Gilman Hall 308

The Johns Hopkins Latin America in a Globalizing World works in progress seminar welcomes Maximiliano Vejares, Political Science (JHU), to present:

The Origins of State Authority: Evidence from Chile

This paper examines the conditions under which national states successfully centralize political authority. Contrary to “bellicist” theories where centralization occurs in response to the immediate threat of war, I argue that rulers opt for centralization when sudden price shocks in the world economy make regions highly valuable to the center. However, subnational outcomes depend on each region’s prior military, political, and natural endowments. I illustrate this argument by examining Chile, a country often considered a successful case of state building. After the sudden end of its incipient silver export economy and the appearance of new markets for grain (c. 1845-1860), the state attempted to boost fiscal revenues by streamlining tax collection and increasing wheat production. However, this came with a costly centralization project, as the central government did not have a permanent presence in the productive regions. By drawing on original data, I identify three outcomes. In cases where regions could militarily resist centralization, the outcome was negotiated, and local elites accepted centralization in exchange for public goods and political incorporation, which I refer to as modernizing cooperation. Where regions could provide a significant clientelistic base to improve the ruling coalition’s chances of political survival, the state strengthened patrimonial relationships, a type of patrimonial cooperation. Finally, where local leaders did not resist or offer a political deal to the center, the outcome was transformation, or modernizing conflict. Each outcome, in turn, had different effects on bureaucratic development.

“Please email Prof. Casey Lurtz ([email protected]) for a copy of the paper and the Zoom link.”

Latin American in a Globalizing World Seminar