Fall of Analytic Philosophy,” Memorial Symposium on the Philosophy of Richard Rorty, University of Pecs, Hungary, May 2008.

“Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism,” conference on contemporary pragmatism, University of Tilburg, Netherlands, May 2008.

“The Tortoise and the Serpent: Sellars on the Structure of Empirical Knowledge,” lecture and seminar, Union College, April 2008.

“Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism,” conference on Naturalism and Normativity, University College, Dublin, March 2008.

“Two Forms of Skepticism,” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2008

Invited Speaker, Memorial Symposium for Richard Rorty, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March 2008.

“Pragmatism, Minimalism and Expressivism,” University of Chicago, February 2008.

“Skepticism without Epistemology,” Zeno Lecture, University of Utrecht, January 2008.

Workshop on Pragmatism and Metaphysics, University of Utrecht, January 2008.

“Skepticism without Epistemology,” conference on Skepticism and Metaphysics, Heidelberg, January 2008.

“Two Challenges for Pragmatism,” Lecture and Seminar in Distinguished Visitor series, Haverford College, December 2007.

“Two Challenges for Pragmatism,” Birkbeck College, University of London, November 2007.

“Two Challenges for Pragmatism,” Keynote Address, Scots Philosophical Club Annual Meeting, Edinburgh, November 2007.

Research Seminar on Basic Knowledge, Arche Institute, University of St. Andrews, November 2007.

“Responsibility and Reliability,” Basic Knowledge Workshop, University of St. Andrews, November 2007.

Invited Speaker, Memorial Symposium: Richard Rorty at Princeton. Princeton, September 2007.

“Four Challenges for Pragmatism,” Conference on Pragmatism, Expressivism and Minimalism.” Sydney, Australia, August 2007. (Unable to attend, owing to illness.)

“Responsibility, Reliability and Epistemic Norms” Conference on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer, Porto Alegre, Brazil, June 2007.

“Curious Researches: Reflections on Skepticism and Its History,” public lecture as subject of the Ohio University Forum. Also three seminars on my current research. May 2007.

“Sellars’s Inferentialism in the Context of his Philosophical Project,” School of Inferentialism, Prague CZ, April 2007.

“Responsibility and Reliability,” Invited Symposium, “Expanding Epistemology,” APA Pacific Division, April 2007; University of Hradec Kralove, CZ, May 2007.

“Contextualism and Relativism”; “Roots of Skepticism”: public lecture and seminar given at the Center for Philosophic Exchange, SUNY Brockport, October 2006.

“The Tortoise and the Serpent: Sellars on Empirical Knowledge”, Conference on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Sellars’s *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, University College, London. June 2006. Also given at conference on Sellars, University of Aix-en-Provence, June 2006.

“Austin’s Contextualist Epistemology,” conference on history of analytic philosophy, University of Manchester June 2006.

“Setting a Bad Example,” conference on Paul Horwich’s philosophy of language, Pecs, Hungary, May 2006.

“Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Isn’t Relativism,” Symposium: Epistemic Relativism, APA (Central), April 2006.

“Why Wittgenstein Isn’t a Foundationalist”, Conference on Wittgenstein, University of Aarhus, Denmark, June 2005.

“Science and Sensibility”, Conference on McDowell between Hegel and Wittgenstein, University of Warwick, UK, June 2005.

“Naturalism and Empiricism: Sellars and Quine”, conference on Naturalism, Rutgers (Camden) School of Law, May 2005.

“Doing Without Basic Beliefs” UNC Chapel Hill, January 2005.

“Realism: What’s Left?” conference on Realism, University of St. Andrews, UK, June 2004.

Kokonas Symposium: Scepticism. Colgate University, April 2004.

“Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon?”, invited symposium on Hilary Kornblith’s *Knowledge and its Place in Nature*. APA Pacific Division, March 2004.

“Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses”, Greensboro Colloquium 2004: Epistemology. UNC Greensboro, March 2004.

“Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy”, Conference on Contextualism in Epistemology, University of Mainz, September 2003; Columbia University, November 2003; Conference on Modalism and Mentalism, Denmark, January 2004; University of Indiana, February 2004.

“Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology”, Invited Address, Joint Session, Mind Association and Aristotelian Society, Belfast NI, July 2003.

“Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism”, Conference on Contemporary Epistemology, University of Amsterdam, June 2003.

“Charles Travis’s ‘Unshadowed Thought’”, invited symposium on “Unshadowed Thought” by Charles Travis, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division meetings, March 2003.

“Truth, Facts and Certainty”, University of Chicago Wittgenstein Workshop, January 2003.

“Wittgenstein and Relativism”, Conference on Mind and Society, University of Manchester, England, June 2002.

“Truth and Meaning; Paul Horwich versus Donald Davidson”, invited symposium on Truth, with American Philosophical Association, Western Division meetings, April 2002.

“Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism”, Conference on Mind, Knowledge and Scepticism, Georgetown University, April 2002.

“Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity,” Princeton University April 2002.

“Truth, Facts and Certainty”, New School University, March 2002.

Lone Star Tour 2002: “Truth, Facts and Certainty”, University of Houston and Texas A and M; “Sellars and Scepticism”, Rice University and University of Texas, Austin. All March 2002.

Workshop on Problems of Knowledge, Carleton College/St. Olaf College, November 2001. (As Cowling Visiting Philosopher, Carleton College 2001.)

“Truth, Facts and Certainty,” conference on Robert Fogelin and Pyrrhonism, sponsored by Dartmouth University, October 2001.

“Curious Researches: Reflections on Scepticism Ancient and Modern,” Carleton College, November 2001. (As Cowling Visiting Philosopher.)

“Sosa, Sellars and Circularity,” Conference on Scepticism, XIX Simposio Internacional de Filosofia, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas, Mexico City, August 2001.

“Is Wittgenstein a Foundationalist?” Fiftieth Anniversary Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, August 2001.

“Truth, Facts and Certainty,” conference on the Legacy of Wittgenstein, Wales July 2001;

“The Problem of Method and the Future of Epistemology,” invited address, British Society for the Philosophy of Science University of York, U.K., July 2001.

Invited participant, conference on Hegel and Analytic Philosophy, University of Venice, May 2001.

“Rorty, Irony and Scepticism,” conference on the Philosophy of Richard Rorty, University of Pecs, Hungary, May 2001.

Invited participant, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 2001.

Workshop on *Problems of Knowledge*. University of Leipzig, January 2001.

Workshop on *Problems of Knowledge*. University of Berlin-Potsdam, January 2001.

“Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism”, Free University, Berlin; University of Leipzig, January 2001.

“Knowledge, Reasons and Causes: Sellars and Scepticism,” conference on “Scepticism and Interpretation,” University of Amsterdam, 2000.

“Pragmatism and Objectivity: Robert Brandom on Meaning and Representation,” conference on Brandom’s “Making It Explicit,” University of Pecs, Hungary, 2000.

“Naturalism, Realism and Pragmatism” plenary address, conference on “The Nature of Nature,” Baylor University, 2000.

“Scepticism in Practice,” Invited Symposium, APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2000.

“Alvin Goldman’s Social Epistemology,” Author Meets Critics, APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2000.

“Scepticism in Practice,” Vanderbilt University (October 1999).

Invited discussant, conference on Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, UNC School of Law/National Humanities Center, October 1999.

“Knowledge, Reasons and Causes: Sellars and Scepticism,” Conference on Michael Williams’s *Unnatural Doubts*, Janus Pannonius University, Pecs, Hungary, May 1999.

“Epistemic Entitlement: Reply to Dretske,” Rutgers Epistemology Conference, April 1999.

“Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards” (new version), Oberlin Colloquium, April 1999.

“Scepticism and Epistemic Standards,” Conference on New Directions in Epistemology, University College, London, March 1999

“The Transcendental Role of Receptivity,” University of Pennsylvania; King’s College, London, March 1999

“How Not To Be a Contextualist,” Johns Hopkins University, February 1999.

“Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards,” (long version). Conference on New Directions in Philosophy, University of Tuebingen, Germany, January 1999.

“Putnam Against the Deflationists,” Conference on the Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, Karlovy Vary, Czech Republic, September 1998.

“Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards,” invited symposium paper, World Congress of Philosophy, Boston MA, August 1998.

“Is Contextualism Statable?, 11th Conference of SOFIA (Sociedad Filosofica Iberoamericana), Skepticism, Externalism, Contextualism, Oviedo, Spain, June 1998.

“Fatal Attraction: McDowell’s Defence of Empiricism,” Conference on Neo-Kantianism and Analytic Philosophy: McDowell’s *Mind and World*, Pecs, Hungary, May 1998.

“Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Cartesian,” two seminars at U.C. Berkeley, March 1998.

“Theories of Meaning and Deflationary Truth,” Irish Philosophical Club Annual Meeting, Ballymascanlon, Republic of Ireland, February 1998

“Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature,” University of Reading, January 1998; University College, Dublin, February 1998.

“Remarks on Brandom on Objectivity,” conference on Robert Brandom’s *Making it Explicit*, University of Virginia, November 1997.

“Davidson and Deflationary Truth,” Washington University, St. Louis, October 1997.

“What’s so Special about Self-Knowledge?” Keynote Address, Philosophical Collaborations Conference, Southern Illinois University, April 1997

“Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature,” College of the Holy Cross, October 1996.

“The Very Idea of a Theory of Knowledge,” Morrison Professorship Inaugural Lecture, Northwestern University 1996; University College, London, 1996; Stirling University, 1996.

Conference, “Le Defi Sceptique,” CNRS, Paris: “L’Idee Meme d’une Theorie de la Connaissance,” 1996.

“Fogelin’s Neo-Pyrrhonism,” invited paper, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), 1995.

“Deflating Davidson,” Institut pour l’Histoire et la Philosophie de la Science (CNRS, Paris), 1995.

“Still Unnatural: Reply to Rorty and Vogel,” Symposium on Michael Williams’s *Unnatural Doubts*, American Philosophical Association (Central Division), 1995.

"Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically," mini-conference on scepticism, Northwestern 1992 (respondent: Barry Stroud, Berkeley); Johns Hopkins University, Tufts University 1993; University of Michigan 1994.

"The Unreality of Knowledge," Brown University, Illinois State University, 1991.

"Externalism and Epistemic Closure," University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1991.

"Knowledge as an Object of Theory," invited paper, American Philosophical Association Western Division meetings, 1991.

"Knowledge as an Object of Theory," Forum fur Philosophie Bad Homburg, December 1989; conference on epistemology, Rice University, March 1990; invited symposium paper, A.P.A. Western Division 1991.

"Pessimism in Epistemology" and "Scepticism and Epistemic Priority", University of York 1989.

"Examples and Paradigms: Scepticism and Ordinary Language," Conference on Philosophy and Modernism, Sheffield; Oxford University Ockham Society 1989.

"Scepticism, Externalism and Deductive Closure," Sheffield University, Birmingham University, Liverpool University, Oxford University Philosophical Society 1989.

"Coherence, Correspondence and the Possibility of Knowledge," conference on "Realism and Reason," University of St. Andrews 1988; Columbia University 1988

"Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism," Oxford University, Birkbeck College (University of London), the University of St. Andrews, Stirling University 1987

"The Insignificance of Scepticism," Invited lecture, A.P.A. Pacific Division 1985; University of Dundee 1987, Princeton University 1985

"Do We Need a Theory of Truth?" conference on "Realism," Northwestern University 1985; University of Pennsylvania, M.I.T. 1985

"Hume's Refutation of Pyrrhonism," Northwestern University 1984, University of California, Berkeley 1983, Brandeis University 1983

"Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt," Princeton University Classical Philosophy Colloquium, Boston University 1984; Virginia Commonwealth University 1983

"Wittgenstein," Symposium on "The End of Philosophy," A.P.A. Pacific Division 1983

Response to Davidson, conference on "Interpretation," University of Michigan 1983

"Realism and Scepticism," conference on "Realism and Epistemology," University of Michigan 1982; Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University 1982

Response to Lasch, conference on "The Future of Liberalism," Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland 1982

"Epistemology versus Philosophy of Science," Clark University 1982

"Hume's Critical Naturalism," Brandeis University 1981; University of Maryland 1979

"Coherence, Justification and Truth," M.I.T., Brown University, University of Vermont 1980

Response to Rorty, conference on "The Death of Epistemology," Simon Fraser University 1978

"Hume and the Notion of Body," Harvard University, University of Pennsylvania 1978

"Ideas and Meanings in Hume," University of Connecticut 1977

Commentator at A.P.A. colloquia 1975, 1978, 1982

University and Department Service (selected)

JHU: Dean's Advisory Committee on Budget and Strategic Planning; Chair, Philosophy Dept., July 2001- June 2013; Provost's Committee on the Future of the Ph. D., 2013; Chair, Committee on Leave Policy, 2011-12; Academic Council 2002-3; Graduate Advisor, Philosophy Dept. 2001-2; Colloquium Co-ordinator, Philosophy Dept, 2001-; Chair, Senior Appointments Committee, Philosophy Department 2001-2; Chair, ad hoc committee, Spring 2002; Tenure Policy Review Committee, 2002.

Northwestern: Graduate Advisor 1986-7; Committee on the Development of an Honors Program in Humanities 1986-7; General Faculty Committee 1986-8; Program Review (Classics) 1989-90; Philosophy Dept. Lecture Committee 1987-92; Committee on Appeals 1990-present (chair, 1992-); Departmental search committee, 1987, 1990; Slavic department search committee 1990; .MALS Steering Committee; Committee on the Center for the Humanities; Placement Officer 1991-3, 1997; Program Review (African Studies) 1993; three ad hoc committees on promotion/appointment. Committee on Tenure, 1996-9; Dean's Advisory Committee on External Appointments, 1999-2000.

Peer Review Responsibilities (selected)

A.P.A.: Programme Committee 1980.

American Philosophical Association, Standing Advisory Committee to the Programme Committee (subject area, Epistemology), 2002--.

Referee for Blackwell, University of California Press, Cambridge University Press, Cornell University Press, Hackett, Humanities Press, University of Minnesota Press, Oxford University Press, Penn. State Press, Princeton University Press, Routledge, SUNY Press, Yale University Press, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialogue, Hume Studies, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Mind, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Nous, Synthese.

Tenure and promotion reviews for various major institutions.

Evaluator (for U.S. accreditation) of proposed Ph.D. program in philosophy, Central European University, Budapest, 2001.

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