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Deidre Cooper Owens, Queens College CUNY [pre-circulated paper]

Living as a Philosopher: Spinoza’s Aspirations

1. Living in the Light of our Knowledge: Spinoza on Fortitude (Sep 17)
2. Emotional Responses to Fiction: A Spinozist Analysis (Sep 20)
3. Philosophical Self-Transformation and Affective Loss (Sep 21)

Living in the Light of our Knowledge: Spinoza on Fortitude

To live as well as we can, Spinoza argues, we not only need to do our best to understand ourselves and the world we inhabit; we also need to put our understanding to work. This is what it is to possess fortitude.

This talk considers Spinoza’s analysis of this virtue and explores some of the traditions on which his account draws. I argue that he bequeaths us a pertinent though neglected set of questions (particularly relevant in an era of fake news) about the project of living in the light of our knowledge.

Emotional Responses to Fiction: A Spinozist Analysis

Within contemporary analytical philosophy there is a lively debate about the emotions that we feel for objects we know to be fictional. We know, for example, that Anna Karenina doesn’t exist; so why, or how, do we feel sad about her death? Spinoza, I suggest, stands at a helpful distance from these contemporary discussions. His conception of imagination can help us view our emotional responses to fiction in a different light, and reformulate the questions they pose.

Philosophical Self-Transformation and Affective Loss

It is not uncommon for early-modern philosophers to portray a perfectly philosophical way of life as a condition that approaches the divine. The philosopher becomes as like God as a human being can, and in doing so experiences unparalleled and unalloyed joy. Spinoza advocates a version of this view and defends it with impressive consistency. I shall argue, however, that his account suppresses a form of loss and sadness integral to his conception of a philosophical life. To elucidate the character of this loss I turn to some examples from recent fiction.

Colloquium with Ian Phillips (Princeton University)

What’s Wrong with Worldly Discrimination Theory?

Behavioural and neuroimaging data often indicate that a stimulus has been registered and processed by a subject’s brain. But when does such evidence allow us to infer that the subject themselves saw the stimulus? And when that they saw it consciously? According to Worldly Discrimination Theory both perception and perceptual consciousness are to be inferred whenever a subject exhibits a better-than-chance capacity to detect or discriminate a stimulus. Worldly Discrimination Theory finds little favor in the literature. It is commonly dismissed on the grounds that: (i) it implies systems as simple as photocells are conscious; (ii) it entirely leaves out the essential subjectivity of consciousness; (iii) it fails to take subjects’ reports seriously; (iv) it does not offer an exclusive measure of consciousness uncontaminated by unconscious influences; (v) it is inconsistent; and (vi) it cannot handle illusions. In this talk, I argue that, when properly understood, Worldly Discrimination Theory survives all these familiar objections, and remains a compelling operational approach to perceptual awareness.

Sponsored by Department of Philosophy

Colloquium with Ian Phillips (Princeton University)

Can Sight Be Blind? Untangling the Tale of Blindsight and Unconscious Vision

Blindsight is a neuropsychological condition in which residual visual capacity survives destruction of a corresponding region of primary visual cortex. No other phenomenon has had greater influence on contemporary thought about the relation between consciousness and perception. Blindsight is invoked to end arguments, close-down otherwise promising proposals, and refute heretofore conceptual truths. Above all blindsight is held by many to establish decisively that voluntary perceptual discrimination, and so subject-level perception, can occur outside awareness. On the basis of a more circumspect consideration of the neurophysiology, psychophysics and phenomenology of blindsight, I suggest a much more sober account. On this account, damage to primary visual cortex abolishes all but the most rudimentary capacities to register sharp spatio-temporal changes in luminance, i.e. salient ‘visual events’. But, crucially, such damage does not abolish consciousness. In other words, there is no compelling reason to think that blindsight involves unconscious perception. What is puzzling about blindsight is why subjects exhibit such conservative and unstable response criteria in detection tasks. I end by offering some speculative thoughts on this critical issue.

Sponsored by Psychological and Brain Science

Living as a Philosopher: Spinoza’s Aspirations

1. Living in the Light of our Knowledge: Spinoza on Fortitude (Sep 17)
2. Emotional Responses to Fiction: A Spinozist Analysis (Sep 20)
3. Philosophical Self-Transformation and Affective Loss (Sep 21)

Living in the Light of our Knowledge: Spinoza on Fortitude

To live as well as we can, Spinoza argues, we not only need to do our best to understand ourselves and the world we inhabit; we also need to put our understanding to work. This is what it is to possess fortitude.

This talk considers Spinoza’s analysis of this virtue and explores some of the traditions on which his account draws. I argue that he bequeaths us a pertinent though neglected set of questions (particularly relevant in an era of fake news) about the project of living in the light of our knowledge.

Emotional Responses to Fiction: A Spinozist Analysis

Within contemporary analytical philosophy there is a lively debate about the emotions that we feel for objects we know to be fictional. We know, for example, that Anna Karenina doesn’t exist; so why, or how, do we feel sad about her death? Spinoza, I suggest, stands at a helpful distance from these contemporary discussions. His conception of imagination can help us view our emotional responses to fiction in a different light, and reformulate the questions they pose.

Philosophical Self-Transformation and Affective Loss

It is not uncommon for early-modern philosophers to portray a perfectly philosophical way of life as a condition that approaches the divine. The philosopher becomes as like God as a human being can, and in doing so experiences unparalleled and unalloyed joy. Spinoza advocates a version of this view and defends it with impressive consistency. I shall argue, however, that his account suppresses a form of loss and sadness integral to his conception of a philosophical life. To elucidate the character of this loss I turn to some examples from recent fiction.